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INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM OF THE ANALYSIS OF TRUTH
This study i s  an exam ination o f the problem o f tru th  w ith in  the
co n tex t o f the "use" view o f meaning. In t h is  chapter w i l l  be o u tlin e d  
b r ie f ly  my reasons for th in k in g  th a t  such a study i s  d e s ir a b le . I  s h a l l
d isc u ss  two typ es o f  a n a ly s is  o f the problem, a " p rop osition a l"  th eory
and two "ordinary language" th e o r ie s ,  and argue b r ie f ly  th a t th ey  are not 
e n t ir e ly  adequate fo r  d e a lin g  w ith  a l l  a sp ec ts  o f  th e  problem o f tr u th .  
Concluding the chapter i s  an o u tlin e  o f th e  manner in  which th e  problem  
i s  to  be pursued in  the rem aining ch a p ters .
Throughout the e n t ir e  study two p r in c ip le s  w i l l  be taken as  
g iv e n - - ( l )  th a t th e  meaning o f a word i s  i t s  u s e , and (2 ) th a t p h ilo so p h ­
ic  problems are con cep tu al problem s. Chapters I I  through V thus c o n s t i ­
tu te  an e x e r c ise  in  a n a ly t ic  ph ilosophy as d e lim ited  by th ese  two p r in c i ­
p le s .  Both o f th e se  p r in c ip le s ,  however, a lthough tr e a te d  as a x io m a tic , 
are them selves in te r p r e te d . That i s ,  they  are not tr e a te d  as proved  
p ro p o s itio n s  whose proof i s  assumed a lon g  w ith  them, b u t, r a th e r , as sp e c ­
ify in g  a type o f  p h ilo so p h ic  approach th a t  i s  open to  more than one in t e r ­
p r e ta t io n , one o f  which i s  developed in  t h is  study.
The a n a ly s is  o f tr u th  g iven  in  th e l a s t  chapter i s  th e r e fo r e  th e  
r e s u lt  o f  a p h ilo so p h ic  e x e r c is e  th a t  has taken as i t s  lim it in g  p r in c i ­
p le s  th e s e  two v ie w s , one concerning th e  nature o f  word-meaning and one 
concerning the nature o f ph ilosophy i t s e l f .
1
2A P r o p o s it io n a l  Theory o f  T ruth
E x p o sitio n .
In  W it tg e n s te in 's  T r a e ta tu s  L o g ic  o -P h i lo s o p h ic u s ’*' s ta te m e n ts  are  
h e ld  t o  be u lt im a te ly  a n a ly z a b le  in t o  sim p le  s ta te m e n ts  th a t  correspon d  
t o  s im p le  f a c t s .  I f  th e  sim p le  f a c t s  are  a c t u a l ,  e x i s t e n t  f a c t s ,  th e n  th e  
sta tem en t i s  t r u e .  I f  th e y  are  m ere ly  l o g i c a l l y  p o s s ib l e  f a c t s ,  and are  
n o t a c t u a l ly  e x i s t e n t ,  th en  th e  s ta te m e n t i s  f a l s e .
The p o s s ib le  f a c t  co rresp o n d in g  to  a se n te n c e  c o n s t i t u t e s  th e  
meaning o f  th e  se n te n c e  and th e  a c t u a l  f a c t ,  i f  th e r e  i s  one, e s t a b l i s h e s  
i t s  t r u th .  The p o s s ib le  f a c t  i s  c a l l e d  a " p r o p o s it io n ,"  and th u s: propo­
s i t i o n  = m eaning o f  a se n te n c e  :  p o s s ib le  f a c t .  The a c t u a l  or e x i s t e n t  f a c t ,  
on th e  o th er hand, cannot be s a id  t o  be th e  tr u th  o f  th e  p r o p o s it io n  b u t ,  
r a th e r ,  th e  correspon d en ce o f  an a c tu a l  f a c t  w ith  a p o s s ib le  one e s t a b ­
l i s h e s  th a t  th e  p r o p o s it io n  i s  tr u e .
What has m eaning i s  what i t  i s  p o s s ib le  (p e r m is s ib le )  t o  s a y ,  
th a t  i s ,  what i s  c o r r e la te d  w ith  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  o f  f a c t s .  Whether a s e n ­
te n c e  e x p r e s s e s  p o s s ib le  f a c t s  must be d eterm in ed  by w hether i t  may be 
a s s e r te d  t o  be tr u e  or f a l s e .  That som eth in g  may be tr u e  or f a l s e  i s  e s ­
s e n t i a l  t o  i t s  meaning som eth in g .
The word "Satz" in  th e  E n g lis h  t r a n s la t io n  o f  th e  T r a e ta tu s  i s  
t r a n s la t e d  " p r o p o s it io n ,"  th e  l o g i c a l  term , b u t i t  a l s o  may be t r a n s la t e d  
" se n te n c e ,"  th e  gram m atical term . W it tg e n s te in  i s  n o t u s in g  th e  term  
am b igu ou sly , though , s in c e  he c o n s id e r s  th e  se n te n c e  t o  be " e s s e n t i a l ly ,"  
i . e . ,  l o g i c a l l y ,  r e d u c ib le  t o  th e  p r o p o s it io n .
^Ludwig W it tg e n s te in , T r a e ta tu s  L o g ic o -P h ilo so p h ic u s  (London: 
R ou tled ge  and Kegan P a u l, 1 9 2 2 ).
3The tr u th -v a lu e s  o f  p r o p o s it io n s  are determ ined by th e  tr u th -  
v a lu e s  o f  t h e ir  c o n s t itu e n t  e lem en tary  p r o p o s it io n s . The sen se  or meaning 
o f  a l l  p r o p o s it io n s  depends upon th e  se n se  o f  e lem entary  p r o p o s it io n s .
S o , th e  T raeta tu s b eg in s  w ith  a d is c u s s io n  o f  th e  r e la t io n s h ip  betw een  
names and th in g s ,  s in c e  i t  h o ld s th e  m eanings o f  names to  be e lem en ts o f  
th e  sen se  o f  e lem en tary  p r o p o s it io n s .
Names are view ed as having th in g s  (" o b je c t s ” ) fo r  t h e ir  m eanings, 
and are combined to g e th e r  in  sen ten ces  in  such a way as to  r e f l e c t  or p ro ­
j e c t  th e  com bination  o f  " ob jects"  in to  " f a c t s , ” The "object"  i s  th e  
meaning o f  th e  name, and th e " fact"  i s  th e  sen se o f  th e  p r o p o s it io n .  
("Meaning" i s  l im ite d  in  th e  T ra eta tu s to  a s p e c ia l  r e la t io n  betw een name 
and o b je c t ,  th e  r e la t io n  o f  naming. To speak o f  th e  "meaning” o f  se n te n c e s  
r e q u ir e s  another word, " sen se ."  T his removes th e  am bigu ity  o f  "m eaning,” 
w hich i s  q u ite  d i f f e r e n t  fo r  a word and a se n te n c e , and t h i s  d if f e r e n c e  i s  
in d ic a te d  by th e use o f  th e  two te r m s .)
The sen se  o f  a sen ten ce  i s  sa id  to  show i t s e l f  in  th e se n te n c e .
The meaning o f  a name can be shown by p u tt in g  i t  in  se n te n c e s  w hich , how­
e v e r , cannot be th em selves  understood  u n t i l  th e  name, as w e l l  as each  o f  
th e  o ther c o n s t itu e n t  names, i s  known to  mean a p a r t ic u la r  o b je c t .  To 
know th a t  a p r o p o s it io n  has s e n se , th e n , depends upon knowing th a t  p a r t i c ­
u la r  o b je c ts  are  meanings o f  i t s  p a r t ic u la r  names.
I f  we had b e fo re  us an u n a n a ly za b le , p r im it iv e ,  e lem entary  p rop ­
o s i t i o n ,  i t s  e lem en ts would be names. I f  we a ls o  had b e fo r e  us th e f a c t  
p ic tu r e d  by th e  p r o p o s it io n , we would be a b le  to  c o r r e la te  i t s  o b je c ts  
w ith  th e names composing th e p r o p o s it io n . S in ce  th e  sen ten ce  r e f l e c t s  
th e p a r t ic u la r  f a c t ,  i t  has a s tr u c tu r e  in  common w ith  i t .  Now, every  
o b je c t  in  th e  f a c t  has a l o g i c a l  form th a t  i s  in te r n a l  to  i t  and th a t
d eterm ines a l l  th e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  o f  i t s  com bination  in to  f a c t s .  The ob ­
j e c t ,  however, determ ines on ly  th e  "form11 o f th e  f a c t s  i t  e n te r s  in to .  
That i s ,  i t  i t s e l f  on ly  determ ines which f a c t s  i t  may en ter  in t o ,  not  
th o se  in to  which i t  a c t u a l ly  does e n te r .
The names o f  o b je c ts  a cco r d in g ly  can n ot, through t h e ir  sy n ta c ­
t i c a l  l im it a t io n s ,  t e l l  an yth in g  about w hich elem entary  p r o p o s it io n s  are  
in  f a c t  tru e; th ey  can t e l l  on ly  which elem entary p r o p o s it io n s  are p o s s i ­
b le .  These p o s s i b i l i t i e s  o f  syn tax  are  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  o f f a c t s .  The 
tr u th  o f  p r o p o s it io n s  l i e s  in  th e  e x is t e n c e  o f  f a c t s ,  w h ile  th e  form o f  
f a c t s ,  th e ir  l o g i c a l  s tr u c tu r e , c o n s t i t u t e s  m erely th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  
f a c t s .
In t h i s  way, t h i s  p r o p o s it io n a l th eo ry  a v o id s sa y in g  th a t  a s e n ­
te n c e  has meaning in  v ir tu e  o f  an a c tu a l s t a t e  o f  a f f a i r s  w ith  which i t  
i s  c o r r e la te d , i . e . ,  th a t  to  mean som ething i t  must be tr u e . The sen se  
o f  a sen ten ce  i s  on ly  th e  p o s s ib le  f a c t  i t  "m irrors" (or "shows fo r th " ) .
P r o p o s it io n s  have a common fo rm --th e  " gen era l form o f  p r o p o s it io n  
[P; N (I T ) ] ;  and a common m a te r ia l—elem en tary , u n analyzab le p r o p o s i­
t io n s .  Their meaning i s  th u s dependent upon th e  nature o f  th e  meaning o f  
elem entary p r o p o s it io n s  ( c o r r e la t io n  w ith  " fa c ts" )  and on th e  nature o f  
th e  meaning o f compound p r o p o s it io n s  (sh a r in g  th e  common lo g ica l/g ra m m a ti 
c a l  s tr u c tu r e  o f  compound p r o p o s it io n s ) .  T heir tr u th  depends upon t h e ir  
having a m e a n in g - - i .e . , b ein g  a p o s s ib le  f a c t ,  and th e r e  b e in g  an a c tu a l ,  
e x i s t e n t  f a c t  correspon d in g  to  i t .
C r it iq u e
This p r o p o s it io n a l th eo ry  con n ects  meaning and tr u th  through th e  
con cep t o f  a " p r o p o s it io n ,"  w hich may be d e fin e d  b o th  as ( l )  "the meaning
5o f  a se n te n c e ,"  and (2 )  " that -which i s  tru e  or f a l s e ."  The th eo ry  o f f e r s  
an ex p la n a tio n  o f  how th e se  two con cep ts are  e q u iv a le n t .
In t h i s  s e c t io n  w i l l  be d isc u sse d  very  b r i e f l y ,  f i r s t ,  how th e  
T raeta tu s concept o f  a p r o p o s it io n  as "the meaning o f  a sen ten ce"  would  
seem t o  be in com p atib le  w ith  a view o f  meaning as u se , and secon d , how th e  
T raeta tu s con cep t o f  a p r o p o s it io n  as " that which i s  tr u e  or f a ls e "  and 
th e r e la te d  correspondence typ e o f th eory  o f  tr u th  a l s o  would seem t o  be 
in com p atib le  w ith  a view  o f  meaning as u se .
The T ra eta tu s th eo ry  o f  meaning i s  in com p atib le  w ith  a use view  o f  
meaning in  a t  l e a s t  two fundam ental ways: ( l )  in  r e s p e c t  to  words as
names, and (2 )  in  r e s p e c t  to  sen ten ces  as sh a r in g  th e " gen era l form o f  
p r o p o s it io n ."
l )  S in ce  th e meanings o f  names are b a s ic  to  th e  sen se  o f  s e n te n c e s ,  
i t  may be asked what an example o f  a name would b e . S in ce  names as under­
stood  in  th e  T raeta tu s cannot be d e fin e d  or an alyzed  i t  i s  c le a r  th a t  few , 
i f  any, nouns o f  any n a tu r a l language would be names in  t h i s  s e n s e . "Name" 
may be understood  to  b e , in  W ittg e n s te in 's  term in o lo g y , a "form al co n cep t,"  
p ro p er ly  rep resen ted  by a v a r ia b le  th a t  may be s u b s t itu te d  fo r  by words 
th a t  are p r im it iv e  and whose meanings are o b je c ts  th a t  may be p o in ted  t o .  
That th e name i s  in d e f in a b le  and th a t  th e  o b je c t  may be p o in ted  to  are  th e  
c r i t e r ia  o f  both  the m ean in gfu ln ess o f  th e  name and th e  e x is te n c e  o f  the  
o b je c t .
In t h i s  view language i s  b a s ic a l ly  composed o f  names in  r e la t io n  
to  each o t h e r - - t h e o r e t i c a l ly ,  we may an a lyze ev ery th in g  we say  in to  e l e ­
mentary p r o p o s it io n s  composed o f  names in  p a r t ic u la r  l o g i c a l  s t r u c tu r e s .  
Whether or n ot such a n a ly ze s  are  p o s s ib le  in  p r a c t ic e ,  in  t h i s  th eo ry
l i n g u i s t i c  m eaning i s  view ed as dependent upon i t s  a n a ly z a b i l i t y  in to  
(" elem en tary" ) p r o p o s it io n s  made up o f  names o f  u n a n a ly z a b le , u lt im a te  
o b j e c t s .  Now, t h i s  s p e c i f i c i t y  o f meaning t h a t ,  through names, u n d e r lie s  
a l l  l i n g u i s t i c  m eaning, i s  in  c o n tr a s t  t o  th e  view o f  meaning as d e f in a b le  
th rou gh  "use."  The n o t io n  o f  meaning as u se  g iv e s  an a l t e r n a t iv e  view  o f  
th e  fo u n d a tio n  o f  m eaning. R ather than  depending upon a b a s is  o f  names 
th a t  c o r r e la te  w ith  u lt im a te  o b je c ts  o f  some s o r t ,  m eaning, in  th e  u se  
v ie w , depends upon a c t i v i t i e s  o f  use o f  w ords, on ly  one ty p e  o f  w hich are  
names or a n a ly z a b le  in to  names.
2 )  W ittg e n s te in  c la im s to  g iv e  th e  e s se n c e  o f  language in  th e  
T r a e ta tu s ; by h i s  own d e f in i t i o n  t h i s  i s  t o  g iv e  what i s  common to  a l l  
w ell-fo r m ed  e x p r e s s io n s  o f  la n g u a g e , and y e t  th ere  i s  no a llo w a n ce  w ith in  
such a th eory  fo r  common se n te n c e s  such as commands, fo r  in s ta n c e .  He 
c la im s to  have reduced  g e n e r a l p r o p o s it io n s  and th o se  o f  th e  form "A b e ­
l i e v e s  p , ” to  c o n c a te n a tio n s  o f  e lem en tary  p r o p o s it io n s ,  b u t j u s t  as im­
p o r ta n t are se n te n c e s  such a s  "Scram!" as w e ll  a s  w a rn in gs, sw earin g , 
e t c . ,  w hich cannot be so  a n a ly ze d . Having no way o f  e x p la in in g  th e  mean­
in g  o f  such s e n te n c e s ,  i t  becomes d o u b tfu l whether we are any lon g er  t a l k ­
in g  about language i t s e l f  a t  a l l .
Here a g a in , w hether or n ot i t  i s  p o s s ib le  in  p r a c t ic e  t o  reduce  
a l l  s e n te n c e s  t o  a " gen era l form o f  p r o p o s it io n ,"  in  t h i s  th eo ry  l i n g u i s ­
t i c  meaning i s  v iew ed  as " e s s e n t ia l ly "  o f  t h i s  form . T his view  o f  th e  
s tr u c tu r e  o f  s e n te n c e s  (and , h en ce , in  t h i s  th e o r y , o f  a l l  l i n g u i s t i c  mean­
in g )  i s  in  c o n tr a s t  a g a in  t o  a u se  ty p e  o f  view o f  m eaning. The a c t i v i t i e s  
o f  language se r v e  th e  fu n c t io n  in  a u se  ty p e  o f view  th a t  th e  n o t io n  o f  
s e n t e n t ia l  s tr u c tu r e  does in  th e  T ra eta tu s  th e o r y . R ather than  depending
7upon an e s s e n t i a l  form or s tr u c tu r e ,  s e n t e n t ia l  m eaning, in  a use v ie w , i s  
a fu n c t io n  o f  a c t i v i t i e s .
In  th e s e  w ays, in  r e s p e c t  to  c o n ten t and t o  form , th e  T r a e ta tu s 1 
trea tm en t o f  a " p ro p o sitio n "  a s  "the m eaning o f  a sen ten ce"  i s  incom pat­
ib le  w ith  a view  o f  meaning as u s e .
The th eo ry  o f  tr u th  o f  th e  T ra eta tu s  cannot be e n t ir e ly  s a t i s f a c ­
to r y  i f  th e  th eo ry  o f  meaning i s  n o t . By fo c u s in g  on th e  th eory  o f  tr u th  
now, how ever, i t  w i l l  be seen  t h a t ,  as a correspondence th e o r y , i t  i s  a ls o  
in co m p a tib le  w ith  a view  o f  meaning as u se .
The n o t io n  o f  a p r o p o s it io n  as " th a t w hich i s  tr u e  or f a ls e "  i s  
in te r p r e te d  in  th e  T ra eta tu s a s  a " p o s s ib le  f a c t ."  There i s  an o b v io u s ly  
im portant r e l a t io n  betw een  f a c t s  and t r u th ,  and t h i s  th eo ry  o f f e r s  an e x ­
p la n a t io n  o f  t h i s  r e la t io n  as correspon d en ce through  common " lo g ic a l  
s tr u c tu r e ."  Thus, tr u th  i s  view ed  as a r e la t io n  betw een  e n t i t i e s  o f  two 
c a t e g o r i e s - - l i n g u i s t i c  and m a te r ia l .  The r e l a t io n  i s  betw een two k in d s o f  
f a c t s  and i s  p o s s ib le  b ecau se th e  " stru ctu re"  o f  l i n g u i s t i c  f a c t s  can m ir­
ror th e  s tr u c tu r e  o f  a l l  o th er f a c t s ,  b o th  p o s s ib le  and a c t u a l .
( R u s s e l l ,  in  h is  v e r s io n  o f  th e  p r o p o s it io n a l  th e o r y , says th a t  
f a c t s  are n e ith e r  tru e  nor f a l s e ,  th ey  j u s t  a r e . Of c o u r se , l i n g u i s t i c  
f a c t s  a r e , t o o ,  but th e s e  f a c t s  are th e  r u le s  and u sa g es  o f  lan gu age , and 
th e  m eanings o f  th e  l i n g u i s t i c  f a c t s  th a t  are s e n te n c e s  are th e  p r o p o s i­
t io n s  whose l o g i c a l  s t r u c tu r e s  m irror o th er  f a c t s .  There are th in g s  th a t  
j u s t  a r e —f a c t s ,  and th e r e  are th in g s  th a t  are tr u e  or f a l s e  as w e l l - -  
p r o p o s it io n s . )
The n o t io n  o f  a " p ro p o sitio n "  a s  " th a t w hich i s  tru e  or f a ls e "  i s  
in te r p r e te d  in  th e  T ra eta tu s  a s  a " p o ss ib le  f a c t ,"  w hich , in  tu r n , i s
eq u ated  "with "the m eaning o f  a se n te n c e ."  Truth i s  th e  r e la t io n  betw een  
p o s s ib le  f a c t  and a c t u a l ,  e x i s t e n t  f a c t ,  or betw een  "words and th e w o rld ,"  
meaning and r e a l i t y .  T h is "correspondence" th eo ry  t r e a t s  t r u th  as a p red ­
ic a t e  o f  th e  meaning (" se n se " )  o f  a s e n te n c e . When a p r o p o s it io n  i s  
"true" th e r e  i s  a c o r r e la t io n  betw een i t  and an a c tu a l  f a c t .  Truth i s  a 
c o r r e la t io n  o f  meaning w ith  s t a t e s  o f  a f f a i r s  th a t  a re  ex tra -m ean in g .
The p h ilo s o p h ic  co n cep t o f  a p r o p o s it io n  i s  co n n ected , in  t h i s  and 
oth er  t h e o r ie s ,  w ith  th e  drawing o f  a d i s t in c t io n  betw een l i n g u i s t i c  s ig n s  
and t h e ir  m eaning. A se n te n c e  as su ch , i t  i s  r ea so n ed , cannot be tr u e  or 
f a l s e  b ecau se i t  i s  composed m erely  o f  marks or sou nd s, w h ich , a_s marks or 
sou nd s, cannot be e i th e r  tr u e  or f a l s e .  T h ere fo r e , i t  must be th e  meaning 
o f  th e s e  " signs"  th a t  i s  tr u e  or f a l s e .  In  t h i s  way, th e  n o t io n  o f  some­
th in g  th a t  i s  th e  s o r t  o f  th in g  th a t  can be tru e  or f a l s e  may come t o  be 
d e fin e d  as a m eaning.
In  t h i s  s o r t  o f  employment o f  th e  p h ilo s o p h ic  concept o f  a propo­
s i t i o n ,  th e  problem  o f  tr u th  i s  v iew ed  as one o f  f i r s t  id e n t i f y in g  and 
n a i l in g  down what s o r t  o f  th in g  "true" i s  p r e d ic a te d  o f ,  and then  exam in­
in g  i t  t o  s e e  how i t  i s  d i f f e r e n t  when "true" i s  in  f a c t  p ro p er ly  p r e d i­
c a ted  o f  i t .  A s e n te n c e  comes in  t h i s  way to  be d e fin e d  as a u n it  o f  
m eaning, a s i n g l e ,  u n ita r y  th in g  o f  which "true" may be p r e d ic a te d . I t  
seems to  be a requ irem ent fo r  th e  a n a ly s is  o f  t r u th  th a t  what i s  capab le  
o f  b e in g  tr u e  be a u n it  o f  meaning whose tr u th  may be t e s t e d — som ething  
whose tr u th  or f a l s i t y  may be v a l id a te d ,  a t  l e a s t  t h e o r e t i c a l l y .
T h is  p u ta t iv e  requ irem ent may le a d  to  th e  a d o p tio n  o f  a n o t io n  
l i k e  th a t  o f  a p r o p o s it io n  in  which i s  in v o lv e d  what m ight be term ed a 
" m ea n in g -freeze ,"  i . e . ,  th e  p r o p o s it io n  i s  d e f in e d  a s  a u n it  o f  m eaning  
t h a t  i s  independent o f  c o n te x t  and whose tr u th  i s  th u s  t h e o r e t i c a l ly
d eterm inab le once and fo r  a l l . The p r o p o s it io n  in  th e  sen se  o f  a u n it  o f 
meaning may become dependent in  t h i s  way upon supposed requirem ents o f  
th e  p r o p o s it io n  in  th e  sen se  o f  th a t  w hich i s  tr u e  or f a l s e .
P r o p o s it io n a l th e o r ie s  o f  t h i s  s o r t  t r e a t  tr u th  as a p r e d ic a te .  
That i s ,  th e  problem o f tr u th  i s  seen  as c e n te r in g  on th e  term " tru e ,"  
w hich i s  p r e d ic a te d  o f s e n te n c e s . An attem p t to  e x p lic a te  "true" then  
le a d s  to  s p e c i f i c a t io n  o f  th e  s o r t  o f  sen ten ce  o f  which i t  i s  p r e d ic a te d .  
T his s o r t  o f  sen ten ce  (a " sta tem ent” ) th en  may be tr e a te d  as a vague, na- 
tu r a l- la n g u a g e  shorthand fo r  a " p r o p o s it io n ,"  i . e . ,  a meaning fro ze n  in  
tim e and space through com plete s p e c i f i c a t io n ,  w hich th e r e fo r e  may be d e ­
term ined , in  th e o r y , t o  be e ith e r  tr u e  or f a l s e .
In g e n io u s ly , th e  T raeta tu s view avo id s  sa y in g  th a t  what i s  f a l s e  
must be m ean in g less w h ile  s im u lta n eo u sly  h o ld in g  th a t  th e  meaning o f  a 
sen ten ce  i s  th e  name o f  a f a c t .  T his i s  done through th e  n o tio n  o f  a p o s ­
s ib le  f a c t  as a " p r o p o s it io n ,” but a p r o p o s it io n  i s  a l o g i c a l  m ean in g--th e  
r e a l  meaning o f  words o f  n a tu r a l language whose r u le s  are a r b itr a r y  and 
id io m a tic . How a meaning i s  ex p ressed —th e  a r b itr a r y  l i n g u i s t i c  r u le s  — 
i s  unim portant; what th e  meaning i s  th a t  i s  e x p r e s se d --th e  p r o p o s it io n - -  
i s  th e  im portant a sp e c t  o f  meaning so fa r  as tr u th  i s  concerned. The 
p r o p o s it io n  i t s e l f ,  however, has a l o g i c a l  s tr u c tu r e  th a t  i s  a d i s t i l l a ­
t io n  o f  l i n g u i s t i c  s tr u c tu r e s —th e  p r o p o s it io n  i s  th e  "essence"  o f  la n ­
g u a g e ^ ) .  The c o r r e la t io n s  betw een a p r o p o s it io n  and a f a c t ,  when a prop­
o s i t io n  i s  t r u e ,  are m e a n in g -r e la tio n s;  The "names" th a t  have a s tr u c tu r e  
in  th e  p r o p o s it io n  are c o r r e la te d  w ith  t h e ir  "m eanings," o b je c ts  th a t  have 
a s tr u c tu r e  in  a " fact"  in  th e w orld , and th e  t o t a l  p r o p o s it io n  names a 
f a c t  through l ik e n e s s  o f  s tr u c tu r e  and c o r r e la t io n  o f names and o b je c t s .
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L ik en ess  o f s tr u c tu r e  i s  a l o g i c a l  m atter and, h en ce , a m atter o f m eaning. 
I t  i s ,  in  t h i s  th eo ry , to  "mean" (c o r r e la te  w ith ) an a c tu a l f a c t  th a t  con ­
s t i t u t e s  what tr u th  i s ;  i f  th e  c o n s t itu e n t  names o f  a p r o p o s it io n  "mean" 
" ob jects"  but th e l o g i c a l  s tr u c tu r e  does not c o r r e la te  w ith  the s tr u c tu r e  
co n n ectin g  th e se  o b je c ts  in to  a f a c t ,  th en  the la c k  o f such c o r r e la t in g  
l in e s  c o n s t i t u t e s  f a l s i t y .
The T raeta tu s th eory  o f  tr u th  i s  in com p atib le  w ith  a use view o f  
meaning in  a t  l e a s t  one fundam ental r e s p e c t :  as a correspondence th eo ry  
i t  r e l a t e s  language to  th e  w orld  in  a manner th a t  i s  in com p atib le  w ith  
meaning viewed as u se . Some view  o f th e  nature o f  meaning i s  in v o lv e d  in  
any correspondence th eo ry  o f tr u th , becau se one o f  th e  two s id e s  o f th e  
c o r r e la t io n  i s  a m e a n in g -e n t ity . We have seen  above how th e  T raetatu s  
th eo ry  o f  meaning i s  in com p atib le  w ith  a view o f meaning as u se . F u rth er , 
s in c e  th e  r e la te d  th eo ry  o f tr u th  i s  a correspondence type o f  th e o r y , i t  
i s  in e x tr ic a b ly  connected  w ith  a view o f  meaning in  which th ere  are mean­
in g  c o r r e la t io n s  co n n ectin g  meanings w ith  what th ey  mean. T h is so r t  o f  
view o f  meaning, w hich , as we have se e n , i s  in com p atib le  w ith  meaning as 
u se , would seem to  be req u ired  by any correspondence view o f tr u th . I t  i s  
d i f f i c u l t  to  im agine how a correspondence view o f tr u th  cou ld  be formu­
la te d  w ith o u t a view o f  meaning o f  t h i s  g en era l ty p e . In  any c a se , th e  
T ra eta tu s th eory  o f tr u th  i s  in com p atib le  w ith  a u se  view o f  meaning b e ­
cause i t  does in v o lv e  t h i s  type o f view o f meaning.
Two Ordinary-Language A n alyses
Two w r it e r s ,  who r e j e c t  the T ra eta tu s th eo ry  o f  meaning and advo­
c a te  th e  view th a t  the meaning o f a word i s  i t s  u s e , have d e a lt  w ith  th e  
problem  o f tr u th  in  q u ite  d i f f e r e n t  w ays. J . L. A u stin  and P . F . S traw son,
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w h ile  a g ree in g  on th e "use"-view  o f meaning and on the problem o f  tr u th  
as b ein g  the problem o f  th e use o f  the word " tru e ."  n e v e r th e le s s  o f f e r  
q u ite  v a r ia n t  a n a ly se s  in  t h e ir  d eb a te , "Truth."'1'
The Debate
A u stin
A u stin  b eg in s h is  a n a ly s is  o f th e  problem o f tr u th  by d e f in in g  
t h i s  problem as "the u s e ,  or c e r ta in  u s e s ,  o f  th e  word 'tr u e '"  (p . 1 1 ) .
In h is  r e b u t t a l ,  Straw son pounces, in  e f f e c t ,  on t h is  l im it a t io n  to  " cer­
t a in  uses"  by c o n c e n tr a tin g  h is  a tta c k  on A u s t in 's  confinem ent o f  the  
problem to  f a c t u a l  s ta te m e n ts . A u stin  reach es t h is  l im it a t io n ,  how ever, 
through a sk in g  th e q u e s t io n , "What i s  i t  th a t  we say i s  tru e  or fa ls e ? "  
and lo o k in g  fo r  an answer th a t  w i l l  t e l l  what i s  tru e  p r im a r ily : " It
seems rea so n a b le  to  ask  whether th ere  i s  n ot some use o f  ’ i s  t r u e ’ th a t  
i s  prim ary, or some g e n e r ic  name fo r  th a t  which a t  bottom  we are alw ays 
sa y in g  ' i s  tr u e '"  (p . 1 1 2 ) . .  He th en  g iv e s  reason s fo r  r e j e c t in g  th e  p r e ­
d ic a t io n  o f "true" o f  an yth in g  ex c e p t what he c a l l s  a " sta tem en t."  His 
d e f in i t io n  o f  " sta tem en t,"  though, i s  unusual: "A sta tem en t i s  made and
i t s  making i s  a h i s t o r ic  e v e n t , th e  u tte r a n c e  by a c e r ta in  speaker or 
w r ite r  o f  c e r ta in  words (a se n te n c e ) to  an aud ience w ith  r e fe r e n c e  to  a 
h is t o r ic  s i t u a t io n ,  ev e n t or what not" (p p . 113-11*0 . S en ten ces are used  
to  make s ta te m e n ts , and "a sen ten ce  i s  made up o f  w ords, a sta tem en t i s  
made in  words" (p . 11*0.
So, a sta tem en t fo r  A u stin  i s  e v id e n t ly  n o t a k ind  o f  sen ten ce
J . L. A ustin  and P . F . Straw son, "Truth," P roceed in gs o f the  
A r is t o t e l i a n  S o c ie t y , Supplem entary Volume, XXIV (1 9 5 0 ), H l - 156 .
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b u t, r a th e r , something made by means o f a kind of sen tence (s in c e  not a l l  
sen ten ces  can be used to  make sta tem en ts) . And, the use of a sen tence to  
make a statem ent i s  understood by A u stin  to  be i t s  u tte r a n c e , considered  
as an even t in  tim e. The fu rth er  q u a l i f ic a t io n  th a t  i t  be "-with referen ce  
to  a h is t o r ic  s i t u a t io n ,  even t or -what n o t,"  i s  the p art o f A u s t in 's  d e f ­
in i t i o n  th a t  comes c lo s e s t  to  most d e f in it io n s  o f "statem ent" (and a ls o  
" p ro p o sitio n " ). In d e f in in g  "statem ent" he has re fe rred  to  th a t  to  which 
th e statem ent r e f e r s ,  "a h is t o r ic  s i t u a t io n ,  ev en t, 'thus co n fin in g  s t a t e ­
ment' to  ' fa c tu a l  s ta tem en t.'"
This d e f in i t io n  o f the term in v o lv e s , th en , not only a d is t in c t io n  
between sen ten ces  and statem ents and a p ecu lia r  view o f what the "use" o f  
a sentence c o n s is t s  in ,  but a ls o  a view o f the r e f e r e n t ia l  meaning o f  
sta tem en ts. Thus, th e b a s ic  in g r e d ie n ts  o f a correspondence theory o f  
tr u th  are found in  A u s t in 's  d e f in i t io n  o f th a t  which may be tru e or f a l s e  
- - th e  s ta te m e n t--s in c e  t h is  d e f in i t io n  con ta in s a view not on ly  o f the 
l i n g u i s t i c  r e la t io n s h ip s  o f the s ta te m e n t--to  sen ten ces and th e ir  u se --b u t  
o f i t s  r e la t io n s h ip  to  e x t r a - l in g u is t ic  even ts  or " fa c ts ."
Having argued fo r  the primacy o f statem ents as what are capable  
o f being tr u e , and fo r  what statem ents a re , A u stin  asks th e q u estio n ,
"When i s  a statem ent true?" I f  i t  be answered, "When i t  corresponds to  
th e  f a c t s ,"  t h is  answer, though not wrong, may be m is lea d in g , A u stin  sa y s .  
He th e r e fo r e  s e t s  fo r th  h is  view o f what t h is  correspondence w ith  the  
f a c t s  c o n s is t s  in .  Communication, he n o te s , req u ires  sym bols, such as 
w ords, and th a t  which the words are "about": " th is  may be c a l le d  the
’w o r ld ." ’ The world must " ex h ib it  . . . s im i la r i t i e s  and d is s im ila r ­
i t i e s "  or , o th erw ise , "there would be noth ing to  say" (p . 115). F u rth er­
more, "there i s  no reason  why th e world should not in clud e the words, in
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every  sense ex cep t th e  sense o f th e  a c tu a l statem ent i t s e l f  -which on any 
p a r tic u la r  o cca sio n  i s  being made about the world" (p . 1 1 5 ).
These are  the gen era l requirem ents fo r  communication—th ere must 
be symbols and the world which th ey  are "about," and th e world may be 
con sid ered  to  in c lu d e  th e  sym bols, except in  th e  sen se  o f th e  a c tu a l s ta t e  
ment i t s e l f ,  (S in ce  A u stin  has d efin ed  a statem ent as an u ttera n ce  con­
s id ered  as a tem poral ev en t, i t  i s  hard to  see  how i t  can be con sid ered  as 
o u ts id e , or n ot in clud ed  in , th e  w orld . He i s  a sk in g  th a t a d is t in c t io n  
be made between a tem poral even t th a t i s  a statem ent and a tem poral ev en t  
or s i tu a t io n  th a t  i s  " in  the world" and i s  what the statem ent i s  "about."  
There does not seem to  be anyth ing e l s e  th a t  d is t in g u is h e s  th e  two s o r ts  
o f e v e n ts , and on the b a s is  o f which one i s  a ssig n ed  to  th e world and th e  
other r e je c te d  from i t ,  except th a t  one i s  an u ttera n ce  and th e  other i s  
n o t . )
These requirem ents having been g iv e n , th ere  are s t i l l  fu rth er  r e ­
quirem ents—e v id e n t ly  to  be con sid ered  as s p e c ia l ,  rather than g e n e r a l, 
r u le s  or requirem ents o f  communication—th a t are n ecessary  in  order to  r e ­
so lv e  th e problem of tr u th . These requirem ents are two s e t s  o f conven­
t io n s :  "D e sc r ip tiv e  conventions c o r r e la t in g  th e  words (= sen te n c e s )  w ith
th e  typ es o f s i t u a t io n ,  th in g , e v e n t , e t c . ,  to  be found in  th e w orld ,"  and 
"D em onstrative conventions c o r r e la t in g  the words (= sta tem en ts) w ith  th e  
h is t o r ic  s i t u a t io n s ,  e t c . ,  to  be found in  th e world" (p . 1 1 6 ). In  terms 
o f th e se  two s e t s  o f conventions A u stin  th en  answers h is  q u estio n  o f  when 
a statem ent i s  sa id  to  be tru e: "A statem ent i s  sa id  to  be tru e when th e
h is t o r ic  s ta t e  o f  a f f a ir s  to  which i t  i s  c o r r e la te d  by the dem onstrative  
conventions ( th e  one to  which i t  ’r e f e r s ' )  i s  o f  a type w ith  which th e  sen  
ten ce  used in  making i t  i s  co r r e la te d  by th e d e s c r ip t iv e  conventions"
I k
(p . 1X 6), " 'I s  o f  a typ e  -with ■which.,'" A u s t in  e x p la in s ,  "means ' i s  s u f ­
f i c i e n t l y  l i k e  th o se  standard  s t a t e s  o f  a f f a i r s  w ith  w hich '"  ( fo o tn o te ,
P. 1 1 6 ) .
D em onstrative co n v e n tio n s , th en , c o r r e la te  s ta tem en ts  w ith  sp e ­
c i f i c  s i t u a t io n s  in  tim e in  th e  w orld . T h is  c o r r e la t io n  i s  th e  r e fe r r in g  
r e l a t io n .  D e s c r ip t iv e  c o n v e n tio n s , on th e  o ther hand, c o r r e la te  sen ten ces  
w ith  ty p es  o f  s i t u a t io n  in  the w orld . T h is r e la t io n  by means o f  d e s c r ip ­
t iv e  co n ven tion s i s  made p o s s ib le  by th e  s i m i l a r i t i e s  e x h ib ite d  in  th e  
w orld . A sta tem en t i s  s a id  to  be tr u e  when th e  ev en t r e fe r r e d  to  by th e  
sta tem en t i s  " s u f f i c i e n t ly  l ik e "  th e  ty p e  d e sc r ib e d  by the se n te n c e . So 
t h i s  th eo ry  o f  tr u th  depends upon a r e la t io n  betw een r e fe r r in g  and d e s c r ib ­
in g , a r e la t io n  o f  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  in  w hich a p a r t ic u la r  s i t u a t io n  i s  judged  
to  be (o r  n o t b e , i f  th e  sta tem en t i s  f a l s e )  c l a s s i f i a b l e  as o f  th e  c e r ta in  
typ e d e sc r ib e d .
T his th eory  i s  a s p e c i f i c a t io n  o f  what "correspondence w ith  the  
fa c ts "  c o n s is t s  in .  "Correspondence" has been  d e fin e d  in  term s o f  a r e l a ­
t io n s h ip  between two s e t s  o f  " co n v en tio n s."  A u stin  em phasizes th a t  th e  
correspondence in  h is  th eo ry  i s  "purely con ven tio n a l"  and im p lie s  no "mir­
roring"  o f  th e  World in  w ords. A p ic tu r e  may be tr u e  to  i t s  o r ig in a l ,  he 
n o te s ,  b u t n o t tr u e  o f  i t ,  and i t  i s  the tr u th  o f  s ta tem en ts  w ith  which th e  
th eory  o f  tr u th  i s  concerned .
(A lthough i t  i s  correspondence w ith  th e  " fa cts"  th a t  A u stin  c la im s  
to  be c la r i f y in g  or s p e c ify in g  in  h is  th e o r y , he speaks in  h is  fo rm u la tion  
o f " s itu a t io n "  ra th er  th an  o f " fa c ts ."  " F act,"  he s a y s ,  i s  m is le a d in g , 
and he a n a ly z e s  th e  phrase " fa c t  th a t"  as "a compendious way o f  speak ing  
about a s i t u a t io n  in v o lv in g  b oth  words and world" [p . 118 ] . )
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S traw son 's  C r itiq u e  o f  A u stin
A u s t in 's  th eo ry  attem p ts to  sa lv a g e  a correspondence th eory  o f  
tr u th  w h ile  r e j e c t in g  a th eory  o f  meaning in  w hich th ere  i s  co n ceived  to  
be a correspondence betw een words and th e ir  m ea n in g s--o b je c ts  in  th e  
w o rld . Straw son i s  working from a s im ila r  view  o f  the nature o f meaning:
He w ish es to  r e j e c t  th e  "correspondence" th eo ry  o f  th e  meaning o f  words 
and to  view  th e  meanings o f  words as t h e ir  "use."  I t  i s  th e  use o f  "true"  
which th ey  b o th  contend to  be th e  problem o f  t r u th ,  but Straw son d is a g r e e s  
n o t o n ly  w ith  A u s t in 's  a n a ly s is  o f  the u se  o f  "true" but a ls o  w ith  h is  
id e n t i f i c a t io n  o f  t h i s  problem w ith  th e  problem o f th e  a n a ly s is  o f  " fa c t -  
s t a t in g  d is c o u r s e ."
S traw son 's c r i t iq u e  i s  d iv id e d  in to  th r e e  s e c t io n s ,  on s ta te m e n ts ,  
f a c t s  and correspon d en ce. In  regard  to  A u s t in 's  trea tm en t o f  " sta tem en ts ,"  
Straw son p o in ts  ou t: "'My sta tem en t' may be e i th e r  what I  say or my sa y in g
i t .  My sa y in g  som ething i s  c e r t a in ly  an e p iso d e . What I  say  i s  n o t . I t  
i s  th e  l a t t e r ,  not th e  form er, we d ec la r e  t o  be true"  (pp. 1 2 9 -3 0 ) . A l­
though "the u se  o f  . . . ' t r u e '  alw ays g la n ce s  backwards or forw ards t o  the  
a c tu a l or en v isaged  making o f  a sta tem en t by someone," th e  word does n ot  
" ch a ra c ter ize  such . . . ep iso d es"  (p . 1 3 1 ).
S eco n d ly , f a c t s ,  a ccord in g  to  S traw son , are m isunderstood  by A u s t in ,  
who r e f e r s  to  th e  second term o f the correspondence as " th in g ,"  " even t,"  
" s itu a t io n ,"  " s ta te  o f  a f f a i r s ,"  and " fe a tu r e ,"  as w e ll  as " fa c t ."  Strawson  
b e l i e v e s  A u stin  to  be c o r r e c t  in  em phasizing th a t  th e c o n v e n tio n a lly  e s ta b ­
l i s h e d  r e la t io n s  betw een words and th in g s  r e fe r r e d  t o ,  and betw een words 
and typ e o f  th in g s  d e sc r ib e d , are d i f f e r e n t  r e la t io n s .  Strawson contends  
fu r th e r ,  however, th a t  in  sta tem en ts  th a t  are  " re feren ce-cu m -d escr ip tio n "
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(w hich , a ccord in g  to  S traw son , n ot a l l  sta tem en ts  a r e )  s t a t in g  i s  n e ith e r  
o f  th ese  r e l a t io n s —n e ith e r  r e fe r r in g  (or  d em on stratin g) nor d e s c r ib in g - -  
b u t both  a t  o n ce .
In a " re feren ce-cu m -d escr ip tio n "  sta tem en t, th e  " th in g , p erso n , 
e t c ."  r e fe r r e d  to  by th e  r e fe r r in g  p a rt o f  th e  sta tem en t and which th e  d e ­
s c r ib in g  p a r t " f i t s  or f a i l s  t o  f i t "  i s  what th e  sta tem en t i s  "about."
There can be no other re la tu m , Straw son con ten d s, and to  ask  fo r  one i s  a 
" lo g ic a l ly  fundam ental typ e-m istak e"  (p . 13*0- A lthough we say th a t  "a 
sta tem en t corresponds to  . . . th e  f a c t s ,  as a v a r ia n t  on sa y in g  th a t  i t  
i s  t r u e ,  we never say  th a t  a sta tem en t corresponds to  the th in g ,  p erso n , 
e t c . ,  i t  i s  about" (p . 1 3 5 ) . T h erefo re , a lth ou gh  i t  i s  not wrong to  say  
th a t  th e  f a c t  a sta tem en t s t a t e s  i s  what makes i t  t r u e ,  t h i s  f a c t  i s  n o t an 
o b je c t  o f  any k in d , i t  i s  n ot " in  th e  w orld ,"  but i s  i t s e l f  s ta te d  by th e  
sta tem en t and so cannot be th a t  to  w hich th e sta tem en t i s  c o r r e la te d  when 
i t  i s  tr u e  (p . 1 3 5 ).
S traw son 's c r i t i c i s m  o f A u s t in 's  trea tm en t o f  " fa cts"  fo c u se s  on 
h is  view th a t  f a c t s  are " in  th e w orld ,"  l i k e  th e  o b je c ts  th a t  sta tem en ts  
a re  about. As fo r  A u s t in 's  eq u atin g  " fa c ts"  w ith  " s i t u a t io n s ” and " s ta te s  
o f a f f a ir s " :  " It i s  tru e  th a t  s i t u a t io n s  and s t a t e s  o f  a f f a i r s  are n o t seen
or heard (any more than f a c t s  a r e ) ,  but are  ra th er  summed up or taken  in  a t  
a g lan ce (p h rases  which s t r e s s  th e  co n n ectio n  w ith  sta tem en t and ' t h a t ' -  
c la u se  r e s p e c t iv e ly ) ,  i t  i s  a ls o  tr u e  th a t  th ere  i s  a sen se  o f  'ab ou t' in  
w hich we do t a lk  ab ou t, do d e s c r ib e , s i t u a t io n s  or s t a t e s  o f  a f fa ir s "  (p .
1 3 7 ) . These e x p r e s s io n s , however, are " su b s ta n t iv a l e x p r e ss io n s  to  a b b r e v i­
a t e ,  summarize and connect"  (p . 1 3 8 ) . They are  d e v ic e s  fo r  con n ectin g  a 
" s e r ie s  o f  d e s c r ip t iv e  sta tem en ts"  w ith  "the rem ainder o f  my d isco u rse"  (p .
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1 3 8 ) . "A s i t u a t io n  or s t a t e  o f  a f f a ir s  i s ,  ro u g h ly , a s e t  o f  f a c t s  n ot a 
s e t  o f  th in gs"  (p . 1 3 8 ). When we speak about a s i t u a t io n ,  i t  i s  th e  "sub­
je c t"  o f a sta tem en t and, th e r e fo r e ,  cannot be a ls o  th a t  w hich makes th e  
sta tem en t tr u e .
S traw son 's view i s  th a t  on ly  th in g s  and e v e n ts  are " in  th e w orld ,"  
and th a t  th e  o n ly  r e la t io n  o f a sta tem en t to  such th in g s  i s  th e  "about"- 
r e la t io n .  He s e e s  the correspondence th eory  o f  tr u th  as r e a l l y  an attem p t  
t o  e lu c id a te  th e  f a c t - s t a t in g  typ e  o f  d is c o u r s e , w h ile  th e  problem o f tr u th  
i s  p rop erly  th e  problem o f  our use o f  " tru e ."  And, when we u se  " tru e ,"  
" fa c t ,"  e t c . ,  we are  " ta lk in g  w ith in , and not ab ou t, a c e r ta in  frame o f  
d is c o u r se ,"  s o ,  th e  "problem about the use o f  ' t r u e '  i s  t o  se e  how t h i s  
word f i t s  in to  th a t  frame o f  d isco u rse"  (p . 1^ 2).
Strawson b e l i e v e s ,  th e n , th a t  th e  terms o f  A u s t in 's  correspondence  
r e la t io n  are wrong. He b e l i e v e s  fu r th e r  th a t  th e c o n v en tio n a l type o f  c o r ­
respondence la i d  out by A u stin  i s  a ls o  wrong. The fundam ental co n fu sio n  o f  
th e  th eory  i s  betw een what th e  sem antic c o n d it io n s  are  fo r  a sta tem en t "p 
i s  true"  to  be tr u e ,  and what i s  a s se r te d  when a c e r ta in  sta tem en t i s  s ta te d  
t o  be tru e  ( i . e . ,  what "p i s  true"  a s s e r t s ) .  I t  i s  as "absurd," Straw son  
s a y s ,  to  cla im  th a t  in  making a sta tem en t "p i s  true"  one i s  a s s e r t in g  th a t  
th e  sem antic c o n d it io n s  fo r  i t s  tr u th  are  f u l f i l l e d  as i t  i s  t o  c la im  th a t  
in  making th e  sta tem en t "p" one i s  a s s e r t in g  f u l f i l lm e n t  o f  th e s e  c o n d it io n s .  
I f  A u s t in 's  th eo ry  o f  "true" were c o r r e c t ,  in  d e c la r in g  a sta tem en t to  be 
tr u e  we would e i th e r  be ta lk in g  about th e  meanings o f  th e  words o f  a s t a t e ­
ment "p" or sa y in g  th a t  th e speaker has used th e  words in  th e  sta tem en t c o r ­
r e c t l y .  S in ce we are doing n e ith e r  o f  th e se  t h in g s ,  Straw son con clud es  
th a t  A u s t in 's  w hole th eory  must be d isp en sed  w ith  (pp . 1 4 3 - ^ ) .
Not o n ly  i s  A u s t in 's  a n a ly s is  o f  th e  u se  o f  "true" m istaken  accord in g
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to  Straw son, b u t he i s  a l s o  m istaken  in  id e n t ify in g  t h is  problem w ith  the  
problem  o f th e a n a ly s is  o f  f a c t - s t a t in g  d is c o u r s e . A lthough th e  r e s t r i c t io n  
o f  " sta tem en t,"  " true,"  and " fa lse"  t o  the f a c t - s t a t i n g  type o f  d isc o u r se  
may be a l l  r ig h t  "in some p h ilo s o p h ic a l  c o n te x ts ,"  A u s t in 's  approach to  the  
a n a ly s is  o f  t h i s  type o f  d isco u rse  i s  not (p . 1 5 3 ). "Mr. A u s t in 's  d e s c r ip ­
t io n  o f  the c o n d it io n s  under which a statem ent i s  tr u e , regarded as an a n a l­
y s i s  o f  the f a c t - s t a t i n g  u s e ,  a p p lie s  only to  a f f ir m a t iv e  su b je c t -p r e d ic a te  
sta tem en ts. . . .  I t  does n o t  apply t o  n e g a t iv e , g en era l and e x i s t e n t i a l  
sta tem en ts  n o r , s tr a ig h t- fo r w a r d ly , t o  h y p o th e tic a l and d is ju n c t iv e  s t a t e ­
m ents. I  agree  th a t  any language ca p a b le  o f th e  f a c t - s t a t in g  use must have 
some d e v ic e s  fo r  perform ing the fu n c t io n  to  w hich Mr. A u stin  e x c lu s iv e ly  
d ir e c t s  h is  a t t e n t io n ,  and th a t o th e r  typ es o f  sta tem en ts o f  f a c t  can be 
understood  o n ly  in  r e la t io n  to  t h i s  type" but "nothing i s  ga in ed  by lumping 
them a l l  to g e th e r  Under a d e s c r ip t io n  ap p rop riate on ly  to  one, even though  
i t  be the b a s ic ,  type" (p p . 15^ -5 5 ).
S traw son 's c r i t iq u e  o f A u s t in  r ev o lv es  around th ree  major o b je c ­
t io n s :  ( l )  "True" i s  n o t properly  view ed as p red ic a te d  o f a s e n te n c e , prop­
o s i t i o n  or a n yth in g  e l s e ;  (2 )  the u se  o f  "true" i s  n ot co n fin ed  to  f a c t -  
s t a t in g  d isc o u r se ;  and, ( 3 )  in  u s in g  "true" we are not a s s e r t in g  th a t  the  
c o n d it io n s  do in  fa c t  o b ta in  which m ust ob ta in  i f  we are " co rrec tly "  to  d e­
c la r e  a sta tem en t to  be t r u e .  These th ree  p o in ts  c o n s t i tu te  th e  major r e ­
j e c t io n s  in v o lv e d  in  h is  own th eory  o f  tr u th .
Straw son
S traw son 's  own th eo ry  i s  g e n e r a l ly  c a l le d  th e  "perform atory" th eo ry  
o f  t r u th ,  a lth o u g h  even in  h is  o r ig in a l  paper in  A n a ly s is  he sa y s: "This
i s  a misnomer. A perform atory word, in  A u s t in 's  s e n s e , I  tak e  to  be a verb ,
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th e  u se  o f  w hich , in  th e  f i r s t  person  p r e se n t in d ic a t iv e ,  seems to  d e sc r ib e  
some a c t i v i t y  o f  th e  sp ea k er , b u t in  f a c t  i s  th a t  a c t i v i t y .  C lea r ly  th e  
u se o f  ' i s  t r u e 1 does n o t seem to  d e sc r ib e  any a c t i v i t y  o f  th e  sp eak er .
. . . The p o in t  o f  u s in g  A u s t in 's  word a t  a l l  i s  th e  f a c t  th a t  th e  phrase  
' i s  t r u e '  can som etim es be r e p la c e d , w ith o u t any im portant change in  mean­
in g , by some such phrase as ' I  confirm  i t , '  which i s  perform atory in  th e  
s t r i c t  s e n s e . " I s  true"  i s  not i t s e l f ,  th en , a perform atory  phrase but 
can , "som etim es," be rep la ced  by c e r ta in  perform atory p h ra ses .
In h is  symposium p ap er, Straw son ta k es  b a s ic a l ly  t h i s  same p o s i t io n ,  
a lth ou gh  he d is c u s s e s  a d d it io n a l u s e s - - f o r  which m ight be s u b s t itu te d  th e  
a d d it io n a l phrases "I grant i t "  and "I corrob orate  i t . "  In t h i s  paper he 
a ls o  r e f e r s  to  "the a s s e r t iv e  d e v ic e  which i s  th e  s u b je c t  o f  t h i s  symposium 
( th e  word ' t r u e ')"  (p . 1 5 0 ) , but m od ify in g  t h i s  c h a r a c te r iz a t io n  by t r e a t ­
in g  "true" as a d e v ic e  fo r  r e - a s s e r t io n  w ith o u t a c tu a l  r e p e t i t io n  o f  a 
s ta tem en t. T h is i s  a change from h is  o r ig in a l  paper in  A n a ly s is , in  which  
he says " is  true"  i s  n o t a s s e r t iv e  in  any sen se  b u t ,  r a th e r , a " l in g u is t ic  
perform ance."  The p a r t ic u la r  typ e  o f  l i n g u i s t i c  perform ance i s  d escr ib ed  
a t  one p la c e  in  t h i s  e ssa y  as analogous w ith  th e  u se  o f  th e  e x p r e ss io n  
" D itto ."  So , in  h is  second lo o k  a t  th e  problem o f t r u th ,  Strawson e v id e n t ly  
f e e l s  th a t  he had exaggerated  th e  n o n -a sse r t iv e  ch a ra cter  o f  " is  tr u e ,"  
w hich (a s  m ight be gath ered  e a s i l y  from i t s  cla im ed resem blance to  " D itto" )  
r e - a s s e r t s  w ith o u t a c tu a l r e p e t i t io n .
Toward th e  end o f  h is  paper, Strawson m o d if ie s  h is  p o s i t io n .  Here 
he s a y s ,  "I have no w ish  to  ch a lle n g e  th e  r e s t r i c t i o n ,  in  some p h ilo s o p h ic a l
P . F . Straw son, "Truth," r e p r in te d  in  P h ilo sop h y  and A n a ly s is , ed . 
M argaret Macdonald (O xford: B a s i l  B la c k w e ll, 195M> P. 275 .
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c o n te x ts , o f th e  words 's ta te m e n t,' ' t r u e , '  ' f a l s e , '  to  what I  have m yself  
e a r l ie r  c a l le d  the ' f a c t - s t a t in g '  type o f d isc o u r se . What tr o u b le s  me 
more i s  Mr. A u s t in 's  own in c ip ie n t  a n a ly s is  o f  t h is  type o f d is c o u r se . I t  
seems to  me such as to  fo r c e  him to  carry the r e s t r ic t io n  fu rth er  than he 
w ish es or intends"  (p . 1 5 3 ).
A u s t in 's  C ritiq u e  o f Strawson
A u s t in 's  paper in c lu d es a c r it iq u e  o f  Straw son's th eory  as p re ­
sen ted  in  h is  i n i t i a l  paper in  A n a ly s is . This theory he se e s  as having two 
main p a rts: "that ' i s  tr u e ' i s  n ot used in  ta lk in g  about . . . an yth in g"
(p . 1 2 7 ), and th a t to  say th a t S i s  true i s  "to confirm  or grant . . . the
a s s e r t io n , made or taken as made a lrea d y , th a t  S"  (p . 1 2 7 ). The f i r s t  part
o f t h i s  theory  i s  wrong according to  A ustin  because " is  true" i s  used in  
ta lk in g  about sta tem en ts. The second p a rt i s  wrong b ecau se, a lthough  th ere  
i s  a perform atory a sp ect to  many ordinary sta tem en ts, th ey  may a ls o  be
statem ents th a t  are tru e  or f a l s e .  (A ustin  in d ic a te s  th a t  "statem ent" would
b e s t  be reserved  for  what i s  tru e or f a l s e ,  and not be extended to  u t t e r ­
ances o f a c e r ta in  grammatical form. He i s  u sin g  the word in  th a t  sense  
h e r e . )
A u stin  c r i t i c i z e s  Straw son's th eory  on the ground th a t  "he co n fin es  
h im se lf  to  th e case where I  say 'your statem ent i s  tr u e ' or som ething s im i­
la r ,  . . . but what o f  th e  case where you s ta te  th a t S and I  say n oth ing  
but ' look  and s e e ' th a t  your statem ent i s  true?  I  do not se e  how t h is  c r i t ­
i c a l  c a se , to  which n oth ing  analogous occurs w ith  s t r i c t l y  perform atory  
u tte r a n c e s , cou ld  be made to  respond to  Mr. S traw son's treatm ent" (p . 1 2 8 ). 
In r ep ly  to  t h i s  Strawson says: "The man who looks and se e s  th a t  the
statem ent th a t  there i s  a ca t on th e mat i s  tr u e , see s  no more and no l e s s
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than the man who looks and sees  th a t  th ere  i s  a ca t on the mat, or th e man 
who look s and see s  th a t  th ere i s  indeed a c a t  on th e mat. B ut, th e  s e t ­
t in g s  o f the f i r s t  and th ir d  ca ses  may be d if f e r e n t  from th a t o f  the s e c ­
o n d .” A u s t in 's  o b je c t io n , Strawson sa y s , serv es  to  emphasize the "im­
portance o f th e  'o c ca sio n '"  o f th e  use o f "true" and to  minimize "(what I 
was in c lin e d  to  over-em phasize) th e  perform atory character o f our uses o f  
it"  (pp. 1 4 9 -5 0 ).
Critique
A ustin  and Strawson have covered qu ite thoroughly p o ssib le  ob jec­
tio n s  to  each o th er 's  treatm ents o f tru th . A u stin 's  theory is  a type of 
correspondence theory and thus tr e a ts  tru th  as a r e la t io n  between words 
and the world. This treatm ent i s  open to  the fundamental c r it ic ism  th a t i t  
confuses tru th  w ith fa c t - s ta t in g , or the nature of the meaning of a type of 
statem ent.
Strawson's th eory , on the other hand, takes the view th at the cen­
t r a l  fa c t  about the meaning of "true" i s  i t s  a sse r t iv e  or rea sser tiv e  func­
t io n . He claim s th at a n a ly sis  o f the meaning of statem ents o f fa c t  i s ,  a t 
b e s t , ta n g en tia l to  the problem of truth  as such. This treatment i s  open to  
the fundamental c r it ic ism  th a t th ere is  more involved in  the use of true  
b esid es i t s  performatory asp ects .
In taking the p o s it io n  th a t the a n a ly s is  o f fa c t - s ta t in g  is  i r r e le ­
vant, Strawson r e je c ts  a dichotomy o f words and world o f the type th at  
A ustin  (as w e ll as some lo g ic a l  p o s i t iv i s t s )  a ccep ts. T his, of course, 
elim in ates the p o s s ib i l i t y  of tr e a tin g  tru th  as a r e la t io n  between words 
and world. C onsistent w ith th is  po in t of view , Strawson's treatment of  
"facts"  i s  qu ite  a t  variance w ith  A u stin 's , which i s  c lo se ly  sim ilar to
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th a t  o f  " a ctu a l f a c t s ” in  th e  T r a e ta tu s . S traw son h o ld s , on th e  c o n tr a r y ,  
t h a t ,  w h ile  f a c t s  are  what make sta tem en ts  t r u e ,  th ey  are n o t a n y th in g  in  
th e  "w orld ."  A lth ou gh  th e r e  i s  som eth ing in  th e  w orld  w hich  a (p u rp o r ted ly )  
f a c t - s t a t i n g  sta tem en t i s  "about,"  t h i s  i s  o f  no r e le v a n c e  t o  th e  e lu c id a ­
t io n  o f  "true" (p . 135 ); and i s  not i t s e l f  th e  f a c t  (p . 1 3 6 ) .  Straw son i s  
sa y in g , i n  other w ords, t h a t  an a b o u t -r e la t io n  i s  d i f f e r e n t  from a t r u t h -  
r e l a t io n ,  and a ls o  from a m e a n in g -r e la t io n . T h is  view i s  b ased  on th e  view  
th a t  n e ith e r  tr u th  nor m eaning are r e la t io n s  o f  any kind w h a tso ev er . The 
a b o u t -r e la t io n  i s  o f  s ig n if ic a n c e  o n ly  in  the e lu c id a t io n  o f  f a c t - s t a t i n g  
d is c o u r s e ,  and "true"  must be view ed a s  w ith in  t h i s  type o f  d is c o u r s e , n o t  
a s  about i t  (p . lh 2 ) .
For Straw son , th e  co n v en tio n s o f  " tr u e " --o f  t h i s  p a r t ic u la r  w ord --  
r e p la c e ,  in  e f f e c t ,  any r u le s  o f  t r u th . For him , th e r e  are  no r e le v a n t  con­
v e n t io n s  or r u le s  e x ce p t m ea n in g -eo n v en tio n s , and th e s e  a r e  n o t ,  in  a g en ­
e r a l  w ay, r e le v a n t  to  th e problem  o f tr u th ;  in d eed , a cco rd in g  t o  S traw son , 
t o  th in k  so  would be to  commit A u s t in 's  m istak e o f  eq u atin g  tr u th  and f a c t -  
s t a t in g .  The o n ly  m ean in g-eon ven tion s th a t  are  r e le v a n t  to  th e  problem , a c ­
cord ing  t o  S traw son , are th o se  o f  " tr u e ."  Now, t h i s  im p lie s  a q u ite  narrow , 
l im ite d  d e f in i t i o n  o f  what i s  in c lu d ed  in  th e m eaning o f  th e  word " t r u e ,” 
s in c e  t h i s  meaning does n o t in c lu d e  r e f e r r in g  t o  s ta tem en ts  s a id  to  be "true  
n or, th e r e fo r e ,  t o  th e m eaning o f  any s ta te m e n ts . S tra w so n 's  view ta k e s  as  
th e  fundam ental u se  o f  "true" i t s  s im p le s t  u se  in  a se n te n c e ;  "True!" (=  
" D itto !" )  This i s  a very narrow view o f  what " the meaning o f  a word, x" con  
s i s t s  in .
Furtherm ore, S traw son 's  a n a ly s is  does n o t  in c lu d e  th e  a sp e c t  o f  th e  
ord in ary  usage o f  " tru e ,"  " tru th ,"  e t c . ,  in  w hich p a rt o f  what we mean by
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say in g  th a t something i s  true i s  th a t  i t s  b ein g  so i s ,  in  some sen se or 
o th er , beyond our c o n tr o l- - in  th a t i t  i s  n on-convention al in  n atu re. Even 
grantin g  th a t -what we (m ean in gfu lly ) say may be l im ite d , not only by the  
range o f p o s s i b i l i t i e s  o f  a p a r tic u la r  language, but a ls o  by the necessary  
l im ita t io n s  o f any language, due to  "the ways th in g s  are" (both in  regard  
to  o u rse lv es  and to  th e  world a t  la r g e ) —even gran tin g  th ese  l im ita t io n s  of 
language i t s e l f ,  tr u th  i s  spoken o f as lim ite d  in  a stronger s e n s e - - i t s  
c r i t e r ia  being spoken o f as o u tsid e  th e  scope o f  con ven tion s. There are no 
such c r i t e r ia  in  Straw son's treatm en t.
A u s tin 's  th eory d e fin e s  tru th  as a type o f r e la t io n  between two 
so r ts  o f  m ean in g-rela tion s (them selves conn ecting  words and f a c t ) .  These 
conventions o f meaning invo lved  in  f a c t - s t a t in g  d isco u rse  e x p la in , for  
A u stin , the nature o f tr u th . A ccording to  him, we use "true" to  r e fe r  to  
s itu a t io n s  in  which th e se  l in g u i s t i c  conventions are used . This th eory  
o f fe r s  a d e sc r ip t io n  o f what i s  in vo lved  in  f a c t - s t a t in g  and th en , in  e f f e c t ,  
d e fin e s  tru th  as the f u lf i l lm e n t  o f th e  claim s o f  a fa c tu a l sta tem ent. That 
i s ,  in  saying th a t th e  a c tu a l s ta te  o f  a f f a ir s  must be "of a type" w ith  the  
(typ e o f )  s ta te  o f  a f f a ir s  expressed in  the sen ten ce , A istin  i s  saying th a t  
th e sen tence must mean something a c tu a lly  e x is t e n t .
In speaking o f a c o r r e la t io n  between words and th e w orld, A u stin  
s e t s  up n am in g-rela tion s between sen tence and e x tr a -s e n te n t ia l  " fa c t."  
C haracteriz ing  th ese  r e la t io n s  as "conventional" might mean th ey  are a r b i­
tra ry  and n on -n ecessary—and A ustin  in ten d s t h i s  to  be understood: "A
statem ent no more need s, in  order to  be tr u e , t o  reproduce th e 'm u lt ip l ic ­
i t y , '  say , orthe 's tr u c tu r e ' or 'form' o f th e r e a l i t y ,  than a word needs to
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be ec h o ic  or w r it in g  p ic to g r a p h ic . To suppose th a t  i t  d o e s , i s  to  f a l l  
once a g a in  in to  th e  error o f  rea d in g  back in to  th e  w orld th e  fe a tu r e s  o f  
language" (p . 119) .  As i s  a ls o  i l lu s t r a t e d  by t h i s  p a ssa g e , he in ten d s  
to  say fu r th e r  th a t  tr u th  c o n s is t s  in  a r e la t io n  betw een c e r ta in  m eaning- 
co n v en tio n s . The fo llo w in g  p assage  i l l u s t r a t e s  t h i s  in  a somewhat d i f ­
fe r e n t  l i g h t :  "Even when a language does 'm irror' [ fe a tu r e s  d e s c r ie d  in
th e  w orld] very  c lo s e ly  (and does i t  ev er? ) th e  tr u th  o f  sta tem en ts  rem ains 
s t i l l  a m atter . . .  o f  the words used b e in g  th e  ones c o n v e n tio n a lly  ap­
p o in ted  fo r  s i t u a t io n s  o f  the ty p e  to  which th a t  r e fe r r e d  to  b elon gs"  (p . 
1 2 0 ) . B ein g  tr u e ,  th e n , c o n s is t s  in  th e  proper or c o r r e c t  a p p lic a t io n  o f  
t h i s  typ e  o f  m ean in g -con ven tion s.
D e sp ite  A u s t in 's  in te r p r e ta t io n  o f  th e  r e le v a n t  m ean in g-ru les as  
co n v en tio n s , h is  view  i s  a correspondence ty p e  o f  th eory  th a t  in t e r p r e t s  
th e se  con ven tion s as c o r r e la t in g  words and th e  w orld . No doubt th e r e  are  
some such co n v en tio n a l c o r r e la t io n s  betw een words and th e  w orld , b u t A u s t in 's  
in te r p r e ta t io n  o f  them as e x p la in in g  tr u th  r e s u l t s  in  b egg in g  th e  q u e s tio n .
S traw son 's a n a ly s is  co n stru es  th e  " conventions o f  th e  u se  o f  't r u e '"  
v ery  n arrow ly , as c o n s is t in g  e x c lu s iv e ly  o f  th e  perform atory a s p e c ts  o f  i t s  
use (th e  "occasion"  fo r  use not b e in g  co n sid ered  a s  in v o lv e d  in  i t s  u s e ,  and 
th e  problem o f th a t  to  which th e  term i s  a p p lie d  a ls o  b e in g  co n sid ered  as  
u n in vo lved  in  i t s  u s e ) .  S traw son 's view  o f  what th e  problem  o f tr u th  i s  
would seem to  be extrem ely  narrow, because i t  would seem th a t  i t  i s  n o t j u s t  
a problem about how to  u se  " tru e ,"  but what t h i s  u se  im p lie s  and how i t  i s  
r e la te d  t o  other a sp e c ts  o f  language-gam es in  w hich i t  i s  in c lu d ed .
A u s t in 's  a n a ly s i s ,  on th e  other hand, co n stru es  c e r ta in  m eaning-
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co n ven tion s as b e in g  th e  con ven tion s r e le v a n t  t o  tr u th , and does n o t a llo w  
fo r  d i f f e r e n t ia t in g  tr u th  from th e  m achinery o f  f a c t - s t a t in g .  A u stin  ap­
proaches th e  problem o f  tr u th  as one o f  "the u se  o f  ' t r u e ’ " but in te r p r e t s  
"true" as used  to  d e s ig n a te  ca se s  in  which c e r ta in  meaning con ven tion s are  
a p p lie d  to  s i t u a t io n s  to  which th ey  a r e , in  f a c t ,  a p p lic a b le .  There i s  no 
s im i la r i t y  o f  l o g i c a l  s tr u c tu r e  in v o lv e d  in  t h i s  v iew , b u t fo r  t h i s  n o t io n  
i s  s u b s t itu te d  a " con ven tion al"  c o r r e la t io n  betw een sta tem en ts  and what th ey  
are ab ou t. "True," a cco rd in g  to  A u s t in , means th a t  m ea n in g -re la tio n s  o f  
t h i s  s o r t  o b ta in . The d is p a r ity  betw een A u s t in 's  and S traw son 's v ie w s su g­
g e s t s  th a t  each d e a ls  w ith  on ly  one a sp e c t  o f  th e  concept o f  tr u th . And, 
th e ir  agreem ent on th e  fo rm u la tio n  o f  th e  problem  (a s  "the use o f ' t r u e '" )  
obscures th e d is p a r ity  o f  t h e ir  in te r p r e ta t io n s  o f t h i s  fo rm u la tio n —fo r  
A u stin  th e  "use" o f  th e  term in v o lv e s  th e  whole co n tex t o f  f a c t - s t a t in g  d i s ­
c o u r se , w h ile  fo r  Straw son i t  i s  l im ite d  to  what would seem to  be one s o r t ,  
or perhaps one a sp e c t  o f  i t s  m eaning.
Im p lic a t io n s  fo r  th e  A n a ly s is  o f  Truth
Having now examined th e  T racta tu s p r o p o s it io n a l th eory  and two o r d i­
nary language a n a ly se s  o f  tr u th  and seen  some o f  th e  rea so n s none o f  them i s  
w h olly  s a t i s f a c t o r y ,  what are th e  im p lic a t io n s  fo r  th e  problem  of th e  a n a l­
y s i s  o f  tru th ?  In t h i s  s e c t io n  I  s h a l l  d is c u s s  what I  tak e th e se  im p lic a ­
t io n s  to  b e , and o u t l in e  what I  s h a l l  attem pt to  do in  th e  fo llo w in g  chap­
t e r s  .
I t  was argued above th a t  th e  n o tio n  o f  a p r o p o s it io n , which i s  funda­
m ental t o  th e  T r a c ta tu s 1 a n a ly se s  o f  both  meaning and tr u th , i s  in c o n s is t e n t  
w ith  th e  v iew , a ccep ted  in  t h i s  s tu d y , th a t  meaning i s  u s e .  W riting from a
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s im ila r  p o in t  o f vie-w, both  A u stin  and Straw son renounce t h i s  n o tio n  o f  a 
p r o p o s it io n , and i t  embodies a view o f  meaning which W it tg e n s te in ’ s la t e r
As was d is c u s se d  on pp . 4 - 5  , however, th e  n o tio n  i s  a d u a l one, 
b e in g  d e f in a b le  b o th  as "the meaning o f  a sen ten ce"  and as " that which i s  
tr u e  or f a l s e ."  W hile th e  T r a c ta tu s 1 n o t io n  o f a p r o p o s it io n  i s  in c o n s i s t ­
e n t w ith  th e  p o in t  o f  view o f  th e  study a t  hand, i t  w i l l  be argued th a t  
th e  n o tio n  o f  "the meaning o f  a s e n te n c e ” i s  n ot o n ly  c o n s is te n t  w ith , but 
im portant t o ,  a u se  view  o f m eaning. S econ d ly , i t  w i l l  be argued th a t  th e  
n o tio n  o f  som ething th a t  i s  t r u e  or f a l s e  i s  im portant in  th e  a n a ly s is  o f  
th e  problem o f t r u t h .
The c r i t iq u e  o f  the a n a ly se s  o f  A u stin  and Straw son su g g e sts  c e r ta in  
requ irem ents fo r  an in te r p r e ta t io n  o f th e  use th eo ry  o f  meaning and fo r  th e  
fo rm u la tio n  o f th e  problem o f  tr u th :  A view  o f meaning should  in c lu d e  th e
q u estio n  o f  th e  n a tu re  o f th e  meaning o f  s e n te n c e s ,  as c o n tr a ste d  w ith  th a t  
o f  words. S eco n d ly , th e  problem  o f tr u th  should  be in te r p r e te d  as in v o lv ­
in g  "depth grammar” as w e ll  a s  " su rface grammar." In th e  term s o f t h i s  
stu d y , th e  problem o f  tru th  i s  one o f what th e con cep t o f  tr u th  i s .  T his 
req u ir es  exam in ation , i t  w i l l  be argued, n o t on ly  o f  th e  "use o f  ’t r u e , '"  
b u t o f th e  u se  o f  sta tem en ts  s a id  to  be tr u e .
T h erefo re , in  Chapters I I  and I I I  w i l l  be d evelop ed  an in t e r p r e ta ­
t io n  o f th e  use view  o f  meaning w ith  th e  s p e c ia l  purpose o f  d ev e lo p in g  a 
view  of th e  nature o f  s e n t e n t ia l  m eaning. And, in  Chapter IV w i l l  be d e ­
veloped  a view  o f th e  g en era l n atu re o f  p h ilo s o p h ic  prob lem s, in  order to  
in te r p r e t  th e  fo rm u la tio n  o f  th e  problem o f  tr u th  a s  "the use o f  ' t r u e . '"
u se  view o f  meaning1 was e x p l i c i t l y  d eveloped  to  c o u n te r a c t .
P h ilo s o p h ic a l I n v e s t ig a t io n s  (New York:
M acm illan C o ., 1 9 5 3 ).
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The in te r p r e ta t io n  o f  th e  meaning o f  words and se n te n c e s  g iv e n  in  
C hapters I I  and I I I  w i l l  r e s u l t  in  v iew in g  sen ten ces  as th e fundam ental 
u n it s  o f  m eaning, in  a manner somewhat s im ila r  to  ’'p r o p o s it io n s . '1 The i n ­
te r p r e ta t io n  o f p h ilo so p h ic  problem s g iv e n  in  Chapter 4 w i l l  r e s u l t  in  
t r e a t in g  tr u th  as a problem  about a ty p e  o f  use o f  a typ e  o f  s e n te n c e , and 
th e  n o tio n  o f " that which i s  tru e  or f a ls e "  i s  used in  th e  a n a ly s is  o f  
t r u th .
Thus, a lth ou gh  th e T racta tu s n o tio n  o f a p r o p o s it io n  i s  in c o n s i s t ­
e n t w ith  a u se  view  o f m eaning, i t s  two c e n tr a l a s p e c t s ,  "the meaning o f  a 
sen ten ce"  and " that w hich i s  tru e  or f a l s e ,"  w i l l  be argued to  be th e o r e t ic  
con cep ts  u s e f u l  in  th e  a n a ly s is  o f  tr u th .
The th eo ry  o f  tr u th  d evelop ed  in  Chapter V r e s u l t s  from a view  o f  
th e  meaning o f  a sen ten ce  as an a c t io n  form ing p a r t o f  an a c t i v i t y ,  and a 
view  o f  tr u th  as an a c t i v i t y  o f  a s s e r t io n s  (a typ e o f  a c t io n  or s e n te n c e ) .
CHAPTER I I
MEANING AS USE: WORDS AND RULES
T h is chapter w i l l  examine th e  meaning and im p lic a t io n s  o f  th e  
c o n te n tio n  th a t  "the meaning o f  a word i s  i t s  u se ."  An in te r p r e ta t io n  o f  
t h i s  view  w i l l  he d evelop ed  from th e  a n a ly s is ,  f i r s t ,  o f  th e  su b je c t  
p h ra se , "the meaning o f  a word," and, secon d , o f  th e  p red ic a te d  term , 
“u s e .” The in te r p r e ta t io n  thus developed  v iew s words as " p o ss ib le  mean­
ings"  th a t  presuppose se n te n c e s  or " actu a l m eanings."  The n o tio n  o f  "the 
meaning o f  a s e n t e n c e - i . e . ,  th e  n o tio n  o f  th e meaning o f  a sen ten ce  as 
d i s t i n c t  and d i f f e r e n t  from th e meaning o f w o r d s - - is  thus h e ld  to  be n e c ­
e ssa r y  as a working p h ilo s o p h ic  co n cep t, i f  th e  view  o f th e  meaning o f  
words as t h e ir  u se i s  in te r p r e te d  ad eq u a te ly  fo r  d e a lin g  w ith  th e  prob­
lems o f  t h i s  stu d y .
The"Meaning o f a Word"
In  "The Meaning o f a Word," 1 J . L. A u stin  a s s e r t s  th a t  th e  "gen ­
e r a l  q u e s t io n , 'What i s  th e  meaning o f  a word?'" i s  "spurious" (p . 2 5 ) ,  
and, in d eed , a "nonsense q u estion "  (p . 2 6 ) .  He argues th a t  p h ilo so p h ers  
are le d  to  ask  i t  on a model w ith  q u e s tio n s  o f  the form: "What i s  th e
meaning o f  (th e  word) 'x '? "  and th a t  th e  error in  th e  g e n e r a liz e d  form  
"What i s  th e  meaning o f  a word?" i s  exposed  i f  th e  model i s  changed to  
"What i s  an ’x 'J"  Then, " i t  becomes very  d i f f i c u l t  to  form u late any
’*’j .  L. A u s t in , "The Meaning o f  a Word," P h ilo so p h ic a l Papers 
(O xford: C larendon P r e s s ,  1961) ,  pp. 23-1+3.
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g e n e r a l q u estio n  w hich cou ld  impose on us fo r  a moment. Perhaps 'What 
i s  an y th in g? ' . . .  In th e  same way, we should  n ot perhaps be tem pted to  
g e n e r a liz e  such a q u e s tio n  as 'Does he know th e  meaning o f  th e  word 
"rat"?' 'Does he know th e  meaning o f  a word?' would be s i l l y "  (p . 2 6 ) .
In co n n ectio n  w ith  t h i s  t h e s i s ,  A u stin  g iv e s  two l i s t s ,  one o f  
"specim ens o f sen se"  and another o f  "specim ens o f  nonsense" (p . 2 3 ) .  The 
specim ens o f  sen se  are a l l  q u e s tio n s  a sk in g  what th e meaning o f  a p a r t i c ­
u la r  word, phrase or sen ten ce  i s .  The specim ens o f  nonsense in c lu d e  d i f ­
f e r e n t  forms o f th e  q u e s tio n , "What i s  th e  'm eaning' o f  words?” and o f  
"What i s  th e  meaning o f 'What i s  th e  "meaning" o f  w ords?'" A u s t in 's  sp e ­
cimens o f  nonsense sound co n s id era b ly  more n o n se n s ic a l than  e i th e r  o f  
th e se  epitom e s e n te n c e s ,  but in  f a c t  on ly  two o f  th e  specim en se n te n c e s  
can r e a l ly  be s a id  t o  be "nonsense,"  V iz . ,  "What is - th e -m e a n in g -o f - ( th e -  
w o r d - ) - ' r a t '?" and "What i s  th e 'm eaning' o f  ( th e  word) 'r a t '? "  These two 
sen ten ces  (which are d i f f e r e n t  ways o f  a sk in g  "What i s  th e  'm eaning' o f  
'x '?"  and which a re  not covered  by th e  epitom e se n te n c e s  g iv e n ) are non­
s e n s ic a l  - -a lth o u g h  "'What i s  th e  meaning o f  'x '?"  does make s e n se . S in ce  
b oth  "meaning" and "rat" (or th e  v a r ia b le  "x") are in  in v e r te d  commas in  
A u s t in 's  se n te n c e , i t  combines in  a n o n se n s ic a l fa s h io n  two d i f f e r e n t  q u e s ­
t io n s :  ( l )  "What i s  th e meaning o f 'm eaning'?" and (2 )  "What i s  th e  mean­
in g  o f  'x '? "  That i s ,  the q u e s tio n  red u ces to :  "What i s  the meaning o f  
'm eaning' in so fa r  a s  i t  r e l a t e s  e x c lu s iv e ly  to  th e word 'r a t '? "  The answer 
i s ,  o f  c o u r se , t h a t  th ere  i s  no such m eaning, or a sp e c t  o f  th e  m eaning, o f  
"meaning." Thus, th e  q u e s tio n  i s  nonsense because th e meaning o f  "meaning" 
p rec lu d es  i t  u se  in  such a way. The q u e s tio n  i s  nonsense b ecause any 
answer t o  i t —i f  t o  th e  p o in t--w o u ld  be n on sen se, not b ecause th e  q u e s tio n  
i t s e l f  i s  "m ean ingless."
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A u s t in 's  paper i s  an attem pt to  show th a t  only q u estio n s ask in g  
fo r  th e meaning o f  s p e c i f i c  words are " sen se1; w h ile  a l l  "general" q u es­
t io n s  about meaning are nonsense because they may be reduced to  th e  
epitom e q u estion : "What i s  the meaning o f a word?" B ut, in so fa r  as any
p h ilosop h er asks t h i s  q u estio n , i t  i s  synonymous w ith  "What i s  th e  mean­
in g  o f words?" ra th er  th a n --a s  A u stin  t r e a t s  i t —"What i s  th e  meaning o f  
any o ld  word?" T his i s  b es id e  th e p o in t  s in c e  i t  tak es "any word" as syn­
onymous w ith  " ju st any word whatsoever" rath er than as a phrase s p e c ify in g  
the s o r t  o f  meaning asked fo r  by th e  q u estio n .
The s o r t  o f  o b je c t io n  th a t  A u stin  r a is e s  to  ask ing "What i s  the  
meaning o f a word?" would im ply, i f  i t  were v a l id ,  strange th in g s about
th e nature o f l i n g u i s t i c  meaning. I t  would imply th a t the nature o f mean­
in g  i t s e l f  cannot be in v e s t ig a te d  s in c e  every word has a unique meaning,
one having noth ing in  common w ith  a l l  other words. But, what words may be
sa id  to  have in  common i s ,  o f  cou rse , not what they  mean, b u t, r a th e r ,  
th a t  they mean. I t  i s  the f a c t  th a t  each one does have a p a r tic u la r  mean­
ing th a t  causes i t  to  be c l a s s i f i e d  as a word. I t  i s  a t  t h is  p o in t th a t  
we then ask th e fu rth er  q u estio n , "What i s  the meaning o f a word?" i . e . ,  
"What c o n s t itu te s  t h i s  f a c t  in  v ir tu e  o f  which a word i s  so c la s s if ie d ? "  
This q u estio n  c a l l s  fo r  an ex p la n a tio n  o f l i n g u i s t i c  meaning in  g en era l and 
word-meaning in  p a r t ic u la r .
The q u estio n  i s  thus perhaps more c le a r ly  framed a s ,  "How, or in  
what way, do words have meaning?" in  order to  avoid  m istak ing th e  q u estion  
fo r  a sk in g , "What do a l l  words mean?" which i s ,  o f  cou rse, absurd. We are  
lo o k in g , th en , fo r  a c h a r a c te r iz a t io n  o f the manner in  which any word means, 
and in  v ir tu e  o f which i t  i s  a word. Such a d e sc r ip tio n  i s  ventured in
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th e  view th a t  "the meaning o f  a word i s  i t s  u se ."  "Use" i s  here g iven  
as ch a r a c te r iz in g  th e manner in  which a word has a meaning.
"Use"
"Use" i s  a very common word th a t  probably i s  used in  a greater  
v a r ie ty  o f  ways and co n tex ts  than "mean," "meaning," e t c .  The view th a t  
"the meaning i s  the use" may be viewed as r e s u lt in g  from th e fo llo w in g  
argument: "In order to  determ ine the meaning o f a word, i t  must be seen
how the word i s  u sed . When i t  i s  seen  how i t  i s  u sed , th a t i s  to  see  i t s
meaning. To know how i t  i s  u sed , i s  to  know i t s  meaning in  th e f u l l e s t
sen se ."  T his seems a c lea r  and stra igh tforw ard  argument. A word ob­
v io u s ly  has meaning on ly  in so fa r  as i t  i s  used co n v en tio n a lly  in  c e r ta in  
ways w ith in  a language. There are p i t f a l l s  in  the argument, however, 
and some o f them may be tra ced  to  the h ig h ly  f l e x i b l e  meaning o f "use."
Consider the sta tem en ts:
1) The meaning o f  a word c o n s is t s  in  how i t  i s  used .
2 ) The meaning o f  a word c o n s is t s  in  i t s  u se .
The d if fe r e n c e  between th ese  two statem en ts might appear to  be n e g l ig ib le .  
Statem ent 1 , however, i s  most n a tu r a lly  in terp re ted  as rep ea tin g  what was 
sa id  in  th e preceding paragraph: A word has meaning only in so fa r  as i t
i s  used co n v en tio n a lly  in  c e r ta in  ways. Statem ent 2 i s  som ething e l s e  
aga in , and req u ires  fu rth er  argument to  e s t a b l is h  i t .  This i s  not to  sa y ,  
o f cou rse , th a t  " it s  u se ,"  r e fe r r in g  to  th e  use o f an yth in g , never can be 
employed id io m a tic a lly  as synonymous w ith  "how i t  i s  used ,"  but in  some 
co n tex ts  th e  two statem ents would be d i f f e r e n t  and d if f e r e n t  s o r ts  o f  i n ­
fere n c es  might be drawn from them.
Statem ent 1 i s  accep tab le  because any p a r tic u la r  word c le a r ly  has
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the meaning i t  has because co n v en tio n a lly  i t  has been used in  c e r ta in  
ways. What i t  means, or what i t s  meaning i s ,  however, would appear to  be 
another problem. I t  i s  t h is  second problem to  which statem ent 2 appears 
to  be a s o lu t io n . I t  might be construed  as a g en era l s o lu t io n  to  any in ­
stance o f th e  q u e s tio n , "What does t h i s  (p a r t ic u la r )  word mean?" I t  i s  
apparent what i s  meant by say in g  th a t  how any word has meaning i s  through  
being  used in  th e  ways th a t  i t  i s  used . I t  i s  fa r  l e s s  apparent what 
might be meant by say in g  th a t th e meaning o f  any word " i£  i t s  u se ."
Statem ents 1 and 2 taken  to g eth er  p resen t a c r u c ia l is s u e  in  th e  
"use" view o f meaning. One d if fe r e n c e  between them has been d iscu sse d :  
Statem ent 1 i s  in te r p r e ta b le  as an answer to  a g en era l q u estio n  about the  
meaning o f any word or th e  meaning o f a l l  words: statem ent 2 can be taken
to  be in  answer to  th e  same q u e s t io n - - in  which case  i t  would be id e n t ic a l  
in  meaning w ith  statem ent l - - o r  to  be in  answer to  what th e  meaning o f any 
p a r tic u la r  word i s .  What statem ent 2 m ight mean and imply in  t h is  second  
sen se i s  not im m ediately e v id e n t . In order to  in v e s t ig a te  i t ,  i t  w i l l  be 
u s e fu l to  examine a second s e t  o f sta tem en ts:
la )  To -understand the meaning o f a word i s  t o  understand how 
to  use i t .
2a) To understand th e  meaning o f a word i s  to  understand how i t  
i s  used .
I t  w i l l  be n o tic e d  th a t  e ith e r  o f  th ese  statem ents might seem to  
imply or be im plied  by e ith e r  statem ent 1 or 2 .  I f  the meaning o f a word 
c o n s is t s  in  how i t  i s  u sed , then  to  understand t h is  meaning would be to  
understand how to  use the word. And i f  th e  meaning o f  a word c o n s is t s  in  
i t s  u se , then  to  understand t h is  meaning would be to  understand how i t  i s
I
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u sed . I f  one understands how a word i s  used , he must a ls o  understand how
to  use i t .  To understand how to  use a word, however, does not imply th a t
one understands how i t  i s  u sed . That th e se  are d if f e r e n t  i s  ev id en t from 
th e f a c t  th a t  a judgment th a t  someone understands how to  u se  a g iven  word 
i s  based on h is  c o r r e c t  use o f  i t ,  whereas a judgment th a t  someone under­
stands how a word i s  used would be based on h is  d e sc r ip t io n  o f i t s  char­
a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  u s e . "To understand th e  meaning" in  sta tem ent la  thus r e ­
f e r s  to  th e  understanding o f  a d if f e r e n t  so r t  o f  th in g  from the su b je c t  o f  
understanding in  2a .
I t  ap p ears, th en , th a t  "meaning" i s  used in  d if f e r e n t  ways in  
sta tem en ts la  and 2a . In la  "meaning" r e fe r s  to  som ething the understand­
in g  o f  which i s  evidenced  by co r r e c t u se . In 2a "meaning" i s  something the
understanding o f which i s  evidenced  by the d e s c r ip t io n , ra th er  than th e  
a c t  o f  u se , o f  sen ten ces  th a t  would be taken as ev idence fo r  understanding  
meaning in  l a .  S u f f ic ie n t  ev idence fo r  "understanding the meaning o f  a 
word" in  the sen se  o f  la  cou ld  c o n s is t  e n t ir e ly  o f  sen ten ces in corp oratin g  
the word. S u f f i c ie n t  ev idence fo r  "understanding the meaning o f a word" 
in  th e  sen se  o f 2a would in c lu d e sen ten ces  or phrases in co rp o ra tin g  th e  
word, but which would be w ith in  q u o ta tio n  marks and which would serv e  as 
m a te r ia l fo r  a n a ly s is  o f  th e  u se  o f th e  word.
The d if fe r e n c e  here i s  th a t  la  r e fe r s  to  the co n d itio n s  o f  speaking  
and understanding a word, th a t  i s ,  u sin g  i t .  Statem ent 2 a , on th e other  
hand, r e fe r s  to  th e  d e sc r ip t io n  o f  th e se  c o n d it io n s . In order to  c la r i f y  
the meanings o f  words o f  ordinary language, i t  i s  ob v iou sly  u s e fu l to  r e a l ­
iz e  th a t  they  have whatever meanings th ey  have by v ir tu e  o f  th e ir  u se , th a t  
t h i s  i s  the source o f th e ir  m eanings. This i s  what i s  form ulated in  la .  
Statem ent 2a , on th e other hand, seems to  say th a t  there i s  another way in
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which we may be sa id  t o  understand th e meaning o f  a word—t h a t  o f  b e in g  
a b le  to  e x p la in  how i t  i s  u sed . T his may be in te r p r e te d  as eq u atin g  t h i s  
s o r t  o f  u n derstan d in g  w ith  th e  m echanics o f  i t s  u s e ,  ra th er  th an  th e  a c t  
o f  use o f  i t .
S tatem ents 1 and 2 are about th e  meaning o f  words w hereas la  and  
2a are about th e u n derstand ing  o f (th e  meanings o f )  words. W ith t h is  d i f ­
fe r e n c e , 1 and la  o th erw ise  share a r e fe r e n c e  to  sou rce  o f m eaning, and 
2 and 2a share a r e fe r e n c e  to  th e nature o f  any p a r t ic u la r  m eaning. The 
common e lem en ts in  th e se  two p a ir s  o f  sen ten ces  may be ex p ressed  as:
lb )  To have meaning i s  t o  have a c o n v e n tio n a l use ( l  and l a ) .
2b ) A meaning i s  a co n v en tio n a l u se  (2  and 2 a ) .
That 1 seems t o  im ply 2 ,  and th a t  la  seems t o  imply 2 a ,  i s  due t o  
th e  apparent eq u iv a le n c e  o f  lb  and 2b , p a r t ly  co n cea led  w ith in  th e se  o th er  
s ta te m e n ts . S tatem ent lb  form u la tes an answer to  th e  q u e s t io n , "What i s  
th e  source o f  m eanings": 2b form u la tes  an answer t o  the q u e s t io n , "What
i s  a meaning?" The c o n tr a s t  betw een lb  and 2b b r in g s  out th e  need to  a v o id  
a g e n e t ic  f a l l a c y  in  w hich source and product are id e n t i f i e d ,  or a t  l e a s t  
confused  w ith  one a n o th er .
S tatem ents la  and 2a show th e  need to  d is t in g u is h  a l s o  betw een th e  
th eory  o f  a p r a c t ic e  ( 2a ) and the p r a c t ic e  i t s e l f  ( l a ) .  As th e  d is c u s s io n  
o f  them b r in g s  o u t, what i s  sa id  about th e  source o f  meaning o f  words may 
be transform ed im properly in to  a sta tem en t about th e  nature o f  p h ilo so p h ic  
in v e s t ig a t io n .
The f i r s t  p a ir  o f  sta tem en ts  fo c u se s  on "how used" a s  opposed to  
"use"; th e  second p a ir  on "understanding how to  use"  as opposed to  "under­
sta n d in g  how used" and th e  th ir d  on "source o f  meaning" as opposed to  
"meaning." They show how "use,"  b e s id e s  b e in g  in  some c o n te x ts  s u b s ta n t ia l ly
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synonymous w ith  "how u s e d / '  may a ls o  be in te r p r e te d  ( in  th e  co n tex t o f  
"understanding how used") as th e  unique job o f  th e  p h ilo so p h ic  in v e s t ig a ­
t io n  o f m eaning, and, in  a more g en era l sen se  ( i n  2b) as meaning i t s e l f .
From co n s id er in g  th e se  va r io u s se n se s  o f  "use,"  i t  may be seen  
th a t  i t  i s  d e s ir a b le  th a t  a u se  th eory  o f  meaning be e s ta b lis h e d  on a 
th e o r e t ic  framework th a t  p rov id es  a d i f f e r e n t ia t io n  o f:  ( l )  th e  source
o f  meaning from meaning i t s e l f ,  and (2 ) the p r a c t ic e  or e x e r c is e  o f  la n ­
guage from th e th eory  o f  t h i s  p r a c t ic e .
F u n ction  and Purpose 
A use view o f meaning i s  in  o p p o sit io n  to  v iew s in  w hich, im p lic ­
i t l y  or e x p l i c i t l y ,  meaning i s  id e n t i f i e d  w ith  some s o r t  o f  "object"  named 
by a word. The fo r e g o in g  p a ir s  o f  sta tem en ts a l l  c o n tr a d ic t  such naming 
th e o r ie s  o f  meaning.
A u se  view i s  a ls o  in  o p p o s it io n  to  th e o r ie s  o f  meaning in  which  
words are tr e a te d  as v e h ic le s  o f  th e  purposes o f  th e ir  u se r s . Consider  
th e sta tem en ts:
1 c ) The meaning o f  a word c o n s is t s  in  how i t  fu n c t io n s .
2 c )  The meaning o f a word c o n s is t s  in  i t s  fu n c t io n .
These sta tem en ts have been ob tained  from 1 and 2 by s u b s t itu t in g  
" fu n ctio n ,"  in  two o f i t s  v a r io u s  form s, fo r  th e  two d if f e r e n t  forms o f  
"use" in  1 and 2 . The sen se  o f  "use" as more or l e s s  synonymous w ith  
"function"  i s  th e dominant sen se  in  th e f i r s t  th r e e  p a ir s  o f  sta tem en ts  
d is c u s se d , but i s  not an unambiguous synonym fo r  "use" in  th e se  s ta tem en ts . 
I f  i t  w ere, th ere  would be a c lo s e  p a r a l l e l  betw een 1 and l c ,  whereas th ey  
a c tu a lly  d i f f e r  co n s id e r a b ly . One in v o lv e s  an im plied  user or u sers  o f  
w ords, which l c  does n o t ,  and u s u a lly  would n ot be so construed  because
o f th e  d if f e r e n c e  in  th e  fu n c t io n s  o f  " fu n c tio n ” and " u s e .”
The im p lic a t io n  o f  a speaker or speakers in  1 shows why a sen se  
o f "use" in v o lv in g  "purpose" cou ld  be thought to  be in v o lv e d  in  or im p lied  
by sta tem en t 1 . This sen se  o f  "use" i s  found in  th e  p hrases "used for"  
and "used to ,"  and q u estio n s  o f  th e  purpose o f th e  use o f  words would be 
fu r th er  q u e s tio n s  beyond th a t  im p l ic i t ly  answered by sta tem en t 1 , s in c e  
"how" in d ic a te s  th a t  " function"  i s  the sen se  o f  "use" h ere . I f  "purpose"  
were im m ediately  in v o lv e d , th e  sta tem en t would have to  be changed to  read , 
"The meaning o f  a word c o n s is t s  in  why i t  i s  u s e d .” With t h i s  change, i f  
1 and 2 were taken as e q u iv a le n t , 2 cou ld  be con stru ed  as "The m eaning o f  
a word c o n s is t s  in  i t s  purpose."
A s im ila r  s i t u a t io n  e x i s t s  in  th e  second p a ir  o f  s ta te m e n ts . S t a t e ­
ment l a ,  "To understand th e  meaning o f  a word i s  t o  understand how to  use 
i t , ” in d ic a te s  aga in  th e sen se  o f  "use" as " fu n c tio n ."  In  2a , "To under­
stand th e  meaning o f a word i s  t o  understand how i t  i s  u sed ,"  "how" ag a in  
in d ic a te s  th e  sen se  o f " fu n c tio n ."  " F unction ,"  however, mpy be read  in to  2a 
—as "To understand th e meaning o f a word i s  to  understand how i t  fu n c tio n s"  
- -b u t  not in to  l a ,  where “how to  use i t"  cannot be t r a n s la te d  in to  a phrase 
c o n ta in in g  " fu n ctio n ."  A speaker i s  im p lied  h ere , a l s o ,  and so  th e  se n se  o f  
"purpose" i s  a ls o  to  th a t  e x te n t  im p lied .
In  th e th ir d  p a ir  o f  s ta te m e n ts , " function"  may be s u b s t itu te d  fo r  
th e  s in g le  word "use" in  both  o f them. S tatem ent lb ,  "To have meaning i s  to  
have a c o n v en tio n a l u se ,"  may be tr a n s la te d  in to  "To have meaning i s  to  have 
a c o n v en tio n a l fu n ction "  (or " fu n ctio n  e s ta b lis h e d  by con ven tion " ); and 2b ,
"A meaning i s  a co n v en tio n a l u s e ,"  becomes "A meaning i s  a c o n v en tio n a l fu n c ­
t i o n ” (or " fu n ctio n  e s ta b lis h e d  by co n v en tio n " ). S in ce  lb  and 2b were sa id
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to  ex p ress the common elem ents in  th e preced ing s e t s  o f  sta tem en ts ( l  and 
2 ; la  and 2a ) ,  i t  i s  cu r io u s and s ig n i f ic a n t  th a t  lb  and 2b both  can be 
reform ulated  w ith  " function"  w h ile  2 and 2a cannot.
An " in te n tio n a l"  a sp e c t  o f  th e  use th eory  i s  im p lied  by th e  idiom s 
employed in  2 and 2a . T his a sp e c t o f  th e  use th eory  i s ,  fu r th e r , not 
con fin ed  to  q u estio n s  about th e source o f  m eaning, but i s  in v o lv ed  a ls o  
in  q u estio n s  about th e  understanding o f  meaning (2a) and th e  nature o f  
meaning (2 ) .
The se n se s  o f  "use" as " function"  and as "purpose" are q u ite  d i f ­
f e r e n t ,  a lth ou gh  n ot alw ays d i s t i n c t .  To d e sc r ib e  the fu n c tio n  o f  some­
th in g  i s  to  d esc r ib e  th e  o p era tio n  o f  one elem ent w ith in  a com plex. To 
d escr ib e  a purpose, on th e other hand, i s  to  d e sc r ib e  what the end o f  a 
ta sk  i s :  th e  reason s fo r  doing som ething, o r , som etim es, th e  a c tu a l r e ­
s u l t s  o f  th e  doing or o p era tin g  o f  som ething. T his i s  n o t to  say  th a t  th e  
q u estio n s  o f  how and why som ething i s  used never o v er la p . They do, in  
f a c t ,  fr e q u e n tly  over lap  to  such an e x te n t  th a t  to  ask th e  one q u estio n  
i s  to  a sk , a t  th e  same t im e , th e  o th e r . To d esc r ib e  a fu n c tio n  may in ­
v o lv e  the d e s c r ip t io n  o f  a purpose, and, c o n v e r se ly , t o  d esc r ib e  a purpose 
may in v o lv e  d e sc r ib in g  a fu n c t io n , but they are d is t in g u is h a b ly  d i f f e r e n t  
ty p es  o f  d e s c r ip t io n .
Both o f  chese se n se s  o f "use" are im p lic i t  in  speak ing o f  "the use"  
o f words. Of co u rse , i t  would alw ays be d i f f i c u l t  to  d is c u s s  th e  fu n c tio n  
o f a w ord --th e m echanics o f  i t s  u se —w ithout r e fe r e n c e  to  a c tu a l or p o s­
s ib le  purposes fo r  u sin g  i t .  Perhaps in  some ca ses  i t  even  would be impos­
s i b l e .  And, in  speaking o f th e  source o f the meaning o f  a word, we may say  
th a t  i t  has what meaning i t  has as a r e s u l t  o f  i t s  b e in g  used in  c e r ta in
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w ays. We may a ls o  say th a t  i t  has what meaning i t  has as a r e s u l t  o f  
b e in g  used fo r  c e r ta in  p u rp o se s .
A t o o l  such as a hoe i s  made in  a c e r ta in  form in  order to  serv e  
c e r ta in  p u rp o ses. I f  i t  i s  used fo r  i t s  purpose, h o e in g , th en  the form  
in  which i t  was made c o n tr ib u te s  to  i t s  f u l f i l l i n g  i t s  purpose. Would 
one say th a t  a hoe i s  th e sort o f  t o o l  i t  i s  because i t  i s  u sed  in  c e r ta in  
ways? Or, would one say  th a t  i t  i s  a hoe b ecau se i t  i s  used fo r  c e r ta in  
purposes? The ways in  w hich a hoe i s  used and th e purposes fo r  which i t  
i s  used are n ea r ly  in d is t in g u is h a b le .  T his t o o l  has a p a r t ic u la r  form in  
w hich i t  was p u rp ose ly  made in  order to  s u i t  i t  fo r  u se  in  p a r t ic u la r  ways 
fo r  p a r t ic u la r  p u rp oses.
We may c a l l  a " t o o l ,1' though, an y th in g  th a t  i s  used to  b r in g  about 
som eth ing. Som ething l i k e  a rock  or a hunk o f  s t e e l ,  fo r  in s ta n c e , may be 
c a l le d  a " too l"  in so fa r  as i t  i s  used fo r  a purpose o f  b r in g in g  som ething  
ab ou t. When such o b je c ts  a re  c a l le d  t o o l s  i t  i s  w ith  r e fe r e n c e  to  such  
u ses  fo r  a purpose. I t  does not make s e n s e , in  a g en era l c o n te x t , to  say  
th a t  rocks are  t o o l s ,  a lth ou gh  i t  does make sen se  in  any c o n te x t to  say  th a t  
any m a te r ia l o b je c t  such as a rock  may be used  as a t o o l .
B u t, a hoe i s  a t o o l  whether i t  ever  i s  used as one or n o t, w h ile
a rock i s  one on ly  when i t  i s  used as one. The p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  use th a t  i s
b u i l t  in to  th e  hoe w arrants c a l l in g  i t  a t o o l .  Such a p o s s i b i l i t y  i s  n o t
b u i l t  in to  a ro ck , b u t , r a th e r , i s  seen  in  i t  whenever i t  i s  c a l le d  a t o o l .
When a rock  i s  a c tu a l ly  b e in g  used as a t o o l - - f o r  th e  purpose o f  h o e in g , 
fo r  e x a m p le -- it  may be c a l le d  a t o o l .  B u t, when i t  i s  not a c tu a lly  b e in g  
used  fo r  t h i s  purpose, th en  t h i s  p o s s i b i l i t y  or other p o s s i b i l i t i e s  o f  u se  
are r e fe r r e d  to - - a r e  in d ic a te d  by th e  e x p l i c i t  or im p l ic i t  co n tex t--w h en  i t
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i s  c a l le d  as t o o l .  A rock  may be c a l le d  a t o o l  on ly  in  r e fe r e n c e  to  s p e ­
c i f i c ,  a c tu a l in s ta n c e s  o f  i t s  use as a to o l;  b u t , in  g e n e r a l , i t  may be 
s a id  on ly  th a t  a rock  may be used as a t o o l  fo r  v a r io u s  p u rp o ses, i . e . ,  th a t  
i t  i s  a p o s s ib le  t o o l .
So, t o  say  th a t  th e  meaning o f words i s  th e ir  u se  and in te r p r e t  
them on an an a logy  w ith  t o o l s ,  s t i l l  le a v e s  open th e  q u e s tio n s  o f  w hether 
and in  what ways l i n g u i s t i c  meaning i s  s im ila r  t o  p o s s ib le  and to  a c tu a l  
t o o l s - - t o o l s  w ith  b u i l t - i n  purposes and o b je c ts  w ith  p o s s ib le  u se s  as t o o l s .
C onventions and M e a n in g -a s -P o s s ib ility  
To speak o f  th e  meaning o f words a t  a l l  may seem to  im ply a d i s ­
t in c t i o n  betw een words and t h e ir  m eanings. We fr e q u e n tly  speak in  other  
c o n te x t s ,  as w e l l ,  o f  th e  "meanings o f  w ords," commonly sa y in g  th in g s  l i k e  
"What does th a t  word mean?" "I d o n 't  know th e  meaning o f  th a t ,"  e t c .  But 
what i s  a word as d is t in g u is h e d  from i t s  meaning? There are words such as 
a re  found in  Lewis C a r r o ll 's  nonsense v e r se s  th a t  could  be c a l le d  "meaning­
l e s s  w ords."  B u t, s in c e  th ey  are m ean ingless i t  would be b e t te r  fo r  most 
purposes n o t to  c a l l  them words a t  a l l ,  A reason  th ey  m ight be c a l le d  
words i s  th a t  th ey  lo o k  and sound l i k e  th em --th ey  can be pronounced and have 
some s e r ie s  o f  l e t t e r s  found in  a c tu a l words in  our lan gu age. P resen ted  
w ith  " l i b i t , "  how ever, one would be l e s s  in c l in e d  to  c a l l  t h i s  s e r ie s  o f  
l e t t e r s  a word, even i f  p r in te d  as one w ith in  som ething th a t  lo o k s  l i k e  a 
sen ten ce  o f  some s o r t .
So, what m ight be c a l le d  a word depends to  a la r g e  e x te n t  on the  
c h a r a c t e r is t ic s  o f  groups o f  sounds and l e t t e r s  th a t  do have meaning in  our 
lan gu age. We are n o t in c l in e d  to  c a l l  any m ean in g less  sound a "m eaningless
w ord." T h is i s  our tendency b ecause ''-word" in  many c o n te x ts  i s  e q u iv a le n t  
to  "m eaningful sound" (or  th e  w r it te n  symbol fo r  o n e ). When we ask  about 
th e  meaning o f  w ords, we are  u s in g  "word" in  th e  sen se  o f  " a r t ic u la te d  
sound or th e symbol fo r  i t . "  B u t, in  u s in g  i t  in  t h i s  sen se  i t  i s  p o in t ­
l e s s  t o  s p e c if y  a word as opposed to  p a rt o f  o n e - - i t s  s y l l a b l e s ,  fo r  in -  
s ta n c e --b e c a u se  both  th e  whole word and each o f i t s  component sounds or 
l e t t e r s  are  a r t ic u la t e d  sounds or th e  symbols fo r  them. So , a word i s  not 
tr e a te d  as such u n le s s  i t  i s  known to  be m ean in g fu l. A word i s  n ot d i s ­
t in g u is h a b le  from i t s  meaning u n t i l  i t  i s  known to  be a word, u n t i l  i t  i s  
known to  have a m eaning.
So, to  speak o f  th e  meanings o f  words m ight seem to  have more 
p o in ts  o f  s im i la r i t y  w ith  th e  u se  o f a rock  as a t o o l  than w ith  th e u se  o f  
a hoe. This m ight seem to  be th e  case  b ecau se a word may be sa id  to  have 
no more meaning "in i t s e l f , "  th a t  i s ,  as a mere a r t ic u la te d  sound, than  a 
ro ck , in  i t s e l f ,  i s  a t o o l  o f  any s o r t .  What makes a sound a word i s  i t s  
use as a meaning; what makes a rock  a hammer i s  i t s  use as a hammer.
On account o f  t h is  seem ing s im i la r i t y ,  i t  i s  u s e fu l  t o  em phasize 
th e con ven tion s o f  th e  u se  o f  words in  d is c u s s io n s  o f  t h e ir  m eaning. F or, 
w h ile  a m anufactured t o o l  such as a hammer has th e  use i t  has because i t  
was d esig n ed  fo r  th a t  purpose, a word has th e  meaning i t  has b ecau se i t  has 
been e s ta b lis h e d  by c o n v en tio n . Both m anufactured t o o ls  and words are  
t o o ls  in  a d i f f e r e n t  sen se  from th a t  in  w hich a rock  may be sa id  to  be a 
t o o l .  I t  i s  on ly  in  i t s  fu n c t io n in g , in  i t s  a c tu a l use as a t o o l ,  th a t  
a rock  i s  a t o o l .  A word, on th e  co n tra ry , i s  a word b ecause i t  i s  conven­
t io n a l l y  used  as one; s im i la r ly ,  a t o o l  i s  a t o o l  because i t  has been b u i l t  
fo r  such a purpose. A word c a r r ie d  i t s  meaning a lon g  w ith  i t  in  th e  way 
th a t  a t o o l  such as a hammer c a r r ie s  i t s  purpose a lo n g  w ith  i t .
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I t  i s  u s e fu l  to  em phasize th e  con ven tion  o f  u se  in  order to  b r in g  
ou t th e  p h ilo s o p h ic a l ly  im portant sen se  o f  "■word" in  -which i t  c a r r ie s  i t s  
meaning a lon g  w ith  i t .  T his i s  made p o s s ib le  by con ven tion : th e  word
has a u se  " b u ilt  in" or e s ta b lis h e d  by co n v en tio n , as a t o o l  has a use  
b u i l t  in  by d e s ig n . 1
The analogy drawn here betw een words and t o o l s  may be m is le a d in g  
in  q u ite  d i f f e r e n t  w ays. One d i f f i c u l t y  w ith  i t  i s  t h a t ,  taken  as a c lo s e  
a n a lo g y , i t  m ight su g g e st  th a t  words have f ix e d ,  unchangeable m eanings, 
w hereas new ways o f  u s in g  words are  c o n s ta n t ly  b e in g  d e v is e d . A nother, 
ra th er  d i f f e r e n t ,  d i f f i c u l t y  w ith  th e  an a lo g y , i f  taken  as a c lo s e  one, 
i s  t h a t ,  w h ile  a word must be used a n a lo g o u sly  w ith  i t s  co n ven tion  o f u se  
( i f  i t  i s  to  rem ain th e  same w ord), a t o o l ,  on th e  o th er  hand, may be used  
in  innum erable ways o th er than th o se  fo r  which i t  was made ( e . g . ,  a hoe 
may be used  as a b e a n -p o le , a d arn in g -n eed le  as a w eapon).
The f i r s t  o f  th e s e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  in v o lv e s  what i s  a ra th e r  im port­
an t q u e s tio n  in  th e  p h ilo so p h y  o f  lan gu age, v i z . ,  th a t  o f  th e  c r e a t io n  o f  
n o v e l m eanings out o f  e s ta b lis h e d  m eanings. The con ven tion  o f  u se  o f  a 
word i s  a h ig h ly  f l e x i b l e  group o f analogous s o r t s  o f  u se , and what counts  
as analogous som etim es may be q u ite  fa r - f e t c h e d . A new use o f  a word must 
be analogous to  some degree w ith  i t s  co n ven tion  o f  u s e , however, or e l s e  
i t  i s  sim ply a new word e n t ir e ly .  The shape or form o f  a word th a t  l i e s  
in  i t s  con ven tion  o f u se  i s  n e v e r th e le s s  su b je c t  to  m o d if ic a t io n  should  th e  
u ses  o f  a word be ex ten d ed . The shape o f  a r e a l  t o o l ,  on th e other hand, 
im poses f ix e d  l im it a t io n s  upon i t s  p o t e n t i a l i t i e s  o f  u se .
In so fa r  as th e  use o f  t h i s  analogy in  t h i s  chapter i s  concerned , i t  
i s  s u f f i c i e n t  to  n o te  t h i s  a sp e c t  o f  th e  in e x a c tn e ss  o f  the ana logy  betw een  
words and t o o l s ,  a lth ou gh  th e r e  remain more g e n e r a l (and probably q u ite  
com plex) problems about c r e a t io n  o f  n o v e l meanings out o f  e s ta b lis h e d  on es.
The second o f  th e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  m entioned—v i z . ,  th a t  r e a l  t o o l s  may­
be used in  r a d ic a l ly  d i f f e r e n t  ways from th o se  fo r  w hich th ey  w ere d es ig n ed ,  
w h ile  words c a n n o t--su g g e s ts  th a t  i t  would be d e s ir a b le  to  s p e c if y  s o r t s  o f  
th e  "uses" o f  words and t o o ls  th a t  are to  be understood  as in v o lv e d  in  th e  
ana logy  in  th e  p r e se n t c o n te x t . The use o f a hoe as a b ea n -p o le  or a darn­
in g -n e e d le  as a dagger are u ses  th a t  should  be understood  as exc lu d ed  from  
th o se  u se s  r e le v a n t  to  th e  analogy in  th e  p r e se n t  c o n te x t . I t  i s  on ly  th o se  
u ses th a t  are c h a r a c t e r i s t ic a l ly  th o se  o f  p a r t ic u la r  t o o ls  th a t  are here  
b e in g  p o in ted  to  as s im ila r  to  th e  u ses  o f w ords. I f  a word i s  u sed  by  
someone in  a co m p le te ly  n o v e l way, th en  i t  i s  n o t th e  same word but j u s t  th e  
same sound (or w r it te n  s ig n )  o f  a word. S im ila r ly ,  i f  a hoe i s  used  as a 
b e a n -p o le , i t  i s  a b e a n -p o le —a b ea n -p o le  made ou t o f  a h oe—and i s  d e f in a b le  
as such on th e  b a s is  o f  i t s  u s e . The p h y s ic a l form o f th e hoe makes i t  
r e c o g n iz a b le  as such by anyone fa m ilia r  w ith  h o e s , but whether i t  i s  more 
to  th e  p o in t  to  d e s ig n a te  i t  as a hoe or a b ean -p o le  i s  a m atter o f  th e  con­
t e x t  or c ircu m stan ces o f  i t s  u se .
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R ules o f Use
The n o tio n  o f a "convention  o f use" may be viewed, as in  answer to  
the g en era l q u estion  o f  why a word has a meaning. T h is convention  o f use  
may in clud e a number o f  s e n s e s ,  so th a t ,  s t r i c t l y  sp eak in g , th e meaning 
o f some words may be a "family"'1" o f s e n se s , each sen se  i t s e l f  made up o f  
a fam ily  or s e t  of p a r t ic u la r  u s e s . So, in  order to  determ ine th e  meaning 
o f  a word, i t  i s  n ecessary  to  look  a t  a l l  th e  uses o f  i t .  But , how can 
t h i s  be done?
I t  can be done b ecause i t  i s  p o s s ib le  to  i s o la t e  types o f  use  
(which may or may not b e -d if f e r e n t  enough t o  be con sid ered  as "senses"  o f  
the word). T h is , in  tu rn , i s  p o s s ib le  because i t  i s  p o s s ib le  to  rec o g ­
n iz e ,  im p lic i t ly  or e x p l i c i t l y ,  th e r u le s  fo r  the use o f  the word. ("Rule 
i s  being  used here in  a very broad se n se , a s in c lu d in g  "law" and " prin ­
c ip l e ." )  To recogn ize such r u le s  " im p lic it ly "  i s ,  o f  cou rse , sim ply to  use  
a word in  accordance w ith  i t s  r u le s .  To reco g n ize  them " e x p l ic i t ly ,"  on 
th e other hand, i s  a c tu a lly  to  form ulate th e  r u le s ,  to  d escr ib e  th e  use of 
a word in s te a d  o f m erely u s in g  i t .
I f  one knows how to  u se  a word, one i s  able to  a c t  in  accordance  
w ith  i t s  r u le s  o f u se . In t h i s  sen se , one may be sa id  to  be " fo llo w in g  
ru les"  whenever he u ses a word c o r r e c t ly .  In many c o n te x ts , though, "to  
fo llo w  a ru le"  im plies a c o n sc io u s , d e lib e r a te  a p p lic a t io n  o f th e  r u le .
"To fo llo w  a ru le"  in  t h i s  sen se  i s  not a p a rt of th e  a c t iv i t y  o f  language
^The term "family" has d isad vantages in  a use theory o f  meaning b e­
cause i t  in v o lv e s  the n o tio n  o f  h e r e d ity , im plying th a t  the source o f s im i­
l a r i t i e s  in  meaning i s  to  be found in  common a n c e s to r s . I  am u sin g  th e  
term here on ly  as W ittg e n ste in , I  b e l ie v e ,  intended i t  to  be understood , 
v i z . ,  as d escr ib in g  or su g g estin g  th e a sp e c ts  o f  fam ily  resem blance (a s  in  
W ittg e n ste in , P h ilo so p h ic a l I n v e s t ig a t io n s , I ,  67) and w ithout i t s e l f  in ­
v o lv in g  any view of the source o f th e  meaning o f words.
3^as such . The "rules"  o f language are d e s c r ip t iv e - - th e y  are form u lation s  
o f procedures "follow ed" w ith in  a p a r tic u la r  language. To be con sciou s o f  
what th e se  procedures are i s  not p r e r e q u is ite  to  speaking and understand­
in g  th e  language. I t  i s  only in  th a t one a c ts  c o n s is t e n t ly  w ith  the r u le s  
when speaking the language th a t  one may be sa id  to  a c t  according to  them. 
The a c t iv i t y  o f  language i s  th a t  from which the r u le s  may be read .
P r e sc r ip t iv e  and D e scr ip tiv e  R ules
R ules may be e ith e r  p r e s c r ip t iv e  or d e s c r ip t iv e .  Language b e in g  a 
human a c t iv i t y  and in s t i t u t io n ,  there i s  an im portant sen se  in  which th e  
r u le s  o f  language may be considered  as p r e s c r ip t iv e . I t  has been empha­
s iz e d  th a t  the r u le s  o f  language are con ven tion s, and any convention  in ­
v o lv e s  c o n s tr a in t  o f some k in d . There are some customs or con ven tio n s, 
though, th a t  are not form ulated as p r e sc r ip t iv e  r u le s —methods o f h a r v e s t­
in g  g ra in , fo r  example. C onstraint in  th ese  cases may seem ju s t  l ik e  th e  
c o n s tr a in t  o f  n e c e s s ity  or n a tu ra l law s. So, h a rv estin g  methods may be 
thought by th e ir  p r a c t it io n e r s  to  be determ ined by n e c e s s ity  ju s t  as p re ­
c i s e ly  as the seasons determ ine growing p er io d s . The r u le s  o f  language, 
a l s o ,  are conventions in  the sen se  in  which methods o f h a rv estin g  a re . 
Hence, th ey  are n e ith e r  p r e s c r ip t iv e  nor d e s c r ip t iv e  o f n a tu ra l p r o c e sse s .
This c h a r a c te r is t ic  o f  l i n g u i s t i c  law s, th e ir  con v en tio n a l a sp e c t ,  
su g g ests  the sense in  which th e r e  i s  n e ith er  in e v i t a b i l i t y  about l i n g u i s t i c  
r u le s  nor t o t a l  a r b itr a r in e s s  in  them. The laws o f language are n e ith e r  
p u rely  ca p r ic io u s  nor are they  d e sc r ip t io n s  o f unchangeable f a c t s .  The 
mechanisms o f language are alw ays to  some ex ten t determ ined by th e  s i t u a ­
t io n s  in  which language i s  u sed , ju s t  as methods o f  reap ing are determ ined  
to  some e x te n t  by th e n atu ra l laws in vo lved  in  the s tru c tu re  and p ro p e r tie s
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o f  g r a in . B ut th e r e  i s  n o t  any s o r t  o f  a b s o lu te  n e c e s s i t y - - s u c h  a s  law s  
o f  lo g i c  or law s o f  n a tu re  th a t  cannot be o th er  than  th e y  a r e --w h ic h  d i c ­
t a t e s  th e  r u le s  o f  la n g u a g e . The r u le s  o f  language a r e  c o n v e n tio n s  l i k e  
th o se  o f  r e a p in g , n o t l i k e  th e  p u r e ly  c o n v e n tio n a l ones o f  a h a r v e s t  
d a n ce , and may be s a id  to  be n e ith e r  d e s c r ip t iv e  nor p r e s c r ip t iv e .
P r e s c r ip t iv e  la w s , o f  c o u r se , may be d e s c r ib e d , and th e  r u le s  o f  
lan gu age may be d e sc r ib e d  w ith o u t r e fe r e n c e  to  w hat s o r t  o f  r u le s  l i n g u i s ­
t i c  r u le s  a r e .  But in  th e  p h ilo s o p h ic  in v e s t ig a t io n  o f  th e  problem s o f  
m eaning, th e  n atu re  o f  th e  r u le s  th e m se lv e s  sh ou ld  be c o n s id e r e d , s in c e  
we a re  concerned  in  t h i s  c a s e  n o t w ith  a p a r t ic u la r  m eaning or m eanings 
b u t w ith  th e  n a tu re  o f  l i n g u i s t i c  m eaning in  g e n e r a l .  T h is  p h ilo s o p h ic  
q u e s t io n  i s  a fu r th e r  q u e s t io n  beyond th a t  o f  d eterm in in g  what th e  r u le s  
fo r  th e  u se  o f  a p a r t ic u la r  word a r e .
R u les; Theory and P r a c t ic e
There may be a th e o r y  o f  any p r a c t ic e - - a s  o f  a n y th in g  e l s e .  A 
p o s i t io n  in  w hich  " th eo ry ” i s  v iew ed  a s  in h e r e n t ly  n o n s e n s ic a l  may r e s t  
som etim es on an ap p aren t s im i l a r i t y  w ith  q u e s t io n s  o f  th e  s o r t  d is c u s s e d  
in  P r e s c r ip t iv e  and D e s c r ip t iv e  R u le s .  I t  i s  n o t u n usu al fo r  th e  n o t io n  
o f  th e  fo l lo w in g  o f  r u le s  a s  c o n sc io u s  g u id es  to  be co n fu sed  w ith  th e  im­
p l i c i t  fo l lo w in g  o f  law s fo rm u la ted  in ,  e . g . ,  law s o f  n a tu r e . That l i n ­
g u i s t i c  p r a c t ic e  does n o t  r e q u ir e  d e l ib e r a t e  a p p l ic a t io n  o f  r u le s  o f  gram­
mar, e t c . ,  may be ta k en  a s  im p ly in g  th a t  th e  p r a c t ic e  o f  lan gu age does  
not in v o lv e  any r u le s  a t  a l l .  That i s ,  th e  f a c t  th a t  lan gu age i s  a p r a c ­
t i c e  may be ta k en  a s  a n t i t h e t i c a l  t o  i t s  h av in g  a th eo ry ; th e  d e s t r u c t io n  
o f  th e  n o t io n  o f  th e  " a p p l ic a t io n  o f  r u le s ,"  th rou gh  i t s  a m b ig u ity , may be
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thought to  d estro y  a ls o  th e  n o tio n  o f  a n a ly s is  in to  p r in c ip le s  th a t  i s  
th e  h ea r t o f " theory ."
I t  may be m is lea d in g  to  speak o f  p h ilo so p h y  as a m e t a - a c t iv i t y — 
or to  speak when doing p h ilo sop h y  as though i t  w e r e - - i f  by " m e ta -a c t iv ity '1 
i s  meant d isc o u r se  on another l e v e l  and in  another vocab u lary  than o rd in ­
ary d is c o u r s e . T his v iew , however, ought to  be d is t in g u is h e d  from th e  
view th a t  p h ilosop h y  must not be " th e o r e t ic a l ."
"Theory" i s  used in  some c o n te x ts  to  d is t in g u is h  "pure" from "ap­
p lie d "  knowledge or " p r a c tic e ."  I t  may a ls o  be used to  mean an hypoth­
e s i s ,  w hich sen se  i s  c lo s e ly  r e la te d  to  a n o th er , perhaps more fundam ental 
s e n se , th a t  o f a sy ste m a tic  view  o f th e  p r in c ip le s  o f  som eth ing. In t h i s  
l a s t  s e n s e , "theory" must be in v o lv e d  to  some e x te n t  in  any k ind  o f i n ­
v e s t i g a t i o n - - ^  any attem pt to  answer q u e s tio n s  o f a h igh er d egree o f  gen ­
e r a l i t y  than th a t  o f  "What i s  th e meaning o f  'r a t '? "
A te c h n ic a l  d i s t in c t io n  may be made betw een a th eo ry  as a system a-  
t i v e  view  o f the p r in c ip le s  o f  som ething and as a n o t io n  o f  how to  do some­
th in g . When one speaks o f  a " th eory” o f  a p r a c t ic e  or a c t i v i t y  i t  m ight
mean e i th e r  a sy ste m a tic  view o f th e  p r in c ip le s  in v o lv e d  or a view  o f how 
to  go about perform ing th e  a c t i v i t y .
As fa r  as th e  is s u e s  now b e in g  co n sid ered  a re  con cerned , to  view  
language as a p r a c t ic e  or a c t i v i t y  i s  u s e f u l  in  c o n s id e r in g , among eth er  
m a tte r s , th e  nature o f  th e  laws or r u le s  o f  language and th e  n atu re o f  l i n ­
g u i s t i c  meaning. In other w ords, v iew in g  language as an a c t i v i t y  or p ra c­
t i c e  in  th e p resen t co n tex t i s  fo r  th e  purpose o f  d ev e lo p in g  a " system atic  
view o f  th e  p r in c ip le s "  o f  lan gu age, i . e . ,  a " theory ."  I t  i s  in  t h i s  sen se  
th a t  a "theory" o f  language i s  being sought h ere . A sy s te m a tic  view  o f th e
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p r in c ip le s  o f  l i n g u i s t i c  meaning w i l l  be sought through c o n s id e r in g  la n ­
guage as an a c t i v i t y .
The Mature o f Word-meaning 
The a n a ly s is  o f  "use" on pages 31-35 su g g ested  the d e s i r a b i l i t y  
fo r  a u se  th eo ry  o f  meaning to  d is t in g u is h  betw een: ( l )  th e  p r a c t ic e  and
th e  th eory  o f  l i n g u i s t i c  m eaning, and (2 ) th e  source and product o f  mean­
in g . In regard  to  th e f i r s t  o f  th e se  p o in t s ,  i t  may be sa id  t h a t ,  lo o k in g  
a t  language a s  a p r a c t ic e ,  th e  use o f  words c r e a te s  l i n g u i s t i c  m eaning, 
and "the meaning i s  th e  use" i s  in te r p r e ta b le  in  t h i s  co n te x t as e x p la in ­
in g  th e  c r e a t in g  o f  meaning; w h ile  in  a p h ilo so p h ic  view (a "theory" in  
th e se n se  o f  a " sy stem a tic  view o f th e  p r in c ip le s ,"  as d isc u sse d  in  th e  
p reced in g  s e c t io n )  th a t  ta k es  th e  “use" o f  words a s  fundam ental to  th e  e x ­
p la n a t io n  o f  l i n g u i s t i c  m eaning, language as a p r a c t ic e  ta k es  a c e n tr a l  
p o s i t io n ,  and "the meaning i s  th e  use" i s  in te r p r e ta b le  in  t h i s  c o n te x t  as  
e x p la in in g  th e nature and p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  meaning.
In regard  to  th e  second p o in t  l i s t e d  above (reg a rd in g  th e  d e s ir a ­
b i l i t y  o f  d is t in g u is h in g  betw een th e source and product o f m eaning), i t  
w i l l  be argued in  th e fo llo w in g  d is c u s s io n  th a t  "the meaning o f  a se n te n c e ,"  
a s d i s t i n c t  and d i f f e r e n t  from th e meaning o f  w ords, i s  d e s ir a b le  in  a u se  
th eo ry  o f  m eaning.
That th e  u ses  o f  words are  e q u iv a le n t to  t h e ir  meanings was taken  
as g iv e n  a t  th e  o u ts e t  o f  t h is  stu d y . We have se e n , however, th a t  a " use” 
may r e fe r  to  an a c tu a l employment o f  a word in  a s e n te n c e , th e  manner in  
which i t  fu n c t io n s  in  v a r io u s  sen ten ces  and c o n te x ts ,  o r , a g a in , th e "usage" 
th a t  c r e a te s  a con v en tio n  o f  u se . Furtherm ore, th ere  are  c e r ta in  u ses  o f  
w ords—e . g . ,  ir o n ic  u s e s —th a t  are  n ot a t  a l l  e q u iv a le n t  to  th e ir  m eanings.
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I t  i s  th e r e fo r e  n ecessa ry  to  d e f in e  e x a c t ly  in  what sen se  o f  "use” i t  
makes sen se  to  say th a t  th e meaning o f a word i s  i t s  u se .
The u se  th eo ry  was developed  in  resp o n se  to  what were h e ld  to  be 
in ad eq u acies and in a c c u r a c ie s  in  th e  T racta tu s th e o r y , and r e la te d  t h e o r ie s ,  
in  which th e p o s s i b i l i t y  o f meaning was h e ld  to  l i e  in  o b je c ts  in  th e  
world w ith  which words are  c o r r e la te d , and in  th e  l o g i c a l  s tr u c tu r e  common 
to  p r o p o s it io n s  and to  t h i s  w orld o f  o b je c ts  arranged in to  f a c t s .  So , in  
t h i s  ty p e  o f  th e o r y , th e  nature o f  meaning was tw o -fo ld :  I t  was composed
o f "sem antic” and " sy n ta c tic"  e lem en ts th a t  to g e th e r  ex p la in ed  th e  p o s s i ­
b i l i t y  o f  meaning by e x p la in in g  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  s e n te n c e s .
I f  a u se th eory  i s  to  be v ery  v a lu a b le  as a th eory  o f  meaning i t  
should  e x p la in  n ot on ly  words—th e  "sem antic" e le m e n ts , but s e n te n c e s - - fo r  
which " sy n ta c tic "  elem en ts were in trod u ced  in  th e o r ie s  r e la te d  to  th a t  o f  
th e T r a c ta tu s . B u t, t here i s  no need fo r  a d i s t in c t io n  betw een " sem antic" 
and " sy n ta c tic "  in  a use theory  o f  the meaning o f  w ords. I f  th e meaning 
o f words i s  t h e ir  u se , th e  " ru les o f  use" or "conventions"  d e sc r ib e  t h e ir  
manner o f  u se  in  sen ten ces  a t  th e  same tim e th a t  th ey  d e sc r ib e  th e  "mean­
in g s ."  "Semantic" and " sy n ta c tic"  c o l la p se  to g e th e r  in to  "use."
Another way o f  sa y in g  t h i s  i s  to  say th a t  th e  r u le s  o f  use o f  words 
are th e same as th e  r u le s  o f the c o n s tr u c t io n  o f  s e n te n c e s . There i s  no 
double s e t  o f  r u le s ,  one fo r  words and one fo r  s e n te n c e s , in  term s o f  
which words and sen ten ces  may be d e fin ed  and d is t in g u is h e d  from one 
an oth er . In f a c t ,  i t  i s  n o t n ecessa ry  to  d is t in g u is h  betw een words and 
sen ten ces  as meanings in  t h i s  typ e  o f  v ie w , co n sid ered  in  i t s e l f  (w ith o u t  
r e fe r e n c e  to  other v iew s o f  meaning th a t  do make such a d i s t i n c t i o n ) .
That i s ,  "the u se  o f  words" in so fa r  as i t  i s  e q u iv a le n t  to  words as
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m eanings sim p ly  i s  th e  u se  o f  words in  s e n te n c e s . A sen ten ce  i s  a case  
o f  th e  use o f  w ords.
So, th e  sen se  in  w hich th e meaning o f  a word i s  " i t s  use" may he 
d efin ed  in  term s o f  th a t  w hich c o n s t i t u t e s  an a c tu a l u se  o f  w ord s--a  s e n ­
te n c e . A word by i t s e l f  i s  m erely a p o s s ib le  m eaning, and o f  im portance  
to  a g en era l th eory  o f  meaning on ly  as embodying th e  con ven tion s or r u le s  
whose p r a c t ic e  i s  th e  a c t iv e  use o f w ords. B u t, as a c tu a l m eanings, 
words must be in  u s e , which i s  t o  be in  use as p a r ts  o f  s e n te n c e s . That 
i s ,  th e  r u le s  o f  th e  use o f  a word c o n s t i t u t e  what m ight be c a l le d  a "pos­
s ib l e  m eaning," w h ile  an a p p lic a t io n  o f th e s e  r u le s  (a use o f  th e word) 
m ight be c a l le d  an " a ctu a l m eaning."
The words o f  a sen ten ce  are n o t to  be t h e o r e t i c a l ly  d is t in g u is h e d  
from th e  meaning o f  th e  sen ten ce  because th e  words to g e th e r  sim ply are th a t  
m eaning. In so fa r  as "the words" are tak en  as d e s ig n a t in g  th e  marks on a 
page or the sounds spoken, how ever, th ey  may be s a id  to  be the "sign" o f  
th e  se n te n c e , d is t in g u is h in g  th e  sen ten ce  as a s ig n  (or  "symbol") from th e  
sen ten ce  as a m eaning. T his d i s t in c t io n  i s  u s e f u l  in  c e r ta in  c o n te x t s ,  
b u t to  th e problem s p r e s e n t ly  under d is c u s s io n  "the words" o f se n te n c e s  are  
r e le v a n t  as meanings ra th er  than  as " s ig n s ."
The d i s t in c t io n  som etim es drawn betw een "token-words" and " typ e-  
words" i s  s im ila r ly  ir r e le v a n t  to  th e p r esen t d is c u s s io n .  Each occurrence  
o f th e  word "x" may be d es ig n a ted  a " token-w ord ," n u m erica lly  d i f f e r e n t  
from every  o th er appearance o f  ”x ."  S in ce  th e sounds (or w r it te n  form s) 
o f  a l l  such tokens are s im ila r ,  th ey  may be used  as a "type-w ord."  One 
m ight speak o f  token-w ords as " occu rren ces,"  "appearances," or " u ses” o f
typ e-w ord s. B e s id e s  t h i s  s o r t  o f  " use,"  w hich i s  rou gh ly  e q u iv a le n t  to  
an " u tter a n c e ,"  th e r e  i s  a ls o  th a t  "use" w hich c o n s is t s  in  th e  p a tte r n  o f  
u se  o f  th e  tok en -w ords. Such a p a tte r n  o f  use i s  what has been r e fe r r e d  
to  above as a " con ven tion  o f u s e ."  To sp eak , th e n , o f  th e  "use" o f  token  
words i s  to  speak o f appearances or u tte r a n c e s  (spoken or w r it te n )  o f  
what a re  r e c o g n iz a b le  as sta n d in g  fo r  a type-w ord . They a re  r ec o g n ized  
as such because o f  s im i la r i t y  o f  a u ra l or v is u a l  form , but t h i s  form r e ­
f l e c t s  a p a tte r n  or s im ila r  or analogous "uses" o f  th e  token-w ords which  
may be equated w ith  th e  type-w ord . A type-w ord i s  a m eaning, a con v en tio n  
o f u s e ,  crea ted  by means o f  u tte r a n c e s  o f  token-w ords. The p a tte r n  o f  
use o f  token-w ords o f  s im ila r  p r in te d  and spoken form c o n s t i t u t e s  a ty p e -  
word. I t  i s  th e se  type-w ords w ith  w hich we are now concerned.
(E lim in a tin g  d is t in c t io n s - - s u c h  as ty p e -to k e n , s ign -m ean in g--b y  
r u lin g  out one s id e  as " ir r e le v a n t ,"  amounts to  d e f in in g  th e problem  w ith  
which I  w ish  to  d e a l .  There are  o th e r , r e la t e d  problem s to  which th e s e  
r e je c te d  d is t in c t io n s  may be r e le v a n t ,  or perhaps even  in d is p e n s a b le . They 
are ir r e le v a n t  to  the p resen t in q u iry  in  th a t  th e  problem under in v e s t ig a ­
t io n  i s  d e f in a b le  through s p e c i f i c a t io n  o f  what term s are n o t w ith in  i t s  
fram e, what d i s t in c t io n s  c o l la p s e  in  r e la t io n  to  i t . )
One d i f f i c u l t y  in  th e exam ination  o f  the r e la t io n s h ip s  betw een  
words and sen ten ces  l i e s  in  th e  f a c t  th a t  words in  one sen se  d e r iv e  t h e ir  
meanings from se n te n c e s  ( in  th a t  th ey  d e r iv e  t h e ir  meanings from t h e ir  use  
in  s e n te n c e s )  w h i le ,  on th e  other hand, se n te n c e s  d e r iv e  t h e ir  meanings 
from words ( in  th a t  th ey  are composed o f  them ). I f  sen ten ces  are view ed  
as a c tu a l m eanings, and wards are  viewed as r e q u ir in g  use in  se n te n c e s  in  
order t o  a cq u ire  a c tu a l m eaning, th en  th e d e r iv a t io n  o f th e  meaning o f
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sentences could be sa id  to  l i e  in  the words whose use produces them. In 
th is  c a se , the d er iv a tio n  o f the meaning o f words could be viewed as the  
d er iv a tio n  o f l in g u is t ic  meaning in  gen era l.
"D erivation,"  " so u rce ,” or " o r ig in ” of meaning, as used h ere , are 
meant to  re fer  to  a type o f r e la t io n sh ip  between a sp ects  o f language, 
rather than to  h i s t o r ic a l  q u estion s o f , e . g . ,  etym ology. Words are some­
tim es sa id  to  be the b u ild in g  m ateria ls  o f  sen ten ces , but w ith  the c o l ­
lapse o f "syntactic"  and "semantic" in to  one term, "use," th ere a r is e s  the  
problem o f what i s  to  be considered to  be the fundamental u n it  o f meaning, 
th a t in  terms o f whose use th e meaning o f any asp ect o f language i s  d e f in ­
able .
I f  i t  i s  asked what th e d er iv a tio n  or o r ig in  o f the meaning o f a 
p a rticu la r  word i s ,  such a q u estion  may be answered by referen ce  to  the  
word's convention o f u s e - - i . e . ,  "It means th is  because i t  i s  (has been) 
used th is  way." B ut, i f  i t  i s  asked what the d er iv a tio n  o f  the meaning 
of words in  general i s ,  then to  re fer  to  the e x isten ce  o f conventions  
would be to  beg the q u estio n , because "words" here i s  to  be taken in  the 
sen se , not of " a r ticu la ted  sounds," but o f  "meanings." Words as meanings 
are the embodiment o f the conventions o f  meaning, and conventions cannot 
be sa id  to  be the o r ig in  o f convention s.
The f i r s t  q u estion  i s  an h is t o r ic a l  one, w h ile  the second might 
be ch aracterized  as about the " p o ss ib ility "  of meaning. In "the use o f  
words," we might answer, l i e s  th e p o s s ib i l i t y  of meaning. I t  has been  
argued in  th is  chapter th a t words as such are " p o ssib le  meanings," b u t, 
a ls o ,  th a t they are not a c tu a l meanings except in  u se —i . e . ,  as parts o f  
sen ten ces . They are p o ss ib le  meanings because they have p o s s ib le  u ses
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in  sen ten ces. Thus, th e p o s s ib i l i t y  o f the meaning o f words might be sa id  
to  l i e  in  the p o s s ib i l i t y  o f th e ir  use in  sen ten ces.
"Use," in so fa r  as i t  i s  th e source o f l in g u is t ic  meaning, i s  de­
fin ed  in  th is  way as "use in  or as a sen tence."  A l l  types o f uses of
words, a l l  a sp ects  of the use o f words, are not among those which are the
meaningful u se s , v i z . ,  th ose in  which the word is  used as part of a sen­
ten ce . Sentences are the source o f meaning in  th a t i t  i s  use in  or as sen ­
tences in  which the p o s s ib i l i t y  o f meaning l i e s .
The nature of "the meaning o f a sentence" w i l l  be examined in  
Chapter I I I .  So far  i t  has been contended only th a t such a notion  i s  fu n­
damental to  exp lanation  o f word-meaning. The notion  o f a sen ten ce—of an 
e n tity  o f meaning d is t in c t  from and d if fe r e n t  from words--has been char­
a c te r iz e d , in  th is  chapter, as th a t in  terms of which the "use of words" 
may be id e n t if ie d  w ith "the meaning o f words." As w i l l  be developed in  
the fo llo w in g  chapter, t h is  view of the sentence i s  intended to  sp ec ify  
the manner in  which "use" i s  meaning, and the manner in  which words and 
sentences are r e la ted  to  th e ir  larger "contexts,"  a term whose sense w i l l  
a lso  be sp e c if ie d  in  Chapter I I I .
CHAPTER I I I
MEANING AS USE: SENTENCES AND ACTION
I t  has been argued in  the preceding chapter th a t the n otion  o f a 
sentence as a meaning d is t in c t  and d if fe r e n t  from words or p o ss ib le  mean­
ings i s  d er iv a b le  from a use theory o f word-meaning. This chapter w i l l  
attem pt to  d e fin e  what i s  important about th is  n o tio n . As th e preceding  
chapter presented  a view of a way in  which the meaning o f a word may be 
sa id  to  be i t s  "use" ( v i z . ,  as a convention o f u s e ) ,  th is  chapter w i l l  
p resen t a view o f how th e meaning of a sentence may be sa id  to  be i t s  
"use"—v i z . ,  as the fu n ctio n  of an a c tio n . I t  w i l l  be argued th a t the  
n otion  o f an a c t io n , o f the type a sentence i s ,  may be in terp reted  as in ­
v o lv in g  an " a c t iv ity ,"  or language-game, o f which i t  forms p a r t.
I f  i t  i s  asked, "What i £  a sentence?" th ere are a number of an­
swers th a t are eq u a lly  c o rr e c t. For, a sen tence i s  many th in g s --a  s e r ie s  
o f words, one o f the grammatical stru c tu res  accepted  in  the language as 
sen ten ces , a form, a fu n c tio n , a (manufactured) t o o l ,  and a ls o  an a c tio n  
and part o f one or more a c t i v i t i e s .  The problem of th is  chapter i s  to  
determ ine what i s  c h a r a c te r is t ic  o f sen tences as m eanings, s t r i c t l y  speak­
in g .
Sentences as Meanings
As observed in  the preceding chapter, i t  would u su a lly  be p o in t­
l e s s  to  c a l l  any m eaningless sound a m eaningless "word," s in c e  i t  would
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be thought to  be a meaning i f  i t  were thought to  be a word. To speak o f  
"m eaningless sen ten ces"  i s  s im ila r ly  a r t i f i c i a l  and not u su a lly  o f much 
v a lu e , because in  most co n tex ts  "sentence" means "meaningful s e r ie s  of 
words," and i t  i s  i t s  m eaningfulness th a t  lead s one to  c a l l  i t  a sen ten ce . 
One m ight, o f  cou rse , c a l l  a s e r ie s  o f words a sen tence w ithout s u f f i c ie n t  
ev id en ce—because i t  looked or sounded l ik e  a sen ten ce—and subsequently  
say i t  was r e a l ly  m ean in g less. N e v er th e le ss , th e  judgment th a t i t  was a 
sen ten ce , whether j u s t i f i e d  or n o t , would be based on th e  b e l i e f  or assump­
t io n  th a t  i t  d id  not mean something in  the way other sen ten ces do.
I t  i s  not of much value in  the p resen t con tex t to  d is t in g u is h  b e ­
tween th e "sign" o f a s e n te n c e - - i t s  v i s ib le  or au d ib le  c h a r a c te r is t ic s  — 
and th e "meaning" o f a sen ten ce . When we do speak o f th e  "meaning o f sen ­
tences"  i t  might seem from the s tru ctu re  o f the phrase th a t the sen ten ce  
i s  something independent o f  i t s  meaning. B ut, where we commonly speak o f  
the "meaning o f sen tences"  i s  in  co n tex ts  in  which sen tences are being con­
tr a s te d  w ith  other s o r ts  o f  m eaningful th in g s —words, m athem atical propo­
s i t i o n s ,  e t c .  I t  i s  m eainly in  co n tex ts  in  which words and sen ten ces are  
tr e a te d  as m eaningful th a t  phrases w ith  th e stru c tu re  "the meaning o f x" 
a r i s e .  Thus, both "words" and "sentences" are them selves s o r ts  o f mean­
in g s —b u t, a lthough i t  i s  more accu rate  to  d is t in g u is h  between th e  s ig n  
o f the word and the word i t s e l f  (a symbol or meaning) than to  speak o f a 
d is t in c t io n  between a word and i t s  meaning, in  th e case  o f sen ten ces  
th ere i s ,  b e s id e s  the d is t in c t io n  between the s ig n s  and the symbols o f  
i t s  w ords, the fu rth er  d is t in c t io n  between th ese  words and th e sen ten ce  i t ­
s e l f .  Without t h is  d i s t in c t io n ,  i t  would seem th a t any s e r ie s  o f  words 
would be t h e o r e t ic a l ly  in d is t in g u ish a b le  from a s e r ie s  c o n s t itu t in g  a 
sen ten ce . B u t, as was d iscu ssed  in  the preceding ch ap ter, the words o f a
5^
sen ten ce , as m eanings, and th e meaning o f the sentence i t s e l f  are in te r  - 
p retab le  as id e n t ic a l  e n t i t i e s .
When th e "sign" o f a sen tence i s  d is t in g u ish e d  from i t s  "meaning” 
(or th e  "proposition" expressed  by i t ) ,  th e  d if fe r e n c e  between how and 
what a sen ten ce  means may be in tended . A ls o , though, i t  may be intended  
to  d is t in g u is h  between "arb itrary  signs"  and th e ir  "meanings." In the  
p resen t v iew , th ese  two d is t in c t io n s  are not to  be equated . The manner or 
means and the product in  l in g u i s t i c  meaning are not to  be id e n t i f ie d ,  r e ­
s p e c t iv e ly ,  w ith  words and sen te n c e .
In t h is  ch ap ter , then , "the meaning o f a sentence"  i s  to  be under­
stood as synonymous w ith  "a sen ten ce as a meaning."
Senten ces: Function  and Form
S e n te n tia l Form
The T ractatus attem pted to  d efin e  th e  meaning o f sen ten ces in  
terms o f  a common form --th e  "general form o f  p ro p o s itio n ."  A sen ten ce was 
viewed as having a ( l o g i c a l )  form p ecu lia r  to  a l l  sen te n c es . Even i f  such 
a common form could be d isco v ered , however, i t  would not n e c e s s a r ily  be 
what i s  e s s e n t ia l  to  s e n te n t ia l  meaning. In  th is  chapter i t  w i l l  be argued 
th a t , on th e  contrary , a l l  meaning u lt im a te ly  may be d efin ed  in  terms of 
fu n c tio n , rather than of form.
I t  was observed in  th e  preceding chapter th a t the conventions of 
the use o f  words should be emphasized in  order to  e x p la in  the sense in  
which a word has a "form"—th a t i s ,  as the t o t a l i t y  o f  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  of i t s  
u se . A word can be sa id  to  have a "form" on ly  in  t h is  m etaphorical sen se , 
o f co u rse , but sen ten ces have the p e r ce p tib le  forms exp ressed  in  form ula­
t io n s  o f  " syn tactic"  or "grammatical" r u le s ,  as w e l l .  The c h a r a c te r is t ic
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forms o f sen ten ces g e n e ra lly  are what t e l l  us which s e r ie s  o f  words are  
sen ten ces and which are n o t. That i t  i s  the s y n ta c t ic a l c o n fig u ra tio n s  
of words th a t are th e  means by which id e n t i f ic a t io n  o f sen ten ces i s
made, however, i s  a d if f e r e n t  m atter from th e problem of what i s  e s s e n ­
t i a l  to  sen ten ces as meanings.
There are a t  le a s t  two separate q u estion s th a t may be expressed
as "What i s  a sentence?" the q u estio n s o f id e n t i f ic a t io n  and o f n atu re.
I t  i s  im portant to  recogn ize  th a t they  req u ire d if fe r e n t  ty p es  o f an­
sw ers, because the q u estio n  o f id e n t i f ic a t io n  i s  a p r a c t ic a l  one and th a t  
o f nature a th e o r e t ic  one.
I f  the form o f  a sen tence i s  viewed as c o n s t itu t in g  i t s  meaning, 
t h is  form could not be in terp re ted  as the con ven tion a l sy n ta c tic  forms o f  
se n te n c e s , u n le s s ,  as was d iscu ssed  in  Chapter I ,  th ere could be found a 
s e n te n t ia l  schema or common form. The breakdown of s e n te n t ia l  typ es  
g iven  in  grammar books i s  a g e n e r a liz a t io n  o f th ose conventions by which  
sen ten ces are recogn ized  as sen ten ces--a  p r a c t ic a l  problem o f  id e n t i f i c a ­
t io n .  B ut, to  take the form o f sen ten ces as what i s  e s s e n t ia l  to  th e ir  
meaning i s  th e o r e t ic a l ly  m istaken , because i t  i s  to  confound th a t by which 
we d ec id e  what has meaning (form ) w ith  meaning i t s e l f  ( fu n c t io n ) , i . e . ,  
the p o s s ib i l i t y  o f  meaning (co n v en tio n s) w ith  the a c t iv i t y  (p rocess or 
fu n c tio n ) o f meaning i t s e l f .
I t  has been argued th a t a word has a meaning in  the sense th a t i t  
has a s e t  o f p o s s ib le  u se s . That i s  to  say th a t words, excep t in  the sense  
o f th e ir  w r itte n  or spoken s ig n s ,  are p o s s ib le  fu n c t io n s . i i  the case o f  
sen te n c es , however, th ere i s  a "form" th a t i s  l i t e r a l l y  a co n fig u ra tio n  of  
words. The convention  o f use o f  a word rep la ces  as "form" th e  d esig n  o f 
a t o o l .  There i s  a form o f any g iven  sen ten ce , however, w hich, even though
i t  might be a thoroughly conventional one, i s  rea l and not m etaphorical.
The source of the "form” o f a word i s  in conventional usage. A 
convention of use ("usage” ) ,  th a t i s ,  crea tes the p o ss ib le  uses th at make 
up any word as a meaning. The source o f the form of a sen tence, on the 
other hand, might seem to  l i e  in  the agency o f the speaker. A speaker 
uses words to  construct sentences for p articu lar  p u rp oses--to  f u l f i l l  c er ­
ta in  fu n ctio n s. In th is  sen se , a sentence might be sa id  to  have a p a r t ic ­
ular form because i t  was constructed for a p articu lar  purpose, as a hammer 
i s ,
But, the "because" here may be in terpreted  as making referen ce to  
e ith er  the sou rce, in  th is  sen se , or the p o s s ib i l i t y . The form of a sen ­
tence i s  a composite o f the (forms of th e) words th a t are in  i t .  The sen ­
tence has the form i t  has because i t  was designed for cer ta in  purposes.
The p o s s ib i l i t y  o f th is  form l i e s ,  however, in  the conventions th a t make 
symbols out of sounds. So, the purposes o f a speaker are f u l f i l l a b ie  b e ­
cause the words e x is t  to  express h is  "meaning”- - i . e . , the intended meaning. 
The ex isten ce  of l in g u is t ic  conventions makes i t  p o ssib le  for an intended  
meaning to  be expressed as a s e n te n tia l meaning.
The p o s s ib i l i t y  o f s e n te n tia l form thus l i e s  in  the esta b lish ed  
conventions o f words. The source o f the form of a sen tence, however, 
might seem to  l i e  not in the usage of words which has made them capable 
o f meaning, but in  the in ten tio n s or purposes of the speaker or w riter  
constructing  the sen ten ce, s in ce  a speaker uses words to  construct sen­
ten ces w ith  p articu lar  purposes. But, w hile i t  i s  c er ta in ly  correct to  
observe th a t , in  one se n se , the source of the form of any sentence i s  i t s  
speaker, th is  fa c t  i s  r e a lly  irre lev a n t to  the fa c t  th a t the sentence has
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a meaning, and th at th is  meaning i s  what i t  i s .  The source, o r ig in  or 
d eriva tion  of meaning th at i s  o f importance for the problem a t hand is  
th at in  which the p o s s ib i l i t y  o f meaning l i e s .  I f  the form of a sen ­
tence i s  taken as equ ivalen t to  i t s  meaning, then the p o s s ib i l i t y  o f the 
form i s  found in  the conventions of the use of words.
The d is t in c t io n  between "type" and "token,” d iscussed  in  the pre­
ceding chapter in  r e la t io n  to  word-meaning, a lso  needs to  be in terpreted  
for  sentence-m eaning. The datable occurrences o f a p articu lar  sen tence, 
"tokens" of i t ,  should not be id e n t if ie d  w ith "actual" meanings or sen ­
te n c e s , but, in stead , a sentence as a meaning may be id e n t if ie d  w ith the 
notion o f a sentence- "type." Like tokens of words, tokens of sentences  
have patterns of use (although there would not be much point in  d escr ib ­
ing them as "conventions of use") and th ese may be sa id  to  c o n stitu te  
sen ten ce-" typ es." "Actual" meanings are patterns o f use in  the same sense 
in  which words, "possible" meanings, are. The "meanings" th at are words, 
phrases or sentences a l l  are patterns of u s e , and, th us, "types" as con­
tra sted  w ith "tokens,” but the patterns o f words and phrases are parts of 
patterns of sen ten ces. "Conventions of u se” are derived from patterns of 
sen ten ces, however, and i t  i s  th is  aspect of the use of words th a t I wish 
to  suggest by the term "possible meaning." "Actual" meaning, on the other 
hand, i s  intended to  suggest th a t sentences are the fundamental uses of 
language, those in  terms of which other uses are e x p lica b le .
I t  was argued in  the preceding chapter th a t words are not the  
fundamental e n t i t ie s  o f meaning, and i t  was suggested th a t, in stea d , sen­
tences are. Why not paragraphs, though, or some other d iv is io n  of la n ­
guage? Sentences are fundamental, I b e lie v e , because: ( l )  words, phrases
I
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and sentences are the parts of language th a t have p attern s of u se , w hile  
the uses or fu n ction s involved in  paragraphs, e ssa y s , language-games, 
e t c . ,  have as forms in  common, p a ttern s, only those o f  sen tences and parts  
of them, and, th er e fo re , sentences or c er ta in  parts o f  them are funda­
mental; (2 ) i t  i s  sentences rather than some su b -d iv is io n  o f them, th at  
are fundamental, because (a s argued in  Chapter I I )  words and phrases oc­
cur only in  sen ten ces, have meaning only in  r e la t io n  to  them, and may be 
defined only in  terms of them.
I t  might appear th a t sen ten ces, in  con trast to  words, have mean­
ing in  is o la t io n ,  i . e . ,  ou tsid e  the context o f  a language-game, s in ce  some 
(probably most) sentences u ttered  in  is o la t io n  convey some meaning not 
conveyed by s in g le  words u ttered  in  is o la t io n . (This i s  p a rtly  resp o n sib le  
for  the tem ptation to  view sentences by them selves as "complete," or even 
" fix e d ," meanings,)
Why do we th ink o f such sentences as conveying "some meaning," 
though? The meanings o f the words o f a sentence are s p e c if ie d  in  meaning 
by th e ir  use in  the sen ten ce. Their senses are made s p e c if ic  to  some de­
gree by being put in to  the context o f a sen ten ce, and in  th is  way a sen ­
tence " fixes"  the meanings of i t s  words to  various d egrees. Thus a sen ­
tence out o f context has a somewhat more d e f in ite  meaning than does a word 
out o f c o n te x t - - i t s  sense i s  c lear  to  some degree, depending upon the par­
t ic u la r  sen tence.
As d iscu ssed  in  Chapter I ,  some correspondence th eo r ie s  o f tru th  
may be sa id  to  involve a "meaning-freeze" in  the notion  of a p ro p o sitio n .
I f  the meaning o f ju s t  c er ta in  sen ten ces--th o se  capable o f being e ith er
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true or f a l s e —could be ex a ctly  s p e c if ic ,  complete and f ix e d , then the 
notion  o f a m eaning-freeze in  p rop osition s perhaps might be appropriate 
for the purposes o f -these correspondence th e o r ie s . But, although there  
i s  greater s p e c i f ic i t y  in  sentences than in  words, and sentences are 
capable o f a high degree of s p e c i f ic i t y ,  there i s  an important sense in  
which the meanings o f sentences are not t o t a l ly  independent o f the con­
te x t  of a language-game.
The fu n ctio n a l nature of meaning involves in te r r e la t io n s  of sen ­
tences w ith some c o n te x t(s ) . I t  w i l l  be argued below th at besid es the im­
mediate con tex t, the language-game in  which the sentence plays a r o le ,  
there are other language-games in  which the same and sim ilar sentences 
play r o le s ,  and these contexts a lso  contribute to  the meaning o f the sen ­
ten ce . n e v e r th e le ss , there are sen ten ces—e . g . ,  "All men are fo o ls" — 
th at might seem to  have context-independent meanings. Such sen ten ces, 
viewed ou tsid e any immediate language-game, have a meaning in  a sense 
th at sentences of more vague, le s s  sp e c if ie d  m eaning--e, g . , "Was i t  down 
there?" do n ot. The meanings o f sentences o f the la t t e r  kind are more 
dependent upon th e ir  immediate contexts than are those of the former kind, 
whose meanings are more com pletely determined by the larger context (o f  
other language-games in  which the same and sim ilar sentences play r o le s ) .  
Thus, although there i s  a sense in  which certa in  sentences may be sa id  to  
be context-independent—v i z . ,  in  th at th e ir  meanings are independent of 
the context of any immediate language-game (a t  le a s t  to  a great degree) 
but are determined by language-games which are not a t a given time being  
"played," there i s  another sense in  which sentences are always to  some d e­
gree co n tex t-d ep en d en t--v iz ., in  th at there i s  one or more language-game
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in  r e la t io n  to  which the sentence has a meaning.
(There i s  another type of s e n te n c e - -e ,g ., " I t 's  raining"--w hich  
a lso  seems to  he context-independent, hut in  a d if fe r e n t  way. This type 
of sentence might he sa id  to  he independent o f any language-game a t a l l  
because i t  could conceivably never be used w ith in  any l in g u is t ic  context 
a t a l l .  This i s  a more complex matter than th a t of sentences l ik e  "All 
men are fo o ls ,"  but the reasons for holding th a t th is  so rt of sentence  
a lso  i s  context-dependent in  a fundamental way w i l l  be c lear  when the 
notion  of "basic a c t iv i t ie s "  i s  developed below, since th ese  sentences  
are d ir e c t ly  dependent upon "basic a c t iv i t i e s ,"  and only in d ir e c t ly  upon 
re la ted  l in g u is t ic  a c t i v i t i e s . )
I f  the "meaning of words" i s  th e ir  u se , as in terpreted  in  the pre­
ceding chapter, then to  in terp ret the meaning o f sentences as th e ir  form 
could involve a notion  of the sentence as a con figu ration  or structure  
made out of oth er, conventional form s--words. The meaning of such a form 
could be sa id  to  l i e  in  i t s  created d esign , as the meanings of i t s  con­
s t itu e n t  forms l i e  in  th e ir  conventional "forms," or p o ss ib le  fu n ctio n s. 
The meaning o f a sentence in  th is  in terp re ta tio n  would l i e  in  a s e t  of 
p o ss ib le  fu nctions which i t s  form makes p o s s ib le .
There remains the p o s s ib i l i t y  th at the nature of s e n te n tia l mean­
ing i s  to  be found in  such a "form" conceived as the t o t a l i t y  o f p o te n tia l  
fu n c tio n s .
S en ten tia l Function
I f  the meaning of a sentence (a sentence as a meaning) i s  a "func­
tio n ,"  i t  must be qu ite  d if fe r e n t from the so rt of fu n ction  th a t i s  the  
meaning of a word. A word, as d iscussed  in  Chapter I I ,  Is  sim ilar to  a
I
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t o o l —s p e c i f i c a l ly ,  s im ila r  to  an im provised to o l  such as a stone which 
comes to  be c a lle d  a to o l  on account o f i t s  use to  do som ething, and only  
in so fa r  as i t  has been so used. A sen ten ce , on the other hand, -would 
seem to  be s im ila r  to  a designed t o o l ,  such as a hammer. But, on ly  the 
words o f a sentence ( i . e . ,  th e com posite form made up. of. the word-forms) 
are r e a l ly  analogous to  a designed to o l  such as a hammer.
Indeed, th e meaning o f a sentence i s  more c lo s e ly  analogous to  th e  
a c t  o f u sin g  a designed  t o o l . The meaning, which i s  n e ith er  an e n t i t y ,  a 
common form, nor a fam ily  o f p o ss ib le  fu n c tio n s , in vo lves both ( l )  th a t  
th ere be a to o l  designed to  be used for c er ta in  purposes and (2 ) th a t th ere  
be an a c t  o f u s e . The words o f the sentence are put to g e th er , l ik e  a t o o l ,  
in to  a form su ita b le  for  c er ta in  fu n ctio n s or jobs; th is  form, though, i s  
the form o f an a c t io n . Thus, the meaning i s  a c tu a l in  th a t i t  i s  an a c tio n .
The fu n ctio n  o f th e  words o f a sen tence and th e fu n ctio n  o f the  
sentence i t s e l f  need not be d if fe r e n t ia te d . The words are the "form" of 
th e  sen ten ce , but the sentence i t s e l f  i s  an a c t io n , not an ob ject or q u a si­
o b jec t. Thus, th e  words are not elem ents in  th e stru ctu re  o f an o b je c t , 
but elem ents o f the a c tin g  asp ect o f th e sen ten ce. So, as an a c t io n , a 
sentence has an a sp ect th a t i s  the doing or a c tin g  as w e ll  as another a s ­
p ect th a t  i s  th e deed, a c tio n  or what has been done. The words togeth er  
form the a c tin g  a sp ect o f a sen ten ce . The fu n ction in g  o f the words i s  
eq u iva len t to  the fu n ctio n in g  o f th e sen ten ce , because the a sp ect o f the  
sentence th a t has a fu n ctio n  _is th e  words.
The a c t io n , on the other hand, i s  the r e s u lt  o f the use o f words, 
o f the a c t in g . I t  i s  t h is  which i s  the asp ect o f the sentence th a t i s  i t s  
"meaning." The meaning i s  the a sp ect o f an a c tio n  (th e  sen ten ce) th a t i s
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th a t which i s  done, the r e s u l t  o f th e a c tin g , th e "action" i t s e l f .
Thus, a sentence as an a c t io n  may be viewed as a com posite of 
means and ends, o f the a c tin g  and th e  a c tio n  or r e s u l t s .  The "sign" and 
the "proposition" th a t i t  s ig n i f i e s  are b e tte r  conceived of as a sp ects  o f  
a sen ten ce , which i s  i t s e l f  an a c tio n  and not an ob ject or q u a s i-o b je c t .
The "type" and th e "token" both may be in terp reted  as a c t io n s , th e  "token" 
as a d atab le  one and the "type" as one s p e c if ia b le  in  terms o f a context 
of one or more language-gam es. These a lso  might be sa id  to  be two a sp ects  
of any given  sen ten ce , but i t  is  th e  a c tio n  in  the sense a p p lica b le  to  the  
"type" th a t i s  id e n t if ia b le  as a meaning as a fu n c tio n --th a t  w ith  which 
th is  study i s  concerned.
Since a sentence i s  created out of con vention s, the a c tio n  is  one 
made by means of conventions and i s  a stru ctu re o f conventions. So, the  
("grammatical") form of a sentence i s  made l i t e r a l l y  out of words, but i t  
i s  not l ik e  a stru ctu re  or form made o f a "m aterial" o f words or "semantic" 
meanings, and y e t i t  is_ th e form o f som ething- - v i z . , an a c tio n .
Words are the m a ter ia l of meaning in  th e sense th a t they are the  
p o t e n t ia l i t y  o f meaning. An a c tio n  th a t i s  a sentence i s  one made p o ss ib le  
by th e e x isten ce  o f th ese  conventions and made a c tu a l by th e ir  u se . U sage, 
though, i s  a body o f a c tio n s  and the "rules o f use" th a t may be ab stracted  
from t h is  body o f a c tio n s  are not them selves a c tu a l meanings b u t, ra th er , 
are d e sc r ip t iv e  o f th ese  a c t io n s . T herefore, meaning should not be ex ­
p la ined  e x c lu s iv e ly  in  terms o f r u le s  o f th e u se o f words.
There i s  no e s s e n t ia l  nature o f a_ word, nor even a means o f id e n t i ­
fy in g  one, s in ce  what s ig n  i s  a word and what i s  not i s  merely a m atter o f  
convention , o f what i s  so used. B ut, there can be sa id  to  be an e s s e n t ia l  
nature o f words c o l l e c t iv e ly ,  o f the m ateria l o f  meaning as a w hole. This
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e s s e n t ia l  nature may be sa id  to  be one o f conventions e s ta b lish e d  through  
usage.
This i s  to  d e fin e  the nature o f th e  r u le s  o f  use o f words. These 
r u le s  d e scr ib e  the e s ta b lish e d  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  o f the r e la t io n s h ip s  between  
words. Thus, they d escr ib e  th e  manner o f the co n stru ctio n  o f sen te n c es .
The o b serva tion  th a t th ese  r u le s  o f th e use o f words are r u le s  d escr ib in g  
conventions i s  an ob servation  about th e  nature of th e r u le s ,  rather than an 
ob servation  about the words th em selves. F or, th ere  could be noth ing common 
to  the meaning o f a l l  words (or o f a l l  s e n te n c e s ) , but there i s  som ething  
common to  th e  manner o f th e ir  meaning—v i z . ,  th e common nature o f th e  r u le s  
d escr ib in g  how th ey  mean.
In th e case o f sen ten ces , a l s o ,  the manner in  which th ey  mean i s  
d escrib ed  by th e r u le s  o f th e use o f words, s in ce  words are th e m a ter ia l  
o f s e n te n t ia l  meaning. The r u le s  o f the use o f words d escr ib e  the p o s s i ­
b i l i t i e s  o f  sen te n c es , i . e . ,  the p o s s i b i l i t i e s  of a c t io n  of a c e r ta in  k ind .
Meaning should be exp la in ed  not in  terms o f th e r u le s  o f  use  o f 
words, but in  terms o f a c t io n . The m a n ife sta tio n  o f  meaning depends upon 
a c t io n , so th e d e f in it io n  o f words as w e ll as sen ten ces should be in  terms 
o f a c t io n . In th e preceding chapter words were d efin ed  in  terms o f th e ir  
r e la t io n s h ip  to  sen te n c es , s in ce  i t  was contended th a t  the concept o f a 
word was dependent upon th a t o f  a sen ten ce . I f  sen ten ces are in terp re ted  
as a c t io n s ,  words are u lt im a te ly  d e fin a b le  as parts o f  th ese  a c t io n s - - th e  
s ig n s or r ep resen ta tio n s  o f l in g u is t i c  r u le s .
Sentences; Use and A ction
S in ce  a c tio n  i s  an in sep arab le  a sp ect of "use," i t  i s  im portant 
to  examine how i t  i s  in vo lved  in  m ean in g--of both words and sen te n c es .
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Words in  i s o la t io n  are merely p o s s ib le  meanings and have no a c tu a l  
meaning except when used in  sen ten ces . That i s ,  words have no meaning e x ­
cep t in  u se , and i t  i s  in  sen ten ces th a t  th e r e le v a n t type o f use i s  made. 
(Of cou rse , words may be "used" in  other ways—a la rg e  number, perhaps- -  
b e s id e s  th e  b a s ic  way in  which they are used as meanings in  s e n te n c e s .)
In in v e s t ig a t in g  what i s  e s s e n t ia l  to  t h i s  b a s ic  type o f  use o f  words, i t  
should a ls o  be seen  what i s  e s s e n t ia l  to  a c tu a l, as opposed to  merely p o s­
s i b l e ,  m eanings.
I f  words are u sed --n o  m atter whether in  th e b a s ic  manner or some 
o th er—an a c t io n  i s  perform ed, an a c t  o f  u se . I f ,  for  example, someone 
were tau ght how to  en un ciate  aloud the p r in ted  words o f  a language he d id  
not understand a t  a l l ,  th ere  would be a sen se in  which he could be sa id  
to  be "using" the words—in  speaking th e ir  sounds. T his i s  an illu m in a tin g  
case s in c e , fu r th e r , th ere  would be a sen se in  which th e  words spoken had 
meaning, but c le a r ly  not on account o f th e ir  pronu nciation  by t h is  non­
comprehending read er.
The words as p r in ted  on the page e ith e r  do or do not have meaning, 
o f co u rse , r eg a r d le ss  o f whether or not th ey  are read , s i l e n t l y  or a loud , 
by anyone. U tterance i s  n ot m eaningful u se , although i t  may be a necessary  
p art o f  th e  means to  m eaningful u se . U tterance i s  c le a r ly  an a c t ,  as w e l l ,  
and th is  a c t  th er e fo re  i s  not one o f m eaningful u se .
The sen se in  which th e  words as spoken would have meaning in  the  
case g iven  would be as used by the o r ig in a l w r iter  rather than th e  a c tu a l  
speaker. The so r t  o f use th a t  i s  r e le v a n t to  th e  p h ilo so p h ic  problem o f  
meaning i s  not use as u tteran ce by anyone—th e  o r ig in a l  w r iter  any more 
than a read er. M eaningful u se  i s  an a c t  o f  a d if fe r e n t  s o r t .
One knows th a t an a c tio n  th a t  i s  a sen tence has been performed, 
u s u a lly , when one has heard (or seen ) the u tteran ce o f con ven tion a l sounds 
(or w r itte n  s ig n s )  in  a s e r ie s  th a t meets th e  grammatical co n d itio n s for  
a sen tence in  the language in  u se . T h is , however, i s  a t e s t  used in  id en ­
t i f i c a t i o n . I t  i s  how a s e r ie s  o f  words a c tu a lly  i s  commonly id e n t i f ie d  
as having a meaning o f the s e n te n t ia l  ty p e . The p h ilo so p h ic  q u estio n  now 
under in v e s t ig a t io n , though, i s  not "How i s  a sen ten ce  to  be id e n t if ie d ? "  
b u t, r a th e r , "How i s  a sen tence to  be defined?"
The problem o f d e f in it io n  in v o lv es  "use" in  a d if f e r e n t  way from 
th e way in  which i t  i s  in vo lved  in  id e n t i f ic a t io n .  In id e n t ify in g  a word 
or s e r ie s  o f words as a sen ten ce , one i s  e x e r c is in g  a s k i l l - - a  b a s ic  s k i l l  
in vo lved  in  using  language, s in ce  to  recogn ize  what s e r ie s  o f  words con­
s t i t u t e  sen ten ces i s  to  recogn ize  what might p lay a p art in  an im aginable 
language-gam e. To d e fin e  a sen ten ce , however, i s  to  d e scr ib e , in s te a d , the  
nature of t h is  s k i l l  i t s e l f ,  as w e l l  as th a t o f o th er , r e la te d  s k i l l s - -  
i . e . ,  i t s  r e la t io n s h ip  to  th e  t o t a l  a c t iv i t y  o f language.
"Use," in  a l l  i t s  s e n se s , im p lies  a u ser . "Function," in  c o n tr a s t ,  
r e fe r s  pu rely  to  the manner o f  op era tio n , w ith out h in t  o f any kind o f
agen t. But "use" c a r r ie s  w ith  i t  th e  idea o f  someone (or,  in  rare case.s,
som ething) who employs th e  th in g  u sed , in  a d d itio n  to  the idea o f th e  fu n c­
t io n in g  o f th e th in g .
So, for  "use," a c t io n  i s  in volved  in  two ways: There i s  the a c tio n
o f something on i t s  surroundings or f i e l d  o f  a c tio n ; and, th ere  i s  the a c ­
t io n  o f an agent th a t puts th e th in g  i t s e l f  in to  a c t io n . In  the case of
words, i t  i s  more to  the p o in t to  speak o f them as being used than o f th e ir
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fu n c tio n in g , s in c e , fundam entally, th ey  are human t o o l s ,  in  th e sense d i s ­
cussed in  Chapter I I .  Being fundam entally to o ls  used by humans, th ey  are  
to o ls  in  more than the m etaphorical sen ses in  which " to o l'1 i s  s tre tch ed  to  
cover anything serv in g  as a means to  an end. This a sp ect o f the analogy  
does not m i l i t a t e ,  however, a g a in st r ec o g n it io n  o f a fundamental d i s t in c ­
t io n  between agency and operation  or fu n c tio n in g . S im ila r ly , the fa c t  
th a t both agency and fu n ctio n in g  may be tr e a ted  as a c t io n s  should not ob­
scure the d is t in c t io n  between them.
I t  might be argued th a t usin g  a t o o l ,  e . g . ,  pounding w ith  a ham­
mer, i s  more properly  la b e lle d  an "act" than an " action ."  When the two 
terms are con trasted , "action" i s  sometimes used to  d esig n a te  the process  
o f a fu n ctio n  being performed, w h ile , in  c o n tr a s t, "act" sometimes d es­
ig n a tes  what i s  done by someone. "Act" in  th is  usage in v o lv es  the notion  
o f human agency, and, more im portant, i t  o ften  in c lu d es both the process  
o f doing and the r e s u l t  o f i t .
These terms do n o t, however, have c le a r ly  sep arate  fu n ctio n s in  
ordinary speech. So, as they are being used h ere, "act" i s  to  be under­
stood as d esig n a tin g  only the process o f a fu n ctio n  b e in g  performed, and 
"action" as the r e s u lt s  brought about by th is  p ro cess , or the combination  
o f process and r e s u l t s .
There are "uses" th a t are them selves a c t io n s — "tokens" or occur­
rences o f words or sen ten ces , as w e ll as "uses" th a t are th e  r u le s  or 
conventions o f l in g u is t i c  meaning—"types."  The former may be c a lle d  the  
"signs" o f language, and in  t h is  sen se the "uses" o f words togeth er  are 
id e n t ic a l  w ith  the u ttera n ces  o f a sen ten ce . On the other hand, th e  a c tio n  
th a t  i s  the type o f a sentence i s  th a t in  terms o f which the typ es o f i t s
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■words are d efin a b le . I t  i s  w ith action s o f th is  so r t th a t we are now con­
cerned.
Any meaning--word or sen tence—i s  a product and fu n ction  ( in  the 
sense of "a q u a lity , t r a i t  or fa c t  so r e la ted  to  another th a t i t  i s  de­
pendent upon and v a r ies  w ith th a t other,"  Webster’s Mew World D ic tio n a ry ) 
of a c tio n s . The d i f f i c u l t i e s  in  seeing what these meanings c o n s is t  in  are 
due in  part to  the fa c t  th a t, on the one hand, th ere are the other action s  
of the immediate context of any given sentence and, on the other hand, 
there are the action s which determine the usage which in  turn determines 
the form of a given sen tence. The analogous asp ects or parts of the la t t e r  
a ction s may be id e n t if ie d  as the words of a language, w hile action s o f the 
former kind c o n stitu te  what may be ca lled  the "language-game," in  which 
any given sentence i s  involved .
These two re la tio n sh ip s  th a t a sentence has to  other sen ten ces--  
analogies w ith action s in  other language-games and d ir e c t  re la tio n sh ip s  
w ith  action s co n stitu tin g  the immediate environment or con tex t- - together  
account for i t s  meaning. They are both r e la t io n sh ip s  o f one action  (the  
sentence) to  other a c tio n s . They are, a ls o , both r e la t io n sh ip s  of th is  ac­
t io n  to  language-games.
Language-games and A ctions
The notion  o f a language-game serv es , among other th in g s , to  empha­
s ize  two important fa c ts  about language--th at i t s  nature or e s s e n t ia l  char­
a c t e r is t ic  is  th a t of an a c t iv i ty  and th a t i t  may be viewed, rather than 
as a s e t  of words p lus sy n ta c tic  r u le s , as a group of in ter r e la ted  a c t i v i ­
t i e s .  In the most fundamental way the p o s s ib i l i t y  o f meaning l i e s  in  the 
p o s s ib i l i t y  of in d e f in ite  numbers o f language-games. What does a c tu a lly
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mean, furthermore, does so because o f the ex isten ce  of in te r r e la te d  a c t iv ­
i t i e s ,  language-games.
In Chapter I I  were d iscussed  "rules of the use o f words" and now 
i t  may be. asked ( l )  whether th ese  ru les are a lso  the ru les o f language- 
games, (2) whether there are a lso  ru les  of the use of sentences and, i f  so , 
(3 ) whether th ese  are the ru les  o f language-games.
I f  a sentence i s  taken apart, analyzed, we may describe the uses 
o f every word in  i t ,  and a lso  the m od ification s of the words upon each 
other and the lim ita tio n s  placed on each word in  th is  way (the "senses" to  
which cer ta in  of the words are lim ite d ) . In th is  way, the ru les  o f the 
construction  of the sentence would be presented.
One problem now at hand i s  to  determine whether or not a complete
d escr ip tio n  o f th is  kind for every sentence p a r tic ip a tin g  in  a language-
game would co n stitu te  the ru le s  of the language-game i t s e l f .  I f  the ru les
o f the use o f words describe the p o s s ib i l i t i e s  of sen ten ces, they describe  
the p o s s ib i l i t i e s  o f action  of one kind, v i z . ,  of l in g u is t ic  meaning, and, 
th erefo re , they a lso  would describe th e p o s s ib i l i t i e s  of the a c t iv i t i e s  
formed by th ese a c tio n s , v i z . ,  language-games.
To speak, though, as in  the f i r s t  sentence of the foregoing para­
graph, of a "complete d escr ip tio n  of [th e ru les  governing] every sentence 
p a r tic ip a tin g  in  a language-game" is  r e a lly  m islead in g, s in ce  i t  would 
seem to  imply a notion  of language-games as fix ed  in  content, as f in ish ed  
e n t i t ie s  or p rocesses. A b e tter  notion  of a language-game, as an in s tr u ­
ment of meaning theory, would be, in stead , a notion  o f a s e t  o f p o s s ib i l i ­
t i e s . A game such as chess may be described through l i s t in g  i t s  formal 
r u le s - - th is  i s  the game of ch ess. This should be d istin g u ish ed  from an
69
a c tu a l (p lay in g  o f a) game which a p p lie s  th ese r u le s  (as w e ll  as o th ers , 
e . g . ,  laws o f lo g ic ) .  Ju st as a_ game o f chess should be thus d is tin g u ish e d  
from th e game, an a c tu a l language-game, such as i s  embodied in  a conver­
sa tio n  or part o f one, should be d is tin g u ish ed  from the s e t  o f  p o s s i b i l i ­
t i e s  r e s id in g  in  the r u le s  o f the language-game.
The a c tu a liz a t io n  o f the s e t  o f  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  th a t c o n s t itu te s  a 
language-game tak es p lace  in  sen tences (and other a c tio n s )  w hich, to g e th e r , 
form a c tu a l language-gam es, or p a r ticu la r  in sta n ces  o f language-gam es.
These are in sta n ces  o f a p p lic a tio n  o f r u le s  o f meaning.
The notion  o f a language-game i s  the notion  o f an a c t iv i t y .  Any 
a c t iv i t y  may be seen  to  be made up of a c t io n s . To describ e an a c t iv i t y ,  
however, we would d escr ib e  i t s  governing p r in c ip le s  or r u le s  ( in  the sense  
d iscu ssed  in  Chapter I I ) .  To d escrib e  sim ply the a c tio n s  c o n s t itu t in g  one 
in sta n ce  o f the a p p lic a tio n  of the r u le s ,  one "playing,"  would be to  de­
s c r ib e , not the a c t iv i t y ,  but one in stan ce  o f i t .  Although an a c t iv i t y  is  
formed out o f a c t io n s , i t  i s  i t s e l f  describ ed  through d e sc r ip t io n  of the
p r in c ip le s  or r u le s  o f the a c t io n s .
F a ilu re  to  mark a d is t in c t io n  between th e  a c t iv i t y  and i t s  in sta n ces  
would lead  to  regarding a language-game as s im ila r  to  a fo o tb a ll  game 
rather than to  the game o f fo o t b a l l .  For example, a p a r ticu la r  fo o tb a ll  
game may be sa id  to  be composed o f th e  sum of the a c tio n s  tak in g  p lace in  
i t ;  the game conceived o f as w ithout one o f th ese  a c tio n s  would be another 
game. The r o le  o f  a sentence in  a language-game i s  not l ik e  t h i s ,  though, 
and i t s  nature or d e fin in g  c h a r a c te r is t ic s  would not be d iscovered  on such 
a lim ite d  conception  o f language-games.
The r e la t io n  o f a sentence to  a language-game i s ,  ra th er , one of
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a c tio n  to  r u le s--b eca u se  a language-game i s  a s e t  o f  p o s s ib i l i t i e s  th a t  
are never exhausted , i . e . ,  th ere i s  never a la s t  p o ss ib le  "playing." I f ,  
however, a sentence i s  viewed s o le ly  in  r e la t io n  to  the language-gam e-- 
i t s  immediate c o n tex t--th en  only those asp ects o f i t s  meaning th a t are 
g en era lly  known as i t s  "sense" in  the g iven  con text are concerned. I f  
t h is  were what the meaning of a sentence co n s isted  in , then the r u le s  of 
any s in g le  language-game would s u f f ic e  for gen eratin g  a s e n te n t ia l meaning. 
Thus, although th e r e la t io n  o f a sentence to  i t s  immediate context in  a 
language-game i s  a r e la t io n  o f t h is  a c tio n  to  the r u le s  o f th is  a c t iv i t y ,  
the meaning o f the sentence (th e  sentence as a meaning) cannot c o n s is t  
e n t ir e ly  in  t h is  r e la t io n s h ip . The notion  of a language-game should in ­
vo lve  more than the n otion  of the m atrix o f meaning of i t s  elem ents ( a c ­
t io n s  ) .
The meaning o f any sen ten ce , on th e  contrary, i s  derived  from a 
number of u ses o f  language in  a number o f language-games. A ll  th ese uses  
in  a l l  th ese  language-games are described  by the r u le s , the form ulations 
of the con ven tion s, o f  the use o f words. Thus, the two ca teg o r ie s  of r e ­
la t io n sh ip s  th a t a sentence has to  other s e n te n c e s - -v iz . , analogous sen ­
ten ces  in  other language-gam es, and the sen tences o f the language-game 
a t h an d--together account for i t s  meaning. Or, a ls o ,  i t  may be sa id  th a t  
meaning i s  produced by the in te r a c tio n  of r u le s - - th e  r u le s  o f o th er , a n a l­
ogous language-games and th ose o f the immediate language-game.
I t  was pointed  out a t  the o u tse t of th is  s e c t io n  th a t a language- 
game ( l )  i s  b e tter  viewed as a group of in te r r e la te d  a c t iv i t i e s  rather  
than as a s e t  o f words p lus sy n ta c tic  r u le s , and (2 ) serves to  emphasize 
th a t  the nature or e s s e n t ia l  c h a r a c te r is t ic  o f language i s  th a t o f  an
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" a c tiv ity ."  Some im p lica tions of the f i r s t  po in t having now been d i s ­
cussed , the second w i l l  now be examined. The im p lica tion s of th is  asp ect  
o f the p h ilosop h ic  notion  o f a language-game are perhaps somewhat more 
b asic  to  the nature o f meaning in  gen era l.
An a c t iv i t y  may be defined  as formed out o f a c t io n s . A ctions 
seen as w ithout referen ce or r e la t io n  to  each o th er , however, would be 
mere events in  time and space. I t  i s  when the u tteran ce o f  (th e  form o f)  
a sentence i s  seen as an a c tio n  in  an a c t iv i t y  th a t i t  i s  seen as a sen ­
tence .
How, a language-game, as we have seen , may be defined  as a s e t  o f  
p o s s ib i l i t i e s  of l in g u is t ic  a c tio n . In any instan ce o f the operation of 
the r u le s  of a language-game (which are not them selves ever defined  once 
and for  a l l , s in ce  the boundaries la id  out by ru le s  are merely r e la t iv e  
to  whatever a c t iv i t y  i s  under in sp ec tio n ) any a c tu a l u tteran ce may be in ­
terp reted  as an a c tio n  by a referen ce to  the a c t iv i t y .  (Of course, through 
reco g n itio n  o f a conventional form of sen ten ce, one might id e n t ify  the 
words as a sen ten ce, but th is  merely would be to  see  i t  as a p o ss ib le  func­
t io n  in  some language-game. )  The in ter p r e ta tio n  o f an a c tio n  as a fu n ction  
in  an a c t iv i t y  i s  com plicated by the fa c t  th a t an in stan ce of a language- 
game i s  a s e r ie s  o f events progressing  in  time and thus i s  a co n tin u a lly  
evo lv in g  stru ctu re . The t o t a l  r e la t io n sh ip  of any a c tio n  to  the other 
a ctio n s o f the language-game i s  thus not determ inable a t the time when the  
a c tio n  i s  made.
A given form of words may be in terp reted  as an a c tio n , not because 
of th e fa c t  th a t i t  i s  analogous in  form w ith  the forms of other a c tio n s  
in  other a c t i v i t i e s ,  but because i t  performs a (p o ss ib ly  novel) fu n ction
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in  the a c t iv i t y  going on. An utterance i s  in terp re ta b le  as an actio n  
only in sofar  as i t  forms part o f an a c t iv i t y .  In order for  a form of 
words to  co n stitu te  a sentence i t  must have a fu n ction  in  some language - 
game. This does not n e c e ssa r ily  imply, however, th at an a c t iv i t y  f i r s t  
must be id e n t if ie d  before the words may be id e n t if ie d  as fu n ction in g  t o ­
gether as an a c tio n . The a c tio n  may be seen as im plying or su ggestin g  
the a c t iv i t y .  In such a ca se , the sentence may be sa id  to  express a
r u le  or r u le s  of th e a c t iv i t y ,  and suggest others th at together may
amount to  the ru les o f the p o s s ib i l i t i e s  of a c tio n s  th a t c o n stitu te  a 
language-game. The utteran ce o f the form of a sentence immediately sug­
g e s ts  language-games o f which i t  might form a p a r t--th e  i n i t i a l  a c tio n .
The ru les o f a language-game, in  other words, are ru le s  only in  the sense 
o f d escr ip tio n s; they are not p r e sc r ip tiv e  ru le s  th at are fo llow ed , nor 
do they t e l l  what had to  occur, but, ra th er , what simply did occur. What 
might occur i s  lim ited  only by the p o s s ib i l i t i e s  of analogous language- 
game s .
So, to  tr e a t  sen tences as a c tio n s has im p lica tion s beyond those  
o f tr e a tin g  language as composed of in ter r e la ted  a c t i v i t i e s .  I f  a sen­
tence i s  properly defin ed  as an a c tio n , then , as such, i t  i s  known to  be 
involved in  and connected w ith  a larger context o f a c tio n , and i s , ( l )  
fundam entally a fu n ctio n  and not an o b jec t, and (2 ) a human deed, p ra c tice  
or performance, as d is t in c t  from a natu ra l occurrence.
Returning to  the th ree r e la ted  q u estion s posed a t the o u tse t o f
t h is  s e c tio n  (see  p. 6 8 ) ,  from the po in t o f view th at now has been ou t­
lin e d , "the ru les  of the use of words," in terp reted  as comprising
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d e scr ip tio n s  o f the analogous fu n ctio n s o f sen ten ces , must be eq u iva len t  
to  a d e scr ip tio n  o f th e p r in c ip le s  o f a l l  p o s s ib le  language-games and, 
th er e fo re , eq u iv a len t to  the p r in c ip le s  o f a l l  p o ss ib le  sen te n c es . "Rules 
of the use o f words" tak es in  a l l  language and i s  a comprehensive term for  
l in g u is t ic  r u le s . "Rules of sentences"  might be thought to  be ambiguous 
in  th a t i t  might r e fer  e ith e r  to  the r u le s  o f th e co n stru ction  o f sen ­
ten ces  or to  th e r u le s  o f the "use" or fu n ctio n in g  o f sen ten ces . I t  i s  
p o in t le s s  from the p resen t p o in t o f  v iew , though, to  so d if fe r e n t ia te  b e ­
tween the fu n ctio n  o f words in  a sentence and the fu n ction  o f the sentence  
i t s e l f .  The fu n ctio n  o f a sentence ju s t  i s  th e fu n ctio n  of i t s  words.
How the words o f a sentence work togeth er  i s  id e n t ic a l  w ith how the sen ­
tence fu n ctio n s in  i t s  con tex t.
"Rules o f language-games" may be eq u a lly  w e ll equated w ith  r u le s  
of words or o f sen ten ces , depending upon whether the p o s s i b i l i t i e s  or 
a c tu a lity  o f meaning i s  to  be s tr e s se d . The r u le s  o f language-games in  
gen era l are the r u le s  o f  words, but th ese  in  turn  depend upon the ru le s  
of p a r ticu la r  language-games composed o f complete a c t io n s - - s e n te n c e s .
Thus, although a l l  th ree typ es o f ru les  may be seen  to  be e s s e n t ia l ly  eq u i­
v a le n t , each i s  e s s e n t ia l  to  illu m in a te  fundamental a sp ects  o f language.
Consequently, to  d e fin e  a word properly  i s  to  d e f in e , a t  the same 
tim e, sen tences and language-gam es, s in c e  the r u le s  o f a l l  are id e n t ic a l .
To speak of the "use o f words," however, i s  to  speak about p o s s i b i l i t i e s  
o f sen tences or meanings, w hile to  speak of sen ten ces , on the other hand, 
i s  to  speak o f a c tu a l, fu n ction in g  meanings in  the context of a language- 
game. Here the c en tra l term i s  "sentence" and i t s  d e f in it io n  lin k s  " lan­
guage -games," on the one hand, w ith  "words," on the oth er.
To understand t h is  i t  w i l l  be u se fu l to  r e c a l l  th at d if fe r e n t ia ­
t io n  of ac tio n s from natural events in volves a p articu lar  type of d i f f e r ­
e n t ia t io n  between language (and other types of human a c t iv i t i e s )  and the  
world. Prima f a c i e , events or occurrences of natural phenomena are in ­
d istin g u ish a b le  from human a c tio n s . An event is  in terp retab le  as an a ction  
only in sofar as i t  forms part of an a c t iv i t y .
Of course, any events w hatsoever, including a c tio n s , may be viewed 
as natural even ts , in so far  as they may be described by laws o f nature.
To describe action s as such, however, i t  i s  not s u f f ic ie n t  to  describe  
the natural laws involved . To d escr ib e  an a c tio n , e . g . ,  of welding by a 
mechanic, i t  would be inadequate merely to  describe the p h ysica l laws in ­
volved in  the welding process and, fu rth er , i t  would be inadequate even i f  
the p h y sio lo g ica l laws involved in  the movements of the mechanic were 
added. These laws would describe the a c tio n  only as a bare even t. To de­
scribe i t  as an a c tio n  i t  would be necessary to  make reference to  the 
general a c t iv i t y  o f rep a iring  or b u ild in g  o f which the action  was part.
Symbolic ac tio n s such as sentences may be described in  sim ilar  
terms. Such an actio n  does not take i t s  character as an a c tio n  from the 
symbolism c o n stitu tin g  i t s  form, b u t, ra th er , from i t s  ro le  in  an a c t iv ­
i t y .
Language-games and B asic A c t iv i t ie s  
The view o f meaning th at now has been outlined  centers on the  
idea of " a c t iv it ie s ."  As treated  here, "language-games" are a c t iv i t i e s  
th at include both l in g u is t ic  and n o n -lin g u is t ic  a c tio n s . I t  w i l l  be seen  
why th is  i s  the case , i f  one considers a language-game involv ing orders 
or commands. The nature o f sentences th a t are commands is  ex p licab le  in
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terms of the actio n s made in  response to  them. These actions th erefore  
are part o f the language-game, the t o t a l  context in  which the a c tio n  op­
erates .
t
Thus, a " lin g u is t ic  action" i s  one th at occurs in  a "language- 
game," but th is  type o f a c t iv i ty  i s  not carried on s o le ly  by means of 
words (although there might be p articu lar  instances of language-games in  
which a l l  the action s were sen ten ces). Not a l l  the elements o f language- 
games are l in g u is t ic  a c tio n s .
Language-games are only one type of a c t iv ity  among a m ultitude 
of human a c t iv i t i e s ,  but they are re la ted  to  n o n -lin g u is tic  a c t iv i t i e s  in  
sp e c ia l ways. Meaning i s  generated in  language-games, l in g u is t ic  a c t i v i ­
t i e s ,  but i t  i s  a medium o f a c t iv i t i e s  as w e ll as a product of them. Most 
(perhaps even a l l )  a c t iv i t i e s  require language for the performance of some 
action s o f the a c t iv i t y .  Language i s  to  th is  exten t required as a medium 
of the a c t iv i t i e s .
On the other hand, language i s  i t s e l f  an a c t iv i ty .  S t r ic t ly  speak­
in g , meaning i s  not the product o f the a c t iv ity  of language, s in ce  i t  i s  
th at a c t iv i t y .  However, l in g u is t ic  meaning is  a product of n o n -lin g u is t ic  
a c t iv i t i e s .  "Language-games" are r e a lly  one aspect o f many a c t iv i t i e s .
They are d istin g u ish a b le  a c t iv i t i e s  th a t may be iso la te d  for cer ta in  pur- 
p o s e s - - e . g . ,  in  order to  pursue the ph ilosophic in v e s tig a tio n  o f meaning.
But, they are them selves interwoven w ith other a c t iv i t i e s  and are funda­
m entally the means, or part o f the means, for  conducting these other a c ­
t i v i t i e s  .
In order to  d is tin g u ish  these language-relevant a c t iv i t i e s  from 
language-games them selves, I s h a ll  c a l l  them "basic a c t iv i t i e s ."  These
I
a c t i v i t i e s  are th e  fo u n d a tio n s o f  th e  g en era tio n  o f  meaning. I f  la n ­
guages are  spoken o f  (q u ite  m is le a d in g ly )  as "system s o f  s i g n s , " and i f  
l i n g u i s t i c  meaning i s  d escr ib ed  in  term s o f  d is c r e t e  c a te g o r ie s  o f  r u le s ,  
sem antic and s y n t a c t ic ,  then  th e  a s s ig n in g  o f  meanings to  th e  s ig n s  may 
come to  be seen  as how s ig n s  are connected  w ith  "the w orld ,"  w ith  what i t  
i s  th ey  are ab ou t. I f ,  in s te a d , we look  a t  meaning in  th e  co n te x t o f  
" b a sic  a c t i v i t i e s , "  th e  co n n ectio n s betw een words and th e  w orld appear as  
more in d ir e c t ,  in  g e n e r a l, than n am ing-connections (w hich even them­
s e lv e s ,  p erh ap s, appear more d ir e c t  than  th ey  o fte n  r e a l ly  a r e ) .  The 
co n n ectio n s  betw een words and what th ey  are about are gen erated  out o f  
th e  a c t io n s  perform ed by means o f  w ords, even  in  th e  s im p le s t  c a se s  o f  
naming. Thus, se n te n c e s  are gen era ted  out o f  b a s ic  a c t i v i t i e s ,  and t h i s  
g e n e r a tio n  o f meaning i s  p a r t ly  a m atter o f  c r e a t in g  r e la t io n s h ip s  betw een  
th e  l i n g u i s t i c  a c t io n s  and th e  a c t io n s  o f  th e  b a s ic  a c t i v i t y .
The f a c t  th a t  meaning i s  gen erated  as a product o f  a c t i v i t i e s  i s  
secondary to  th e f a c t  th a t  i t  i s  a medium o f a c t i v i t i e s .  Meaning as a 
means to  a c t io n  i s  fundam ental to  th e  th eo ry  o f  m eaning. Meaning as a 
product o f  a c t io n  i s  u s e f u l  m ain ly in  e x p la in in g  th e  o r ig in  or g en era tio n  
o f  m eaning, and i s  in e s s e n t ia l  in  in te r p r e t in g  i t s  n a tu re .
"Basic a c t i v i t i e s , "  th en , are  fundam ental a c t i v i t i e s  ca r r ie d  on 
in  some ca se s  and to  some e x te n t  w ith  th e a id  o f  language. The r u le s  
govern ing  b a s ic  a c t i v i t i e s ,  however, are n ot th o se  o f  meaning. More im­
p o r ta n t , th e  r u le s  o f meaning are n ot p a r t o f  th e  r u le s  o f  b a s ic  a c t i v i ­
t i e s .  To co n sid er  th e r u le s  o f  meaning i s  n ot to  s in g le  out a c e r ta in  
c la s s  o f  r u le s  out o f th o se  govern ing  b a s ic  a c t i v i t i e s ,  b u t, r a th e r , to  
co n sid er  one a sp e c t  o f  th e se  a c t i v i t i e s ,  v i z . ,  one type o f  a c t i v i t y  among 
a l l  th o se  th a t  are means to  th e  p u r su it  o f  th e  b a s ic  a c t i v i t y .
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M eaning-ru les have t o  do on ly  w ith  one such "enabling" a c t i v i t y .
The n o tio n  o f  an a c t i v i t y ,  i t  has been remarked, i s  r e l a t iv e  to  th e  pur­
p o ses  a t  hand. The r u le s  o f  meaning have to  do w ith  (some o f )  th e  same 
phenomena th a t  c o n s t i t u t e  a b a s ic  a c t i v i t y ,  which i s  i t s e l f  d e f in a b le  in  
term s o f another s e t  o f  r u le s  d e s c r ib in g  th e  same phenomena in  another  
r e s p e c t .
B a s ic  a c t i v i t i e s ,  c a r r ie d  on probably w ith o u t e x c e p tio n  p a r t ly  by 
means o f m ea n in g -ru le s , are th em selves  th a t  fo r  w hich m ean in g-ru les are  
u sed . The a c t io n s  c a r r ie d  on w ith in  th e s e  a c t i v i t i e s  are d e sc r ib a b le  as  
such by r u le s  r e la t in g  them to  th e s e  a c t i v i t i e s .  The same e v e n ts  or phe­
nomena may be d e sc r ib e d  in  r e la t io n  to  other m a tte r s , in c lu d in g  th e con ­
v e n tio n s  o f  m eaning, b u t , as su ch , th ey  are n o t th e  same a c t io n s .
As an example o f  a b a s ic  a c t i v i t y  and r e la te d  language-gam es, 
co n sid er  a case  in  w hich I  am b u ild in g  a shed . I measure beams and p la n k s,  
saw and hammer, d ig  support h o le s ,  pour cem ent, e t c .  I  m ight e n g a g e  in  a 
number o f  language-gam es w ith  m y s e lf ,  w ith  a h e lp e r , w ith  a hardware s a l e s ­
man. These language-gam es are in te r p r e ta b le  by r e fe r e n c e  to  th e b u ild in g  
o f  th e shed . I f  I  were d ir e c t in g  my h elp er  to  mark o f f  measurements on a 
beam, I  m ight c a l l  out th e  f ig u r e s  to  him and, in  order to  c l a r i f y  where 
th ey  were to  be marked o f f ,  he m ight ask  q u e s tio n s  about where th e  f in is h e d  
beam was to  be p la c e d , e t c .  In t h i s  c o n te x t , th e  marking o f  th e  beam may 
be co n sid ered  as a b a s ic  a c t i v i t y .  The whole a c t i v i t y  o f  b u ild in g  th e  
shed m ight be viewed as a b a s ic  a c t i v i t y  in  another c o n te x t , e . g . ,  one in  
w hich  I  d is c u s s  w ith  a hardware salesm an th e  b e s t  s o r t s  o f  lumber to  be 
purchased fo r  th e  sh ed . In  t h i s  case  th e  language-gam es would be r e la t e d
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t o  th e  w hole complex o f  a c t i v i t i e s  th a t  are  to  be in v o lv e d  in  th e  b u i ld ­
in g  o f  th e  shed . What i s  t o  be id e n t i f i e d  as a b a s ic  a c t i v i t y  depends 
upon th e  language-gam es fo cu sed  upon.
C on clu sion : S en ten ces  and Meaning
We c a l l ,  a t  v a r io u s  tim es  and in  v a r io u s  s i t u a t io n s ,  a l l  r e la t io n s  
betw een  se n te n c e s  and, h en ce , betw een  w ords, "meaning." In  t h i s  ch ap ter  
th e r e  has been o u t l in e d  a view  o f  th e  n atu re o f  l i n g u i s t i c  meaning as l y ­
in g  in  a c t io n s  d e f in e d  as made by means o f  th e  u se  o f  w ords, and d e t e r ­
mined a s  a c t io n s  by t h e ir  fu n c t io n s  in  l i n g u i s t i c  a c t i v i t i e s ,  " language-  
g a m es.” In t h i s  way, th e  r e le v a n t  sen se  o f  "meaning" has been s p e c i f i e d .
S in ce  t h i s  d e f in i t i o n  i s  in  term s o f  th e  fu n c t io n  o f  a l i n g u i s t i c  
a c t io n ,  th e  n o t io n  o f  a language-gam e has been examined in  order t o  c l a r ­
i f y  i t s  e le m e n ts , s e n te n c e s .  T h is  n o t io n  may be d e sc r ib e d  as th a t  o f  a 
s e t  o f  in t e r r e la t e d  r u le s  fo r  th e  use o f  w ords. Such a s e t  o f  r u le s  o f  
a c t io n  em bodies c e r t a in  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  o f  a c t io n ,  by d e s c r ib in g  ty p es  o f  
in t e r r e la t io n s  betw een  c e r ta in  l i n g u i s t i c  and n o n - lin g u is t ic  a c t io n s .
The r u le s  o f  language-gam es are  e q u iv a le n t  to  th e  r u le s  o f  s e n ­
te n c e s  and o f  th e  use o f  w ords. These r u le s ,  w hich d e sc r ib e  human a c t i v ­
i t i e s ,  are  n e ith e r  a r b itr a r y  nor n e c e s sa r y , but in v o lv e  b o th  " fa c ts  o f  
nature" and n o n -n ecessa ry  custom s. T h is co n ju n ctio n  i s  r e f l e c t e d  in  th e  
n o tio n  o f  a language-gam e as composed o f  b oth  l i n g u i s t i c  and n o n - l in g u is ­
t i c  a c t io n s ,  perform ed in  and l im ite d  by th e  human environm ent.
The n o tio n s  o f  " action "  and " a c t iv ity "  are  c e n tr a l t o  th e  i n t e r ­
p r e ta t io n  o f th e  u se  view  o f meaning o u t lin e d  in  C hapters I I  and I I I .  The 
co n cep t o f  a s e n te n c e , an a c t io n  o f  a p a r t ic u la r  ty p e , i s  th e  con cep t o f  
a u n it  o f  m eaning, in  term s o f w hich r u le s  (and w ords) are  d is t in g u is h e d
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and ou t o f  -which language-gam es are  c o n s tr u c te d . The "meaning o f  a s e n ­
t e n c e ” (or "a sen ten ce  as a m eaning") i s  th u s fundam ental in  t h i s  view  o f  
m eaning, b e in g  used  a s  a t h e o r e t ic  con cep t fo r  th e  e x p la n a tio n  o f  m eaning.
The n o tio n  o f  "the meaning o f  a sen ten ce"  i s  o b v io u s ly  q u ite  d i f ­
f e r e n t  from th a t  o f  th e  " p ro p o sitio n "  in  th e  T ra c ta tu s  and r e la t e d  t h e o r ie s .  
I t  i s  s im ila r  in  an im portant r e s p e c t ,  th ou gh , v i z . ,  a s  v iew in g  th e  s e n ­
te n c e  as th e  b a s ic  u n it  o f  l i n g u i s t i c  meaning and fu n dam en ta lly  d i f f e r e n t  
from w ord-m eanings.
In Chapter I  were d is c u s se d  th r e e  a n a ly se s  o f  tr u th  and t h e ir  r e l a ­
t io n s h ip s  t o  meaning a s  u s e . The view  o f meaning o u t lin e d  in  t h i s  stu d y  
w i l l  have a p p l ic a t io n  in  a new a n a ly s is  o f  tr u th .  I t  has a p p l ic a t io n  a l s o ,  
how ever, in  th e  e s ta b lis h m e n t  o f  th e  nature o f  th e  problem  o f  tr u th  and o f  
th e  n atu re o f  p h ilo so p h ic  m ethod. Thus, o f  th e  p r in c ip le s  taken  a s  g iv e n  
in  t h i s  s t u d y - - v i z . ,  th a t  th e  nature o f  l i n g u i s t i c  meaning l i e s  in  u se  and 
th a t  p h ilo s o p h ic  problem s are c o n c e p tu a l- - th e  second now w i l l  be i n t e r ­
p r e te d .
CHAPTER IV
THE PHILOSOPHIC PROBLEM OF TRUTH
Some F orm u lation s o f  th e  Problem
Among th e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  o f  what th e  p h ilo s o p h ic  a n a ly s is  o f  tr u th  
m ight y ie ld  a re:
1 ) When a sta tem en t i s  t r u e ,
2 )  When we may say  a s ta tem en t i s  t r u e ,
3 ) When we say  a sta tem en t i s  t r u e ,
4 ) When th e  word "true" i s  u sed .
One i s  a fo rm u la tio n  o f what t r a d i t i o n a l ly  has been  tak en  a s  th e  
p h ilo s o p h ic  problem  o f  tr u th . T h is fo rm u la tio n  has been  in te p r e te d  in  a 
v a r ie t y  o f  w ays, in c lu d in g  2 ,  3 and k.
I f  2 and 3 are  co n sid ered  e q u iv a le n t  to  one a n o th er , meaning b e ­
comes th e  c r i t e r io n  o f  tr u th  in  th a t  th e  c r i t e r ia  o f  " tru e” having  mean­
in g  in  a p a r t ic u la r  c o n te x t  would be tak en  a l s o  as th e  c r i t e r ia  o f  tr u th  
in  t h i s  same c o n te x t . I f  i t  i s  m istak en  t o  view  th e s e  two s e t s  o f  c r i ­
t e r ia  as e q u iv a le n t ,  though , th e  problem  th en  a r i s e s  o f  what th e  c r i t e r ia  
o f  tr u th  are and w hat, i f  any, r e la t io n  th ey  bear to  th e  co n v en tio n s  th a t  
are th e  c r i t e r ia  (a s  w e l l  a s  th e  m edia) o f  m eaning.
Two m ight r e f e r  t o  stand ard s o th er than  th o se  o f  u s a g e . I t  
a llo w s  fo r  drawing a d i s t in c t io n  betw een what i s  in  f a c t  tr u e  and what i s  
sa id  to  be t r u e .  I t  has been argued in  th e  p rece d in g  ch a p ters  th a t  th e  
co n v en tio n s  o f  usage th a t  make m eaning p o s s ib le  are  n e ith e r  o f  a co m p le te ly
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a r b itr a r y  nor o f  a com p lete ly  n ecessa ry  n a tu re . T his does not p reclu de  
th e  p o s s i b i l i t y ,  however, th a t  the con ven tion s o f a p a r t ic u la r  word might 
be e x c lu s iv e ly  o f one k ind or th e  o th e r . One o f th e  most im portant ques­
t io n s  in  th e  ca se  o f th e  word ’'tru e1' i s :  Are th e r u le s  o f  i t s  use d e te r ­
mined by som ething more than a r b itr a r y  standards o f  usage?
I m p lic it  in  many d eb ates about tr u th - - in c lu d in g  th a t  betw een  
A u stin  and Straw son— i s  a co n fu sio n  o f sta tem en ts o f  th e  ty p e  o f  1 and 2 
w ith  th o se  o f th e type o f  3 aQ£l 4 , That i s ,  th e r e  i s  a confounding o f the  
q u e stio n  o f which standards o f  tr u th  are co n v en tio n a l w ith  th e  q u e s tio n  o f  
which standards o f  tr u th  w i l l  g iv e  th e  tr u th . In th e  case  o f  Straw son, 
th ere  i s  a ls o  d e lib e r a te  id e n t i f i c a t io n  o f th e  con ven tion s o f  the a p p lic a ­
t io n  o f "true" w ith  th e  con ven tion s o f tr u th , which i s  coupled w ith  a r e -  
,1 e c t io n  o f  th e  q u e s tio n  o f what standards o f  tr u th  w i l l  g iv e  the tr u th .
S tatem ents 1 and 2 , th en , a llo w  fo r  b e in g  in te r p r e te d  as r e fe r r in g  
to  e x t r a - l in g u is t i c  stan d ard s, w h ile  3 an<3- ^ are  q u estio n s  about l i n g u i s t i c  
u sa g e . The standards o f  r u le s  o f  tr u th  may or may n o t be id e n t ic a l  w ith  
th o se  r u le s  (or some p a rt o f  them) th a t  are th e  con ven tion s o f  m eaning, but  
i t  i s  th e  job o f  th e p h ilo so p h ic  a n a ly s is  o f tr u th  to  e s t a b l is h  and n ot  
assume such an id e n t i f i c a t io n ,  s in c e  i t  i s  fa r  from com m onsensical.
The d if fe r e n c e  between th e two p a ir s  o f  sta tem en ts i s  in v o lv ed  in  
r e j e c t in g  th e problem o f  "truth" as a p h ilo so p h ic  one, and con ten d in g  
t h a t ,  in s te a d , th e  problem o f  "true" i s  th e  p rop erly  p h ilo so p h ic  one. In  
th e  debate d isc u sse d  in  Chapter I ,  A u stin  s e t s  up th e  problem w ith  r e f e r ­
ence to  P i l a t e ' s  p r e te n tio u s  "What i s  tru th?"  "Truth" b ein g  an a b s tr a c t  
noun i s  l i k e l y  to  le a d  one a s tr a y , A u stin  b e l i e v e s ,  and th e use o f "true"  
or " is  tru e"  w i l l  be l e s s  treach erou s to  a n a ly ze . T h is , o f  co u rse , g iv e s
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th e  problem  s t i l l  o th er  t w i s t s .  Most im p ortan t, i f  t r u th  i s  p u t in to  
a d j e c t iv a l  form fo r  a n a ly s i s ,  i t  e a s i l y  may appear to  be som ething p red ­
ic a te d  o f  la r g e  u n it s  o f  m eaning— e . g . ,  " se n te n c e s” or " p r o p o s it io n s .” 
A sking what "true" means le a d s  to  t r e a t in g  i t  a s  a p ro p erty  o f  sem an tic  
u n it s  o f  some k in d , such a s  t h e s e .  J u s t  a s  fo rm u la tin g  th e  problem  as  
"What i s  tru th ?"  p u ts  a c e r ta in  c a s t  on th e  m a tter , so  fo rm u la tin g  i t  as  
"How i s  ' t r u e '  used?" a ls o  p u ts a c e r ta in  c a s t  on i t - - v i z . , th e  problem  i s
put in to  th e c la s s  o f  3 and 4 and th u s comes t o  be t r e a te d  as a sea rch
fo r  l i n g u i s t i c  r u le s  or co n v e n tio n s .
There are a t  l e a s t  two ty p es  o f  fo rm u la tio n  o f  th e  problem  o f  
t r u th ,  th e n , th o se  th a t  may be in te r p r e te d  are  r e f e r r in g  t o  e x t r a - l i n ­
g u i s t i c  c r i t e r ia  and th o se  th a t  im ply p u re ly  l i n g u i s t i c  c r i t e r i a .  I t  i s  
im portant to  n o te , however, th a t  v e n tu r in g  an answer to  th e  q u e s t io n  o f  
l i n g u i s t i c  c r i t e r ia  d oes n o t d isp o se  o f  q u e s t io n s  o f  th e  other ty p e . I t  
should  be shown why th e  p h ilo so p h ic  q u e s t io n  i s  form u la ted  in  one way 
r a th er  than  o th e r s .
Method and th e  N ature o f  P h ilo so p h ic  Problem s
To i s o l a t e  th e  problem  o f  tr u th  r e q u ir e s  som eth ing more than  p ro ­
t e s t a t io n s  o f  th e  m odest c la im s o f p h ilo so p h y  when i t  ta k e s  " tru e” a s  th e  
proper item  fo r  in v e s t ig a t io n .  What c o n s t i t u t e s  a p h ilo s o p h ic  problem  
c l e a r ly  must have some r e l a t io n  to  what i s  v iew ed  as c o n s t i t u t in g  the  
proper p h ilo s o p h ic  m ethod, b u t th e  n atu re o f any p h ilo s o p h ic  problem  i s  
n ot im m ediately  e v id e n t  from th e  g e n e r a l view  th a t  "meaning i s  u s e ."  To 
e s t a b l i s h  a method fo r  in v e s t ig a t in g  th e  g e n e r a l n a tu re  o f  t r u th  (o r  any 
oth er p h ilo so p h ic  p rob lem ), some view o f th e  g e n e r a l n atu re  o f  meaning i s  
n ot enough. I t  i s  fu r th e r  n e c e ssa r y  th a t  th e  a n a ly s is  o f  m eaning be
83
e s ta b lis h e d  as a method o f  p h ilo so p h y , and th a t  th e g e n e r a l natu re o f  
t h i s  ty p e  o f a n a ly s is  be o u t lin e d .
That th e  d e l in e a t io n  o f  th e  nature o f a proper p h ilo s o p h ic  prob­
lem i s  a d i f f e r e n t  s o r t  o f  ta s k  from th a t  o f  o u t l in in g  a p h ilo s o p h ic  
method i s  e v id e n t  from c o n s id e r in g  th a t  problem s are m a te r ia l fo r  in v e s ­
t ig a t i o n  by some m ethod. I f  p h ilo so p h y  were to  be d e f in e d  in  term s o f  
i t s  m a tte r , i t  would be th e  stu d y  o f  a c e r ta in  body o f  p rob lem s. T his  
would be a u s e f u l  d e f i n i t i o n ,  how ever, on ly  i f  '’problem s" were u n derstood  
as in c lu d in g  n o t on ly  th e  g e n e r a l d e s ig n a t io n  o f  any problem , b u t a ls o  
i t s  s p e c i f i c  fo r m u la t io n s , i . e . ,  th e  v a r io u s  manners in  w hich i t  has been  
or may be p o se d .
I t  was argued in  Chapter I I  th a t  th e r e  may be a th eo ry  o f  th e  
p r a c t ic e  th a t  i s  lan g u a g e , j u s t  as th e r e  may be a th eo ry  o f  a n y th in g  
e l s e .  A th eory  o f  language in  w hich meaning i s  seen  as u se  i s  n o t  i t ­
s e l f ,  o f  c o u r se , a p h ilo s o p h ic  m ethod. To t r e a t  t h is  th e o r y  o f  language  
as im plying a p h ilo s o p h ic  method m ight be done w ith  th e  id ea  th a t  language  
i s  th e  m a te r ia l o f  p h ilo s o p h ic  i n q u i r y - - i . e . , th a t  the problem s o f  p h i­
losop h y  are a l l  m a tters  o f  lan gu age. Methods o f  a n a ly z in g  language are  
m odeled to  a la r g e  e x t e n t ,  o f  c o u r se , on t h e o r ie s  o f th e  nature o f  la n ­
guage. In  t h i s  way, th e  developm ent o f  a th eo ry  o f language becomes c en ­
t r a l  t o  e s t a b l i s h in g  a method fo r  p h ilo so p h ic  in v e s t ig a t io n .  S o , in d ic a ­
t io n s  o f  th e  in t e r p r e t a t io n  o f  th e  u se  view  adhered to  by any p a r t ic u la r  
a n a ly t ic  p h ilo so p h er  may be found in  h is  methods o f d e a lin g  w ith  v a r io u s  
p h ilo s o p h ic  prob lem s.
In  order to  e s t a b l i s h  a s u it a b le  m ethod, I  s h a l l  co n s id er  th e  n a ­
tu re  o f  p h ilo s o p h ic  problem s in  g e n e r a l and th en  co n sid er  what s o r t  o f
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method th e  n atu re  o f  th e s e  problem s s u g g e s t s .  I t  i s  on ly  a f t e r  b oth  o f  
th e se  m a tters  have been co n s id ered  th a t  fo rm u la tio n  o f  th e  p a r t ic u la r  
p ro b lem --th a t o f  t r u th - -c a n  be attem pted  w ith  a c le a r  id ea  o f  what i s  a s ­
sumed by th e  fo rm u la tio n  and what rem ains to  be so lv e d .
I t  has been  argued in  th e  p reced in g  ch ap ters  th a t  th e  n o t io n  o f  
a word i s  d e r iv a t iv e  from th a t  o f  a se n te n c e , th a t  meaning i s  b a s i c a l l y  
s e n t e n t ia l ,  and th a t  se n te n c e s  in s o fa r  a s  th ey  a re  m eanings may be i n t e r ­
p r e te d  as a c t io n s .  What does t h i s  in t e r p r e ta t io n  o f th e  view  th a t  meanr 
in g  i s  u se  su g g e s t  or im ply about th e nature o f  p h ilo so p h ic  problem s?
Other in t e r p r e t a t io n s ,  such as th o se  d is c u s s e d  in  Chapter I ,  have
been lin k e d  w ith  th e  view  th a t  th e  n atu re  o f  p h ilo s o p h ic  problem s i s  fu n ­
d am en ta lly  l i n g u i s t i c .  C onnected w ith  th e s e  two f a c t o r s - - t h e  view  o f  
meaning as u se  and th e  view  th a t  p h ilo so p h ic  problem s are  fu n d am en ta lly  
l i n g u i s t i c - - h a s  been th e  fu r th e r  c o n te n t io n  th a t  a s u ita b le  p h ilo s o p h ic  
method i s  one w hich exam ines th e  "use" o f  " p h ilo sop h ic"  term s or co n cep ts  
in  t h e ir  " ord in ary ,"  e x tr a -p h ilo s o p h ic  h a b ita t s .
Between t h i s  view  o f m ethod, on th e  one hand, and, on th e  o th e r ,
th e  u se  th eo ry  o f  m eaning and th e  l i n g u i s t i c  th eo ry  o f  th e  natu re o f  p h i l ­
o so p h ic  prob lem s, th e  l in k s  are  somewhat ten u o u s. They may c o n s i s t  in  
v iew s and argum ents o f  one k ind  or another t h a t  in v o lv e  t r e a t in g  c e r ta in  
t e r m s - - in d iv id u a l  words o r , a t  m ost, p h r a s e s - - th a t  have commonly been c en ­
t r a l  t o  fo rm u la tio n s  o f  " tr a d it io n a l"  p h ilo s o p h ic  prob lem s, as th e  proper  
o b je c ts  o f  p h ilo s o p h ic  in q u ir y . In t h i s  way, t r a d i t io n a l  problem s o f te n  
are d isp o se d  o f ,  in  e f f e c t ,  by , f i r s t ,  ta k in g  t h e ir  c e n tr a l  term s a s  ob­
j e c t s  o f  in q u iry --rem o v in g  them to  t h e ir  "ordinary" h a b ita t s  and in v e s ­
t ig a t i n g  th e  s o r t  o f  u se  th ey  have th e r e - -a n d , secon d , con c lu d in g  th a t  in
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th e  p h ilo s o p h ic  q u e s t io n s  a t  hand th e s e  term s are  used im p rop erly , i . e . ,  
in c o n s is t e n t ly  w ith  t h e ir  u se  in  ord in ary  d is c o u r s e .
The r e j e c t io n  o f  t r a d i t io n a l  p h ilo s o p h ic  q u e s t io n s  i s  n o t  made 
out o f  hand by such  a n a ly t ic  p h ilo so p h e r s  but i s  a r e s u l t  o f  a n a ly se s  o f  
t h i s  k in d  made o f  c e n t r a l  p h ilo s o p h ic  term s. A r e s u l t  o f  t h i s  p ro ced u re , 
how ever, i s  th a t  th e  q u e s tio n s  in v e s t ig a t e d  by th e s e  p h ilo so p h e r s  are a l ­
most e x c lu s iv e ly  q u e s t io n s  about th e  u se  o f  w ord s--sh ow in g  what i s  wrong 
w ith  t r a d i t i o n a l  p h ilo s o p h ic  u s e s  and a d v o ca tin g  o th er u se s  consonant 
w ith  ord in ary  u sa g e .
T his approach i s  n ot e n t i r e ly  s a t i s f a c t o r y  fo r  a t  l e a s t  two r e a ­
son s: Cl) m eanings o f  s in g le  term s are n o t th e  s o le  problem s o f  p h i lo s ­
ophy (and are fr e q u e n t ly  on ly  among th e i n i t i a l  ones in v o lv e d  in  th e  i n ­
v e s t ig a t io n  o f  c e n tr a l  p h ilo s o p h ic  prob lem s); (2 )  the method o f  i n v e s t i ­
g a t io n ,  based upon a to o  l im it e d  in t e r p r e t a t io n  o f  th e  u se  view o f  mean­
in g  ( in  which th e r e  i s  an i n s u f f i c i e n t  trea tm en t o f  th e  meaning o f  s e n ­
t e n c e s )  i s  i t s e l f  to o  l im it e d .  Thus, n e ith e r  th e  d e l in e a t io n  o f  problem s 
nor th e  method o f  in v e s t ig a t in g  them i s  e n t i r e ly  ad eq u ate , and fo r  s im i­
la r  r e a s o n s , v i z . ,  t h e ir  r e la t io n s h ip s  t o  in t e r p r e ta t io n s  o f  th e  use view  
o f  meaning th a t  go l i t t l e  fu r th e r  than th e  use o f  w ord s.
In  th e  fo l lo w in g  s e c t io n s  w i l l  be o u t l in e d , f i r s t ,  a view  o f  th e  
ch a ra c te r  o f  p h ilo s o p h ic  problem s and, secon d , an extended  method fo r  
p h ilo so p h ic  in v e s t ig a t io n .
The N ature o f a P h ilo so p h ic  Problem
The fo rm u la tio n  o f  a problem  d e te r m in e s , a t  l e a s t  to  some e x t e n t ,  
th e  methods employed in  a ttem p ts t o  s o lv e  i t .  For t h i s  r ea so n , th e o r ie s  
o f  th e  nature o f  p h ilo so p h y  i t s e l f  c o n ta in  v iew s both  o f  th e  g e n e r a l
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ch a ra cter  o f  p h ilo s o p h ic  problem s and o f th e  method t o  be used  to  in v e s ­
t ig a t e  them.
In order to  in t e r p r e t  th e  second la r g e  assum ption  o f  t h i s  s tu d y - -  
v i z . ,  th a t  p h ilo so p h ic  problem s are c o n cep tu a l p r o b le m s - - it  'w ill be u s e ­
f u l  to  co n s id er  two la r g e  c a te g o r ie s  w ith in  w hich p h ilo so p h y  m ight f in d  
i t s  prob lem s, v i z . ,  phenomena and c o n c e p ts . (By 'phenomena" I  mean "ob­
s e r v a b le s ,"  o b je c ts  o f  p e r c e p t io n , what i s  o b serv a b le  th rou gh  th e  s e n s e s .  
By "concepts"  I  mean in stru m en ts o f  th o u g h t, as ex p r e sse d  in  lan gu age.
See n ex t p a ra g ra p h .) I t  i s  w ith in  th e com petence o f  any n a tu r a l language  
to  r e f e r  to  b o th . So, th e  a n a ly s is  o f  language does n o t  l im i t  p h ilo s o p h ic  
in q u ir y  t o  on ly  th o se  a s p e c ts  o f  lan gu age th a t  have to  do w ith  c o n c e p ts ,  
nor to  th o se  th a t  have t o  do w ith  phenomena, s in c e  many co n cep ts  are o f  
or about phenomena. Thus, t o  d e f in e  p h ilo s o p h ic  problem s as co n cep tu a l 
i s  n o t to  e l im in a te  a s p e c ts  o f  language th a t  d e a l w ith  phenomena.
"Concepts" a re  t o o l s  or in stru m en ts o f  th ou ght and a re  ex p ressed  
in  our a c t io n s .  Perhaps p re-em in en t among th e s e  a c t io n s  are  l i n g u i s t i c  
a c t io n s ,  e lem en ts o f  lan gu age-gam es. The m eanings o f  l i n g u i s t i c  a c t io n s ,  
i . e . ,  s e n te n c e s  as m eanings, a re  fa b r ic s  o f  c o n c e p ts .
I t  m ight be m is le a d in g  to  say  th a t  co n cep ts  are  m eanings o f  
w ords, though, b ecau se t h i s  way o f  p u t t in g  i t  m ight make i t  seem th a t  a 
con cep t i s  th e  meaning o f  a_ word. T his i s ,  perhaps u n fo r tu n a te ly , h ard ly  
ever  l i k e l y  to  be th e  c a s e .  There i s ,  fo r  exam ple, th e  co n cep t o f  mean­
in g ,  w hich i s  ex p ressed  n o t on ly  in  what we do w ith  th e  word "meaning" 
bu t in  what we do w ith  m eanings. There are  a l s o  co n cep ts  such  as "cause"  
th a t  can be d e f in e d  perhaps on ly  a lo n g  w ith  th e  co n cep t o f  " e f fe c t"  (and , 
in d eed , fo r  some purposes i t  m ight be more to  th e  p o in t  t o  speak o f  "the
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concept o f  c a u s e -a n d -e f fe c t" ) .  I t  i s  l e s s  m is le a d in g  to  sa y , th e r e fo r e ,  
th a t  con cep ts are  e x h ib ite d  in  s e n t e n t ia l  m eanings in  a v a r ie ty  o f w ays, 
many o f  w hich may be q u ite  com plex.
To a n a lyze  how we u se  c e r ta in  con cep ts  i s  t o  e lu c id a te  what th e se  
con cep ts a r e .  Why shou ld  n o t p h ilo so p h ic  a n a ly s is  be l im it e d ,  th e n , to  
a n a ly s is  o f  con cep ts i f  p h ilo so p h ic  problem s are con cep tu a l?  B ecau se, 
fo r  one th in g , co n cep tu a l and phenomenal language a re  so c lo s e ly  i n t e r ­
woven in  ord inary  sp eech , and, more im p ortan t, because phenomena in f lu e n c e  
our c o n c e p ts , and, c o n v e r se ly , con cep ts d ir e c t  the o b serv a tio n  o f phenom­
ena .
Thus, con cep ts may be in v e s t ig a te d  through in v e s t ig a t in g  p e r t i ­
n en t a s p e c ts  o f  lan gu age, b u t th e p e r t in e n t  a s p e c ts  might in c lu d e  phenom­
en a l as w e l l  as co n cep tu a l a sp e c ts  o f  sp eech . In  ad op tin g  th e  view th a t  
p h ilo so p h ic  problem s are c o n cep tu a l, th en , and stu d y in g  th e s e  problem s in  
th e use o f  p e r t in e n t  p a r ts  and a sp e c ts  o f  lan g u a g e , we are n o t ,  in  so  
d o in g , l im it in g  th e f i e l d  o f  in q u iry  to  a n y th in g  l e s s  than th e  Whole o f  
n a tu r a l lan gu age.
To study  th e  w orkings o f  lan gu age, though, in v o lv e s  stu d y in g  l i n ­
g u i s t i c  phenomena, v i z . ,  s ig n s  and th e  manner in  which th ey  are used ( in  
r e la t io n  to  each o th er  and to  other t h in g s ) .  P h ilo so p h ic  problems are  
concerned w ith  th e s e  phenomena, however, o n ly  in so fa r  as th ey  m a n ifest  
con cep ts p e r t in e n t  to  th e  problem s. In th e  view  o f  th e p r e se n t  s tu d y , 
"words" are n o t e q u iv a le n t  t o  th e s e  phenomena (even  though th ey  are c o ­
e x t e n s iv e ) ,  s in c e  words a s  such are  m erely c o n v e n tio n a lly  s in g le d  out 
from s e n te n c e s , and r e p r e se n t  on ly  th e s m a lle s t  u n it s  o f  meaning h e ld  in  
common betw een a l l  s e n te n c e s  c o n ta in in g  them . There b ein g  n oth in g
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fundam ental about words as m ean ings, th ey  a re  n ot th e phenomena o f  la n ­
guage th a t  are r e le v a n t  to  p h ilo s o p h ic  in v e s t ig a t io n  o f  meaning.
The r e le v a n t  e n t i t i e s  o f  language are m eanings, i . e . ,  s e n te n c e s - -  
ev en ts  o f  which th e  s ig n s  h e ld  in  common, w ords, are m erely  an a s p e c t .
So, t o  s e t  fo r th  a p h ilo so p h ic  problem  in v o lv e s  d e c id in g  which sen ten ces  
or ty p es  o f  se n te n c e s  are r e le v a n t  t o  th e problem . The o b je c ts  o f  study  
are p a r t ic u la r  u ses  o f  lan gu age.
S in ce  th e r e  i s  q u ite  o f te n  no one-one correspondence betw een a 
con cep t and a word, i t  i s  n o t enough to  examine a l l  th e  s o r ts  o f  s e n ­
te n c e s  in  which a word o s te n s ib ly  naming a s in g le  con cep t ap p ears. The 
s o r ts  o f  language-gam es where th e se  se n te n c e s  appear and th e  r e l a t i o n ­
sh ip s  o f  th e  se n te n c e s  to  o th er elem en ts o f  th e s e  language-gam es are  
o fte n  fundam ental in  e x h ib it in g  th e co n cep t. S in ce  language-gam es 
o f te n  in c lu d e  a c t io n s  o ther th an  s e n te n c e s ,  r e la t io n s h ip s  o f  th e  se n ­
te n c e s  to  th e se  elem en ts are a ls o  im portant in  such an in v e s t ig a t io n .  
Indeed , th e  r e la t io n s h ip s  betw een l i n g u i s t i c  and n o n - l in g u is t ic  e lem en ts  
o f  a language-gam e are o fte n  o f  fundam ental im portance s in c e  th ey  may 
su g g e st  th e  lin k s  o f  th e  language-gam e to  a la r g e r  c o n te x t  o f  one or more 
b a s ic  a c t i v i t i e s .  S in ce  i t  i s  b a s ic  a c t i v i t i e s  th a t  u se and g en era te  
m eaning, i t  i s  th e  r e la t io n s h ip  o f con cep ts t o  b a s ic  a c t i v i t i e s  th a t  
should  be th e u lt im a te  fo cu s  o f  th e  p h ilo so p h ic  method o f  co n cep tu a l 
a n a ly s i s .
Language i s  th e  m a te r ia l o f  p h ilo so p h y , th e n , b ecause i t  m ani­
f e s t s  c o n c e p ts , and th e se  o f te n  are embodied in  th e  in t e r r e la t io n s  o f  a 
v a r ie ty  o f  a c t i v i t i e s .  I f  language i s  fundam entally  s e n t e n t ia l  and s e n ­
te n c e s  are fundam entally  a c t io n s  w ith in  a c t i v i t i e s ,  th en  p h ilo so p h ic
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problem s are  problem s about c e r ta in  a s p e c ts  o f  l i n g u i s t i c  a c t i v i t i e s - -  
v i z . ,  th o se  th a t  m a n ife s t  th e  meaning o f  c o n c e p ts .
S in ce  meaning i s  d e f in a b le  in  term s o f  th e  a c t io n s  th a t  may be 
perform ed by means o f  i t ,  th e r e  i s  a sen se  in  w hich c o n c e p ts , as w e l l  as  
w ords, have m eanings. There are n o n - l in g u is t ic  a c t io n s  th a t  may be p e r ­
formed in  p a r t  by means o f  c o n c e p ts— in d eed , m ost human a c t io n s  probably  
in v o lv e  con cep ts  o r ig in a t in g  in  a c t i v i t i e s  in v o lv in g  lan gu age . Even 
s k i l l s  such a s  d r iv in g  a car or perhaps even  p itc h in g  a b a s e b a l l  may be 
argued to  e s s e n t i a l l y  in v o lv e  c o n c e p ts .
The "uses o f  w ords,"  o r , more a c c u r a te ly ,  s e n te n c e s ,  are th e  ma­
t e r i a l  fo r  p h ilo s o p h ic  in v e s t ig a t io n  in s o fa r  as th ey  r e f l e c t  th e  fu n c ­
t io n s  o f  c o n c e p ts . S o , i t  i s  n o t b ecau se  words "stand for"  co n cep ts  th a t  
th e  study  o f  meaning i s  c r u c ia l  in  p h ilo so p h y , b u t , r a th e r , b ecause i t  i s  
th e  meaning o f  co n cep ts  th em se lv es  th a t  i s  th e  concern  o f  p h ilo so p h y .
That i s ,  i t  i s  th e  r e la t io n s h ip  o f  a con cep t to  o th er  con cep ts  and other  
th in g s  th a t  i s  o f  i n t e r e s t ,  and t h i s  i s  i t s  "meaning." The ways we say  
t h in g s - - t h e  mechanisms o f  l i n g u i s t i c  m ean in g --are  o f  i n t e r e s t  in s o fa r  as 
th e y  il lu m in a te  th e  ways we co n ce iv e  t h in g s .
L in g u is t ic  meaning i s  a phenomenon, i . e . ,  i t  i s  m a n ife s ted  in  
o b serv a b le  f a c t s ,  b u t ,  a l s o ,  i t  i s  a c o n c e p t - -o r , more a c c u r a te ly ,  a s e t  
o f  in t e r r e la t e d  c o n c e p ts , which c lu s t e r  around "mean." I f  th e s e  con cep ts  
were adequate in  ev ery  way, fo r  a l l  p u rp o se s , th e r e  would be no need fo r  
p h ilo s o p h ic  th e o r ie s  o f  m eaning. On th e  o th er hand, i f  a l l  co n cep ts  were 
adequate in  ev ery  way th e r e  would be no p h ilo s o p h ic  problem s a t  a l l .
C onceptual adequacy in v o lv e s  n o t o n ly  c l a r i t y  and c o n s is te n c y  o f  
r e la t e d  co n cep ts  b u t a ls o  adequacy in  d e a lin g  w ith  th e  r e la t e d  phenomena.
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S o , in  order to  c l a r i f y  co n cep ts  i t  i s  n e c e ssa r y  t o  exam ine them in  r e l a ­
t io n  to  phenomena a s  w e l l  a s to  other c o n c e p ts .
On th e  b a s is  o f  th e  above a n a ly s is  o f  th e  n atu re o f  co n cep ts  and 
th e ir  r e la t io n s  to  l i n g u i s t i c  and r e la t e d  m eaning, co n cep ts  are  means to  
a c t io n  t h a t  are r e f l e c t e d  in  l i n g u i s t i c  and r e la t e d  a c t io n s .  T h e r e fo r e , 
co n cep tu a l problem s are problem s a r i s in g  ou t o f  th e  m eanings o f  co n cep ts  
— i . e . ,  a r i s in g  in  co n n ec tio n  w ith  a c t io n s  r e s u l t in g  from th e  use o f  con ­
c e p t s .  These problem s may be approached through exam in ation  o f  th e  
m il ie u  o f  a c t i v i t i e s  in  w hich con cep ts are  u sed .
P h ilo so p h ic  Method
Language-games are  fundam ental t o  th e  view  o f  th e  meaning o f  s e n ­
te n c e s  d evelop ed  in  Chapter I I I .  The n o t io n  o f  a language-gam e was d e ­
f in e d  th e r e  in s o fa r  as req u ired  by th e  th eo ry  o f  m eaning. Now i t  w i l l  be 
co n sid ered  how t h i s  con cep t i s  in v o lv e d  in  th e  a n a ly s is  o f  p h ilo s o p h ic  
p rob lem s.
I f  p h ilo so p h ic  methods are t o  be d ir e c te d  toward e x p l ic a t in g  con ­
c e p t s ,  t h i s  may be done in  p a rt through d e s c r ip t io n  o f  th e  r e le v a n t  mean- 
in g - a c t io n s - - t h e  I n te r r e la t io n s h ip s  o f  se n te n c e s  c o n ta in in g  th e w o rd (s)  
"naming" th e  co n cep t, and th o s e ,  as w e l l ,  whose fu n c t io n in g  in  la n g u a g e -  
games i s  in terd ep en d en t w ith  th e s e  s e n te n c e s .  To l i m i t  in v e s t ig a t io n  to  
th o se  se n te n c e s  th a t  a c t u a l ly  c o n ta in  (or m ight c o n ta in , i . e . ,  may be 
tr a n s la te d  in to  se n te n c e s  th a t  do c o n ta in )  th e  n am e(s), would be t o  i n ­
v e s t ig a t e  on ly  one a s p e c t  o f  language-gam es in  w hich th e s e  words have 
m eaning, w hereas t h e ir  m eaning i s  c o m p le te ly  d e sc r ib e d  on ly  w ith  r e f e r ­
ence to  th e  t o t a l  c o n te x t .
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The r e le v a n t  m ean in g-action s are not th e  on ly  requirem ents o f  
con cep tu a l a n a ly s is ,  however, s in c e  language-gam es have been in te r p r e te d  
as c o n ta in in g , a t  l e a s t  som etim es, a c t io n s  other than l i n g u i s t i c  o n es . 
(P o in t in g  i s  an example o f such an a c t io n . )  There may b e , as w e l l ,  
ex tra -sy m b o lic  a c t i v i t i e s  (" b a s ic  a c t i v i t i e s " )  th a t  form a c o n te x t 'fo r  a 
language-gam e. The a c t i v i t i e s  th a t  gen erate m e a n in g -a c t iv it ie s  or la n ­
guage -games should  be th e  primary fo cu s o f  in v e s t ig a t io n s  o f  p h ilo so p h ic  
problem s, s in c e ,  fu n dam en ta lly , th ey  gen erate  th e r e le v a n t co n cep ts .
Thus, p h ilo so p h ic  in v e s t ig a t io n  should attem pt to  i s o la t e  th e se  
" b asic  a c t iv i t i e s "  th a t  gen erate  the co n tex ts  in  which the r e le v a n t  con­
ce p ts  are found, and th en  a n a lyze  how th e  concepts fu n c t io n . In stu d y in g  
th e s e  fu n c t io n s ,  th ere  are th r e e  l e v e l s  o f  a c t i v i t y  to  be in v e s t ig a te d :
( l )  r e la t io n s h ip s  betw een con cep ts w ith in  in d iv id u a l language-gam es; (2 )  
r e la t io n s h ip s  o f  th e se  con cep ts w ith  o th e r , n o n - l in g u is t ic  a c t io n s  and 
other phenomena; and (3 )  r e la t io n s h ip s  between such language-gam es and 
th e r e s u lta n t  in t e r r e la t io n s h ip s  o f th e  co n cep ts . These rep re se n t th e  
most im portant a sp e c ts  o f  " b asic  a c t iv i t i e s "  as r e la te d  to  language-gam es.
The aim o f such a p h ilo so p h ic  method i s ,  f i r s t ,  t o  determ ine what 
s o r t s  o f  a c t io n s  may be performed by means o f p a r t ic u la r  con cep ts (and in  
many c a se s  what other a c t io n s  may be performed on account o f  th e se  a c ­
t io n s )  and, secon d , through th e  e x p lic a t io n  o f concepts thus a rr iv ed  a t ,  
to  a ttem pt to  d e a l w ith  p h ilo so p h ic  is s u e s  in  which they  are in v o lv e d .
In e f f e c t ,  th e n , the exam ination  o f th e  meaning or fu n c tio n  o f  con cep ts  
le a d s  to  form u la tion s o f  r u l e s , which may be a p p lied  th en  to  th e  problem s 
in  w hich th e se  con cep ts are in v o lv e d .
92
The P h ilo so p h ic  Problem o f Truth  
P h ilo so p h y , -whatever e l s e  i t  may b e , i s  a search  fo r  t r u th .  
T h erefo re , any th eo ry  o f  th e  nature o f  p h ilo so p h ic  problem s im p lie s  some 
view o f tr u th , s in c e  in  th e  fo rm u la tio n s  o f  p h ilo s o p h ic  problem s l i e  
view s o f  where tr u th  may b e , th a t  i s ,  what q u e s tio n s  m ight be answ ered.
The problem o f  tr u th  h o ld s  a c e n tr a l  p o s i t io n  in  any p h ilo so p h ic
p o in t  o f v iew , s in c e ,  fu n d am en ta lly , a p o in t  o f  view i s  a n o tio n  o f
tr u th . A n o tio n  o f  tr u th  must be among th e  f i r s t  p r in c ip le s ,  e x p l i c i t  or 
n o t , upon which a p h ilo so p h ic  p o in t  o f  view s ta n d s . S im ila r ly ,  any 
th eory  o f  th e  proper method o f  p h ilo sop h y  (a p a rt from any view o f  p h i lo s ­
ophic problem s) im p lie s  some view o f  t r u th , s in c e  a n o tio n  o f  a proper  
method i s  a n o tio n  o f  how t o  carry  on th e  sea rch  fo r  tr u th .
That tr u th  i s  a con cep t w ith  an in tim a te  co n n ectio n  to  s e n t e n t ia l  
meaning i s  e v id e n t from th e  freq u en t ways in  which tr u th  and s e n t e n t ia l  
meaning have been c lo s e ly  a s s o c ia te d  in  a n a ly t ic  t h e o r ie s .  I n te r p r e ta ­
t io n s  o f t h i s  so r t  may be view ed  as r e la te d  to  th e f a c t  th a t  th e  lo c u s  o f  
th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  t r u th ,  i . e . ,  th a t  w hich has th e  c a p a c ity  o f  b e in g  tru e  
or f a l s e ,  must have m eaning. And, i t  has been argued, what has meaning 
p re-em in en tly  i s  s e n te n c e s . In t h i s  way, " th a t which i s  tru e  or fa ls e "  
may come to  be tr e a te d  as a s e n t e n t ia l  m eaning.
The problem o f  tr u th  o f te n  has been  approached by a sk in g , f i r s t ,
"What s o r t  o f  th in g  may be true?"  and, secon d , "What does th e  tr u th  o f
such a th in g  c o n s is t  in?" That i s ,  f i r s t  what i s  p o s s ib ly  tru e  i s  s in g le d  
o u t, and th en  what i s  a c tu a l ly  t r u e . Now, when th e answer to  th e  f i r s t  
q u e stio n  i s  g iv en  as some s o r t  o f  s ta tem en t, p r o p o s it io n , e t c . ,  t h i s  may 
le a d  to  seek in g  an e x p la n a tio n  o f th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  tr u th  in  th e
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meanings o f s ta te m e n ts , e t c .  The p o s s i b i l i t y  o f tr u th , however, need not 
be sought in  t h i s  d ir e c t io n  a t  a l l .
(We p r e d ic a te  "true" o f v a r io u s  s o r ts  o f th in g s - -p ic t u r e s ,
i
s t o r ie s  or a cco u n ts , m easurem ents, c o p ie s ,  l i n g u i s t i c  m eanings, b e l i e f s ,  
d e s c r ip t io n s ,  works o f  a r t ,  e t c .  In th e  p resen t study  we are m ainly con­
cerned w ith  on ly  one a p p lic a t io n  o f  " tru e ,"  in  sen ten ces  o f  th e  form:
"p i s  true" fp sta n d in g  fo r  a s e n te n c e ] . S in c e , in  th e  view o f t h is  stu d y , 
sen ten ces  are th e  fundam ental u n its  o f  m eaning, whenever "true" i s  p red ­
ic a te d  o f  any l i n g u i s t i c  meaning i t  i s  u lt im a te ly  p red ica ted  o f se n te n c e s .
The n o n - l in g u is t ic  th in g s  o f  which "true" i s  sometimes p r e d ic a t e d - - e .g . , 
tru e  c o p ie s ,  measurements, p ic tu r e s —do not p resen t problems o f th e  type  
d isc u sse d  in  most o f  t h i s  s tu d y , which i s  th e r e fo r e  alm ost e x c lu s iv e ly  
concerned w ith  tr u th  as p red ica ted  o f  se n te n c e s . In Chapter V i t  w i l l  be 
argued th a t  th e  view o f  tr u th  developed  fo r  "true" as p red ica ted  o f sen ­
te n c e s  ex ten d s to  "true" as p red ic a te d  o f other s o r ts  o f t h in g s .)
The q u e s tio n  "What s o r t  o f th in g  may be tr u e ? ” may be tr e a te d  as 
a sk in g  on ly  fo r  the typ e o f  sen ten ces  o f which "true" i s  p r e d ic a te d . The 
s o r t  o f  " p o s s ib il ity "  th a t th e s e  sen ten ces  e x h ib it  i s  m erely th a t  "true"  
i s  gram m atically  a p p lic a b le  to  them. There i s  no need to  t r e a t  sen ten ces  
o f t h i s  kind as having in t r i n s ic  p r o p e r tie s  m y ster io u s ly  connected  w ith  
" tru th ."
There i s  no need , e i t h e r ,  t o  go on and id e n t i f y  such p r o p e r tie s  
w ith  th e  meaning o f  th e se  s e n te n c e s , reason in g  th a t  whatever i s  tru e  or 
f a l s e  must be m eaningfu l and th e r e fo r e  the " p o s s ib il ity "  o f tr u th  must be 
"meaning." T his would be s im ila r  to  arguing th a t whatever reproduces  
s e x u a lly  i s  l i v in g  and th e r e fo r e  th e  " p o s s ib i l i ty "  o f sex u a l rep rod u ction  
c o n s is t s  in  having l i f e .
Rather than  approach th e  problem o f tru th  in  t h i s  way a t  a l l ,  i t  
i s  p r e fe r a b le  sim ply  to  b eg in  by a sk in g , f i r s t ,  what l i n g u i s t i c  phenomena 
are most c lo s e ly  or im m ediately a s so c ia te d  w ith  " tru e ,"  and then  ask  what 
th e se  r e la t io n s h ip s  c o n s is t  in ,  what c h a r a c te r iz e s  them. Perhaps th e  
whole approach a s s o c ia te d  w ith  " p o s s ib i l i ty "  and " a c tu a lity "  in  th e  prob­
lem o f  tr u th  i s  unnecessary  and has th e e f f e c t  o f a b o rtin g  a s o lu t io n  b e -
j
fo r e  i t  i s  f u l l y  d evelop ed .
The q u e s tio n  o f  what so r ts  o f  th in g s  are tru e  i s  s u s c e p t ib le  o f  
in te r p r e ta t io n  as e q u iv a le n t to  th e q u estio n  o f what a l l  tr u e  sta tem en ts  
a r e , i . e . ,  a sk in g  fo r  a l i s t  o f  a l l  " tru th s ."  We are here engaged, 
though, n ot in  a search  fo r  t r u th s ,  in s ta n c e s  o f tr u th ,  b u t, in s te a d , the  
a n a ly s is  o f  t r u th ,  th e  con cep t. We are th e r e fo r e  concerned w ith  th e  use  
o f th e  con cep t o f  t r u th , in c lu d in g  th e  im p lic a tio n s  o f  say in g  th a t  c e r ­
t a in  sen ten ces  are  tr u e .  Q uestions having to  do, in s te a d , w ith  j u s t i f i ­
c a t io n  fo r  sa y in g  t h i s  are another m a tter . We are n ot concerned w ith  
w hich sen ten ces  ought to  be sa id  to  be tr u e ,  but w ith  what i s  done w ith  
them when th ey  are sa id  to  be tr u e .
I t  i s  n ot th e  problem of what d is t in g u is h e s  tr u e  s ta tem en ts , s t a t e ­
ments in  f a c t  t r u e ,  from f a l s e  sta tem en ts th a t  i s  th e  concern o f t h i s  
stu d y . R ather, our problem i s  th a t o f  what d is t in g u is h e s  sta tem en ts sa id  
to  be tru e  and /or used as tru e  from other s o r ts  o f  s ta tem en ts . For t h i s  
purpose, se n te n c e s  m erely capable o f tr u th  are the r e le v a n t  m ea n in g -en ti-  
t i e s .
The e n t i t i e s  w ith  which we are  here concerned are in s ta n c e s  o f  
"that which i s  tr u e  or f a l s e ,"  one sen se  o f  " p r o p o s itio n ."  In t h i s  
s e n se , the n o tio n  o f  a p r o p o s it io n  i s  here b ein g  used  as a working con­
cep t in  th e  p h ilo so p h ic  in v e s t ig a t io n  o f t r u th .
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As such  a working co n cep t, " th a t which i s  tr u e  or f a ls e "  m ight 
be in te r p r e te d  as embodying th e  " p o s s ib i l i t y  o f  tru th "  in  th e  se n se  th a t  
i t  r e f e r s  to  any phenomenon t o  w hich "true" may be a p p lie d . T h is con­
c e p t i s  u s e f u l  in  th e  a n a ly s is  o f  t r u th ,  how ever, because i t  r e p r e s e n ts  
a p re-em in en t a sp e c t  o f  the u se  o f  " tru e ,"  v i z . ,  th a t  i t  r e f e r s  to  s e n ­
te n c e s  o f  some k in d . I f  we can d is c o v e r  and d e s c r ib e  th e  nature o f  th e se  
se n te n c e s  in s o fa r  as "true" i s  p r e d ic a te d  o f them , th e  i n i t i a l  s t e p ,  a t  
l e a s t ,  w i l l  have been taken  in  e x p l ic a t in g  th e con cep t o f  t r u th .
To r e tu rn  now to  th e fo rm u la tio n s  o f  th e  problem o f  tr u th  g iv e n  
on page 8 0 , i t  may be seen  t h a t ,  as d eveloped  in  t h i s  c h a p te r , th e  i n i ­
t i a l  q u e s tio n  to  be asked  in  a n a ly z in g  t h i s  problem  would in c lu d e  an 
answer o f th e  form o f  sta tem en t 4 . That i s ,  i t  would t e l l  when or how 
"true" i s  u se d . I t  has been argued , how ever, t h a t  th e  m eaning o f  th e  
co n cep t o f  tr u th  may be sa id  t o  be the c e n tr a l i s s u e ,  and t h i s  i s  not 
f u l l y  e x p ressed  in  th e  use o f  " tru e ."  T h is p o in t  o f view  i s  s im i la r ,  I  
th in k , t o  th a t  con n ected  w ith  th e  d i s t in c t io n  drawn by W ittgenstein^" b e ­
tw een  " su rfa ce  grammar" and "depth grammar.” The d is c u s s io n  in  t h i s  
ch ap ter o f  th e  nature o f  p h ilo so p h ic  problem s and method may be s a id  to  
amount to  an in t e r p r e ta t io n  o f  what d ep th  grammar c o n s is t s  in .
The oth er th r e e  fo rm u la tio n s  g iv e n  on page 80 a l l  in v o lv e  r e f e r ­
ence to  a " sta tem en t."  I t  has been  argued th a t  "what i s  tru e  or f a l s e ,"  
e n t i t i e s  to  w hich th e  concept o f  tr u th  i s  a p p lie d , should  be th e  i n i t i a l  
o b j e c t s  o f  in v e s t ig a t io n .  I t  w i l l  be argued in  th e n e x t  c h a p te r , how ever, 
th a t  th e se  e n t i t i e s  are not " sta tem e n ts ,"  s t r i c t l y  sp ea k in g , a t  a l l .
1
W it tg e n s te in , P h ilo s o p h ic a l I n v e s t ig a t io n s , I ,  6 6 k .
96
Perhaps th e  m ost fundam ental m atter a r i s in g  from c o n s id e r in g  
th e se  fo u r  fo rm u la tio n s  o f  th e  problem  i s  th e  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  o f  1 and 2 
as im p ly in g  n o n - l in g u is t ic  stand ard s or r u le s ,  and 3 and 4 a s  im p ly in g  
l i n q u i s t i c  r u le s ,  in s t e a d .  S in ce  r u le s  o f  meaning cannot govern  t r u th ,  
i t  must be determ ined  what r u le s  do govern  tr u th .
T h is i s  in v o lv e d  in  1 and 2 (and i t  i s  im portant to  n o te  th a t  
" ru les  g o vern in g  tru th "  i s  n o t n e c e s s a r i ly  synonymous w ith  " ru les  o f  v e r ­
i f i c a t i o n " ) .  B e s id e s  t h i s  q u e s t io n , th e r e  i s  an e q u a lly  le g it im a t e  q u es­
t io n  in v o lv e d  in  3 and 4 o f  how r u le s  o f  m eaning (or  se n te n c e s  c o n ta in in g  
"true" and r e la t e d  s e n te n c e s )  ex p ress  (a s  opposed t o  g o v ern ) tr u th .
The problem  o f  t r u th ,  a s d e f in e d  in  t h i s  ch a p ter , w i l l  n o t be r e ­
so lv e d  by b e in g  a s s ig n e d  t o  one c a teg o r y  or th e  o th e r —l i n g u i s t i c  or non- 
l i n g u i s t i c ,  I t  i s  in  th e  v ery  nature o f  th e  problem  th a t  both  are i n ­
v o lv e d  in  i t .  Many o f  th e  paradoxes surrounding th e  problem  o f tr u th  r e ­
f l e c t  t h i s  d ou b le  natu re o f  th e  problem . Many o f  them a r i s e  from th e  
fundam ental paradox t h a t ,  w h ile  i t  i s  a p p a ren tly  m eanings, in  some s e n se ,  
th a t  are  sa id  to  be t r u e ,  t r u th  i t s e l f  would n o t seem to  be governed by 
r u le s  o f  m eaning, nor e x p la in e d  by them.
In  th e  fo llo w in g  c h a p te r , an a n a ly s is  o f  tr u th  w i l l  be i n i t i a t e d  
by c o n s id e r in g  th e  e lem en ts  o f  t h i s  fundam ental paradox.
CHAPTER V
ANALYSIS OF THE CONCEPT OF TRUTH
"That w hich i s  True or F a l s e "
To in v e s t ig a t e  th e  con cep t o f  t r u th  in  accordance w ith  th e  p r in ­
c ip l e s  d evelop ed  in  th e  p reced in g  c h a p te r , we may b eg in  by a sk in g  what 
s o r t s  o f  th in g s  may be sa id  t o  be tru e  (o r  f a l s e ) .  For rea so n s  m entioned  
in  th e  p reced in g  c h a p te r , t h i s  in v e s t ig a t io n  w i l l  fo cu s  on l i n g u i s t i c  
t h in g s ,  but we s h a l l  see  th a t  n o n - l in g u is t ic  th in g s  sa id  t o  be tr u e  p la y  
an im portant p a rt in  th e  in v e s t ig a t io n .  When we p r e d ic a te  "true" o f  a 
se n te n c e  i t  i s  p r e d ic a te d  o f  i t  a s  a meaning (n o t  as an u tte r a n c e  o f  
w o rd s). Only se n te n c e s  o f  a c e r t a in  gram m atical form are  sa id  to  be tr u e  
- - v i z . ,  s ta te m e n ts . S in ce  in  th e  view o f  t h i s  stu d y  se n te n c e s  as mean­
in g s  are f u n c t io n s ,  ty p e s  o f  s e n te n c e s  a re  c h a r a c te r iz e d  by s im ila r  fu n c ­
t io n s .  Thus, a lth o u g h  gram m atical form i s  an in d ic a t io n  o f  some s im i la r ­
i t y  o f  fu n c t io n s ,  i t  i s  t o  th e se  fu n c t io n s  th a t  we must lo o k  fo r  what i s  
common to  (or  a t  l e a s t  s im ila r  in )  a l l  s ta te m e n ts .
One fu n c t io n  common to  a l l  s ta tem en ts  i s  th a t  th ey  are cap ab le  o f  
b ein g  tr u e  (or f a l s e ) .  T r a d it io n a l ly ,  a l l  se n te n c e s  o f  sta tem en t form  
are sa id  to  have th e  c a p a c ity  t o  be tru e  or f a l s e  and to  be n e c e s s a r i ly  
one or th e  o th e r , in  f a c t .  There a r e , how ever, some u se s  o f  sta tem en ts  
th a t  would seem n o t to  make any cla im  to  t r u t h - - e . g . ,  s ta tem en ts  in v o lv e d  
in  jo k e s , f i c t i o n ,  ir o n y . In t h i s  study sta tem en ts  th a t  do make a t r u th -  
cla im  w i l l  be term ed " a ss e r t io n s"  or " tr u th -c la im s ."
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In view o f  t h i s  stu d y , th ere  i s  some a c t iv i t y  in  terms o f  w hich  
any m eaningfu l l i n g u i s t i c  ev en t i s  in te r p r e ta b le  as an a c t io n .  S o , an 
a s s e r t io n  i s  in te r p r e ta b le  as such by r e fe r e n c e  to  a p a r t ic u la r  a c t i v i t y  
in  which i t  has th e  fu n c t io n  o f making a tr u th -c la im .
Now, any a c t i v i t y  in v o lv in g  a s s e r t in g  may in v o lv e , o f  co u rse , 
a c tu a l u se  o f  th e  words ,'tr u e ,' b u t i t  need n ot alw ays do so . To a s s e r t  
p i s  e q u iv a le n t  to  a s s e r t in g  th a t  p i s  t r u e ,  in  th a t  th e  r e s u l t s  o f  th e  
one are e q u iv a le n t  to  th o se  o f  th e  o th e r , e x c e p t  th a t  in  some c a se s  "p 
i s  true*' em phasizes th a t  an a s s e r t io n  i s  b e in g  made— i . e . ,  th a t  a s t a t e ­
m ent-form i s  b e in g  used to  make a tr u th -c la im .
What a s s e r t in g  c o n s is t s  in  i s  n o t sa y in g  th a t  a sen ten ce  i s  tru e
but u s in g  a sen ten ce  as t r u e . T his fu n c t io n  or job i s  th a t  o f  making a 
tr u th -c la im , e x p l i c i t l y  or im p l i c i t l y ,  which i s  d i f f e r e n t ,  o f  c o u rse , 
from a c t u a l ly  b e in g  tr u e .  T h erefo re , s in c e  a s s e r t io n s ,  sta tem en ts  th a t  
make a tr u th -c la im , are  d i s t i n c t  from "true s ta te m e n ts ,"  th e  fu n c t io n  o f  
making a tr u th -c la im  i s  not th e  fu n c t io n  o f  b e in g  tr u e .
As th e  d is t in g u is h in g  marks o f  an a s s e r t io n  are  n o t th o se  o f  
b ein g  tr u e , th e  ta sk  o f e x p l ic a t in g  th e con cep t o f  tr u th  i s  a d i f f e r e n t  
ta sk  from th a t  o f  exam ining tru e  sta tem en ts  and th e ir  r e la t io n s h ip s  t o  
other th in g s  th a t  determ ine them as tr u e .  I f  th ere  cou ld  be d isco v ere d  
c e r ta in  c h a r a c t e r is t ic s  common to  a l l  tru e  sta tem en ts (or  perhaps on ly  
shared fa m ily  re sem b la n ce s) , th e se  would n ot d e f in e  th e  con cep t o f  tr u th .  
The q u e s tio n  o f  th e  n atu re  o f  tr u th , o f  what i t  i s  to  be tr u e , i s  am­
biguous s in c e  i t  may be in te r p r e te d  as b e in g  about a con cep t or about the  
phenomena, tru e  s ta te m e n ts . I t  i s  the concept w ith  which we are here 
concerned , and i t  i s  c h a r a c t e r is t ic s  o f  s ta tem en ts  th a t  make a tr u th -c la im
(r a th e r  than  tru e  s ta te m e n ts ) th a t  d e f in e  t h i s  con cep t.
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Truth-gam es and T ru th -c la im s
The d is t in g u is h in g  c h a r a c t e r i s t ic s  o f  tr u th -c la im s  are to  he 
sou gh t in  th o se  a c t i v i t i e s  in  w hich th ey  fu n c t io n . L et us c a l l  such  a c ­
t i v i t i e s  in  w hich tr u th -c la im s  fu n c t io n  " tru th -gam es."
Truth-gam es m ight be ( l )  a typ e  o f  language-gam e, (2 )  a t y p e .o f  
b a s ic  a c t i v i t y ,  or (3 )  some o th er  typ e o f  a c t i v i t y .  As d e f in e d  in  Chap­
t e r  I I I ,  language-gam es are in stru m en ts  o f  b a s ic  a c t i v i t i e s .  I f  t r u th -  
games were a ty p e  (o r  fa m ily )  o f  language-gam es then  th e r e  would be no 
u ses  o f  tr u th  th a t  were n o n - l i n g u i s t i c . That i s ,  " tru e” would be p r e d i­
ca te d  only  o f  s e n te n c e s .  I t  has been noted  in  Chapter IV, however, th a t  
th e r e  are o th e r , n o n - l in g u is t i c  th in g s  sa id  to  be tr u e .  T h ere fo r e , t r u th -  
games are n ot lan gu age-gam es.
I f  tru th -gam es were a c t i v i t i e s  o f  a type d i f f e r e n t  from b a s ic  a c ­
t i v i t i e s ,  th en  th ey  would be a c t i v i t i e s  th a t  n e ith e r  use nor g en era te  
language-gam es. S in c e  th e  m ost obvious exam ples o f  tr u th -c la im s  are  
sta tem en ts  in  language-gam es such as th o se  in v o lv in g  p r o o fs , tru th -gam es  
may be in c lu d ed  in  th e  broad ca teg o r y  o f  b a s ic  a c t i v i t i e s ,  as d e f in e d  in  
Chapter I I I .
In  order t o  d is c o v e r  th e  d is t in g u is h in g  c h a r a c t e r is t ic s  o f  t r u th -  
gam es, l e t  us exam ine some ty p e s  o f  a c t i v i t i e s  th a t  would seem to  be 
tru th -g a m es. The most ob v iou s exam ples o f  tru th -gam es would seem t o  be 
found  in  p ro o fs  (o r  a ttem p ts a t  p r o o fs )  o f  v a r io u s  s o r t s —m athem atical 
and s c i e n t i f i c  a s  w e l l  as l e s s  r ig o ro u s  ch a in s o f  rea so n in g  employed in  
everyday s i t u a t io n s .  For exam ple, w h ile  d r iv in g  I  m ight say  to  m y s e lf ,  
"The t r a f f i c  i s  h eavy . I 'd  b e t t e r  slow  down." These sen ten ces  form a 
language-gam e a r i s in g  ou t o f  th e  a c t i v i t y  o f  d r iv in g .  Each sen ten ce  i s
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used, as tr u e  in  th a t  a c la im  to  tr u th  i s  e s s e n t i a l  t o  i t s  f u n c t io n . I t  
may a ls o  be observed th a t  each  se n te n c e  fu n c t io n s  t o  s u g g e s t  ( " e n t a i l ” or 
"imply" in  a broad s e n se )  other a c t io n s .  That i s ,  th e  f i r s t  s ta tem en t  
("The t r a f f i c  i s  h ea v y ." ) s u g g e s ts  th e  second (" I 'd  b e t t e r  slow  down.") 
in  th a t  th e  two s ta tem en ts  c o n s t i t u t e  an a b b rev ia ted  argument; th e  second  
se n te n c e  su g g e s ts  th a t  I  l e t  up th e  p r e ssu r e  o f  my fo o t  on th e  a c c e le r a to r  
and perhaps s h i f t  t o  a low er g e a r . (Both o f  th e s e  n o n - l in g u is t ic  a c t io n s ,  
i f  perform ed, a ls o  would be p a rt o f  th e  tr u th -g a m e .)
C ases o f  th e  above typ e are  th o se  in  w hich " tru th -c la im s"  are  
c l e a r ly  b e in g  made becau se in fe r e n c e s  are b e in g  drawn from c e r ta in  s t a t e ­
m ents - - th o s e  making c la im s th a t  such in fe r e n c e s  a re  w arranted , th o s e  mak­
in g  tr u th -c la im s . In order to  determ ine w hich c h a r a c t e r i s t ic s  o f  t h i s  
ty p e  o f  truth-gam e are  common to  a l l  tru th -g a m es, i t  w i l l  be u s e f u l  t o  
co n s id er  a type o f a c t i v i t y  in  w hich i t  would seem th a t  tr u th -c la im s  are  
made b u t in  w hich i t  would seem th a t  th e s e  tr u th -c la im s  do not e n t a i l  one 
an oth er in  any way an alogou s t o  th a t  d is c u s s e d .
An a c t i v i t y  o f  t h i s  ty p e  would seem to  be any d e s c r ib in g  a c t i v ­
i t y .  We may d is t in g u is h  exam ples o f d escr ib in g -g a m es in  which s ta tem en ts  
are "used as t r u e ,"  in  th a t  i t  i s  p a r t o f  a d escr ib in g -g a m e to  u se  tr u e  
s ta te m e n ts , but in  w hich th e se  s ta tem en ts  would n o t seem to  e n t a i l  each  
oth er in  any s e n s e .
To tak e a s im p le  exam ple, co n s id e r  a group o f  s ta tem en ts  made by 
me to  a v i s i t o r  to  my v i l l a g e .  As we s t r o l l  downtown I  p o in t  ou t t o  him 
v a r io u s  b u i ld in g s - - t h e  p o s t  o f f i c e ,  th e  p u b lic  l ib r a r y ,  an un usu al monu­
ment in  th e  square, a lu n ch  co u n ter , e t c .  A l l  th e  s ta tem en ts  I  u se  in  
t h i s  a c t i v i t y ,  a lon g  w ith  other a c t io n s  such as p o in t in g  w o r d le s s ly  to
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c e r t a in  p o in ts  o f  in t e r e s t ,  ta k in g  c e r ta in  r o u te s  t h a t  I  th in k  w i l l  be  
in t e r e s t in g  fo r  v a r io u s  r e a so n s , beh avin g  c a u t io u s ly  when c r o s s in g  dan­
gerou s c o r n e r s , a l l  th e s e  a c t io n s  make a s o r t  o f p ic tu r e  o f  th e  v i l l a g e .  
They are r e la t e d  to  each  other p r im a r ily  in  th a t  th ey  a l l  have to  do w ith  
some a s p e c t  o f  th e  v i l l a g e .  P o s s ib ly  I  m ight n ot make any two sta tem en ts  
r e la t e d  to  each  o th er in  th e  manner in  which th e  s ta tem en ts  in  th e  d r iv ­
in g  language-gam e were r e la t e d .  I  am n ot p r e se n t in g  arguments o f  any 
s o r t ,  b u t s im p ly  a group o f f a c t s  (or  what I  b e l ie v e  to  be f a c t s )  about 
th e  v i l l a g e .  In  p r e se n t in g  f a c t s ,  though , one u ses  s ta tem en ts  (and oth er  
a c t io n s )  "as tr u e ."  Y e t, in  t h i s  ca se  th e s ta tem en ts  are r e la t e d  t o  each  
oth er n ot a s  e lem en ts  in  ch a in s  o f  r e a so n in g , but as e lem en ts in  a d e ­
s c r ip t io n  or p ic tu r e .
The e lem en ts  (s ta te m e n ts  and o th er a c t io n s )  in  th e  d r iv in g  la n ­
guage-game were s a id  to  fu n c t io n  t o  su g g e st  or e n t a i l  o th er a c t io n s .  In  
th e  d escr ib in g -g a m e t h i s  cannot be s a id  to  be the c a se ;  th e  s ta tem en ts  
are  n o t l o g i c a l l y  r e la t e d .  We m ight ta k e  an even  more d i f f i c u l t  exam ple, 
and im agine t h a t ,  a f t e r  show ing my fr ie n d  th e  v i l l a g e ,  I  ta k e  him fo r  a 
r id e  in  th e  cou n try . We are both  t ir e d  and th e r e  i s  no c o n v e r sa tio n  e x ­
c e p t  o n ce , when he e x c la im s , "Look, th a t  barn i s  round! " T h is sta tem en t  
would seem t o  have no r e la t io n s h ip  t o  any l i n g u i s t i c  c o n te x t ,  and a l s o  
n o t t o  a tru th -gam e.
D e sc r ib in g  games are n o t tru th -gam es b ecau se th e  e lem en ts o f  d e ­
s c r ip t io n s  a r e  n ot r e la t e d  to  each  o th er  by l o g i c a l  r u le s .  There i s  
n o n e th e le s s  a sen se  in  w hich th e s e  e lem en ts are t r u t h - c la im s - - in  t h a t  th e  
w hole d e s c r ip t io n  makes a tr u th -c la im . That i s ,  th e  in d iv id u a l s t a t e ­
m ents make an in d ir e c t  tr u th -c la im  s in c e  th e  whole d e s c r ip t io n  i s  r e la t e d
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to  a v a r ie t y  o f  a c t i v i t i e s  th a t  are  in te r p r e ta b le  on ly  in  r e fe r e n c e  to  
th e d e s c r ip t io n .  There m ight b e , fo r  exam ple, v iew s about th e  r e l a t iv e  
com forts o f  th e  v i l l a g e  which I  expound to  my f r ie n d ,  and which cou ld  
in v o lv e  truth-gam es having lo g i c a l  r e la t io n s h ip s  w ith  th e d e s c r ip t io n  I  
had g iv e n  him o f  the v i l l a g e .  In th e  ca se  o f  h is  i s o la t e d  remark, "Look, 
th a t  barn i s  round!” which i s  a s in g le - s e n te n c e  d e s c r ip t io n ,  t h i s  i s  a 
sen ten ce  used as tr u e  on ly  in  th e  sen se  th a t  i t  i s  p o t e n t ia l ly  an e l e ­
ment in  a tru th -gam e.
D e scr ib in g  i s  an a c t i v i t y  th a t  i s  in te r p r e ta b le  as a p a rt or 
a sp e c t  o f  a tru th -gam e, b u t n ot as i t s e l f  a tru th -gam e. Thus, th e  s t a t e ­
ments in  a d escrib in g-gam e are "used as tr u e ,"  but n ot d i r e c t ly ,  in  r e ­
la t io n  to  each  o th e r , but in d ir e c t ly ,  as p o t e n t ia l  e lem en ts th a t  make a 
tr u th -c la im  in  a tru th -gam e.
To a c tu a lly  u se a sen ten ce  a s  tru e  i s  to  u se  i t  as an elem en t in  
an a c t i v i t y  in  w hich i t  has w ith  a t  l e a s t  one other elem ent o f  th e  a c t i v ­
i t y  a m u tua lly  dependent r e la t io n ,  such th a t  i f  one i s  tr u e  th e  other i s  
f a l s e ,  th e  o th er  f a l s e .  In any truth-gam e th e r e  must be a t  l e a s t  two e l e ­
ments r e la te d  to  each o th er in  such a m u tually  dependent manner. There 
m ight be any number o f  other sta tem en ts having a r o le  in  a truth-gam e but 
n ot th e  r o le  o f  making a tr u th -c la im . There m ight be q u ite  a v a r ie ty  o f  
r e la t io n s h ip s  betw een th e  elem en ts o f  a truth-gam e b e s id e s  th e  m u tua lly  
dependent r e la t io n s h ip s  th a t  make i t  a tru th -gam e. A l l  th e s e  elem ents  
are p a r ts  o f th e  tru th -gam e, but n o t the p a r ts  th a t  determ ine i t  as a 
tru th -gam e.
As d e fin e d  h e r e , "use as true"  (" a c tu a l u se  as true"  i s  to  be un­
d erstood  u n le s s  the phrase i s  s p e c i f i c a l l y  l im ite d  as " p o te n t ia l" )  i s  n o t
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opposed to  "use as f a l s e ."  I t  m ight be thought th a t  th e r e  are ty p es  o f  
a c t i v i t i e s  such as ly in g-gam es and propaganda-games in  which " sen ten ces  
are used  a s  f a l s e ."  L et us im agine a propaganda-game in  which my a c t io n s  
are d ir e c te d  toward co n v in c in g  an aud ience th a t  some p a r t ic u la r  war i s  
j u s t i f i e d  on our s id e .  "They began sh o o tin g  f i r s t , "  I  l i e ,  and produce 
f a l s i f i e d  ev id en ce to  back up by sta tem en t. S in ce  b oth  my sta tem en t and 
the "evidence" I produce are l i e s ,  I  am d e l ib e r a t e ly  u s in g  a f a l s e  s t a t e ­
ment and perform ing o th er  a c t io n s  in  order to  d e c e iv e . F a ls e  sta tem en ts  
used as propaganda and l i e s  in  any c o n te x t , though, are n ot m erely f a l s e  
but fa ls e h o o d s . W ith in  any c o n te x t  in  which l i e s  are  used th ey  are 
sta tem en ts used as t r u e ,  n e v e r th e le s s ,  in  th e sen se  th a t  th ey  are m u tua lly  
dependent upon each oth er w ith in  th e  ly in g -gam e, ( i f  th ey  were n ot used  
as tr u e  in  t h i s  s e n s e ,  th en  th ey  cou ld  not perform  th e  fu n c t io n  o f l y i n g . )  
W ithin  i t s  im m ediate language-gam e a l i e  i s  a sen ten ce  used as tr u e , a l ­
though r e la t io n s h ip s  o f  t h i s  language-gam e to  o th er , b a s ic  a c t i v i t i e s  
d is c lo s e  th a t  th e  language-gam e i s  p art o f  a d e c e iv in g  a c t i v i t y .
When an a c t i v i t y  i s  c h a r a c te r iz e d  by in t e r r e la t io n s h ip s  o f  i t s  
e lem en ts , as we have done here w ith  th e  n o tio n  o f  a tru th -gam e, one d i f ­
f i c u l t y  th a t  a r i s e s  i s  th a t  th ere  m ight be some a c t i v i t i e s  in  w hich no 
p a ttern  i s  d is c e r n a b le . I  m igh t, fo r  exam ple, ob serve someone r e p e a t in g  
to  h im s e lf ,  "Since th e r e  are w atch es, th e r e  must be w a ter ."  Upon in v e s ­
t ig a t io n  I  m ight p o s s ib ly  d isc o v e r  th a t  th e  speaker i s  drunk, in  which  
case  what he i s  sa y in g  makes no sen se  because he i s  in cap ab le  o f  th in k in g
c le a r ly .  S im ila r ly ,  I  m ight d isc o v e r  th a t  he i s  th e  town i d i o t ,  in  which
ca se  what he i s  sa y in g  makes no sen se  fo r  th e same rea so n . Or, I  m ight
d isc o v e r  th a t  he i s  a fo r e ig n e r  j u s t  le a r n in g  th e lan gu age, and b e l ie v e s
ioU
"watches" to  mean " r iv e r s ."  In t h i s  ca se  he makes no sense because h is  
instrum ents o f  ex p ress io n  are not im m ediately in te r p r e ta b le  by o th ers  
around him. B u t, w ith  adequate in v e s t ig a t io n  o f h is  r e la te d  a c t io n s ,  one 
should be a b le  to  d is c o v e r , as I  d id , th a t  he i s  perform ing m eaningfu l 
a c t io n s .  In the f i r s t  two c a s e s ,  however, in  which i t  turned out th a t  he 
was drunk or s tu p id , th e r e  was no in te r n a l c o n s is te n c y  in  h is  a c t io n s ,  
in c lu d in g  h is  u t te r a n c e s .
T his s o r t  o f  s i t u a t io n  i s  im portant in  th e p resen t co n tex t b e ­
cause th ere  are ca ses  in  which someone t r i e s  to  use tr u e  sta tem en ts in  a 
truth-gam e, but f a i l s  to  some degree and produces lo g i c a l  in c o n s is te n ­
c ie s  . S in ce  truth-gam es have n ot been d e fin ed  in  terms o f th e  in te n t io n s  
o f p a r t ic ip a n ts  in  them, but ra th er  in  terms o f  th e  r e la t io n s h ip s  betw een  
th e ir  e lem en ts , i t  m ight seem th a t  a l l  truth-gam es a r e , by our d e f i n i ­
t io n ,  a c t i v i t i e s  in  w hich th e  r e la t io n s h ip s  between th e  sta tem en ts are a l l  
lo g i c a l ly  c o n s is te n t .
T his would be somewhat s im ila r  to  say in g  th a t  on ly  a c t io n s  o f  th e  
w inning s id e  c o n s t itu te  p la y in g  c h e s s . The a c t io n s  o f  a lo s in g  p layer  
m ight d i f f e r  from th o se  o f th e  w inning p layer  in  th a t  c e r ta in  r u le s  o f  
lo g ic  were v io la te d  by th e  lo s in g  p la y e r . For exam ple, he m ight p lan  an 
a tta c k  in  which some o f th e  moves c a n c e lle d  out other moves. We would 
s t i l l  sa y , however, th a t  he was p la y in g  c h e s s ,  as long as he was fo l lo w ­
ing  th e s p e c ia l  r u le s  o f  th e  game o f c h e ss . The f a c t  th a t  he i s  u sin g  
them in  a f u t i l e  manner does n o t change th e  f a c t  th a t  he i s  p la y in g  
c h e ss .
The "ru les"  o f  truth-gam es are r u le s  in  th e  sen se  th a t  i t  can be 
dem onstrated th a t  th ey  are fo llo w e d  in  most c a s e s .  Someone p la y in g  a
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truth-gam e m ight use th e  r u le s  o f tr u th  in  improper w ays, b u t we would 
say  he was engaging in  a truth-gam e as lon g  as th e r e  cou ld  be seen  some 
manner in  which th e  e lem en ts appeared (perhaps on ly  to  one p a r t ic ip a n t )  
to  be lo g i c a l l y  r e la t e d .  The case  would be s im ila r  t o  a language-gam e 
in  which a p a r t ic ip a n t  m isunderstood  many o f  th e  r e le v a n t  r u le s  o f  gram­
mar. For any s o r t  o f  a c t i v i t y  th e r e  are b o r d e r lin e  c a se s  in  which i t  i s  
d o u b tfu l whether or n o t th ey  should  even be c a l le d  a c t i v i t i e s ,  s in c e  th ey  
la c k  a coh erent s tr u c tu r e . A sid e  from extrem e ca ses  o f  t h i s  ty p e , how­
e v e r , we id e n t i f y  an a c t i v i t y  as a truth-gam e by an a logy  w ith  other  
tru th -gam es.
Included  among a c t i v i t i e s  o f  t h i s  k ind are l o g i c a l l y  in v a l id  
s tr u c tu r e s  o f  sta tem en ts th a t  are n e v e r th e le s s  c l a s s i f i e d  as truth-gam es  
because c e r ta in  m e a n in g -r e la tio n sh ip s  betw een t h e ir  e lem en ts d is c lo s e  
th a t  c e r ta in  elem en ts are b e in g  used as m u tua lly  dependent. In any g iv e n  
language-gam e th a t  e x p r e sse s  a truth-gam e th e r e  are l i k e l y  to  be a number 
o f  m ea n in g -r e la tio n sh ip s  among v a r io u s  elem en ts o f  th e  language-gam e 
th a t  in d ic a te  th a t  c e r ta in  sta tem en ts  are used as m u tua lly  dependent.
I f  tr u th -c la im s  are  r e la te d  in  th e  "m utually dependent” manner 
d e f in e d , i . e . ,  when one tr u th -c la im  in  a truth-gam e i s  a tru e  s ta tem en t, 
any r e la te d  tr u th -c la im  must a ls o  be a tr u e  s ta tem en t, and i f  one i s  
f a l s e ,  th e  other must be f a l s e ,  th en  th e  r e la t io n s h ip s  betw een tr u th -  
cla im s may be sa id  to  be l o g i c a l  r e la t io n s h ip s .  T ru th -cla im s are th e  d e ­
f in in g  elem ents o f  tru th -g a m es. That i s ,  i t  i s  by r e fe r e n c e  to  th e  e x i s ­
te n c e  o f  tr u th -c la im s  in  an a c t i v i t y  th a t  i t  may be c h a r a c te r iz e d  as a 
tru th -gam e. So , th e  r u le s  o f  lo g i c  are o f  some im portance in  c h a r a c te r ­
iz in g  tru th -gam es.
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Formal lo g i c  d is t in g u is h e s  betw een  " v a lid ity "  and " tru th ,"  th e  
form er a p p ly in g  t o  form al d ed u c tiv e  arguments and th e  l a t t e r  t o  p r o p o s i­
t i o n s ,  th e  e lem en ts  o f  l o g i c a l  argum ents. Thus, in  a v a l id  argument i f  
th e  p rem ises are tru e  th e n  th e  c o n c lu s io n  must be t r u e .  A "sound" argu ­
ment i s  a v a l id  d e d u c tiv e  argument a l l  o f  whose p rem ises are tr u e .  In ­
d u c tiv e  argum ents, on th e  o th er  hand, are u s u a lly  term ed " correct"  or 
" in c o r r e c t ,"  ra th er  th an  " va lid "  or " in v a lid ."
Formal l o g i c  i s  a c c o r d in g ly  d e f in e d  as th e  stud y  o f th e  r u le s  o f  
" v a lid ity "  and " co rrec tn ess"  when b oth  d ed u ctiv e  and in d u c t iv e  branches 
are in c lu d e d . T ruth , in  th e  term s o f t h i s  d e f i n i t i o n ,  i s  another m atter  
w ith  w hich lo g i c  does n o t concern  i t s e l f .
In th e p r e se n t  a n a ly s is  o f  th e  con cep t o f  t r u th ,  how ever, we are  
n ot in v e s t ig a t in g  th e c o n d it io n s  under w hich s ta tem en ts  are in  f a c t  t r u e ,  
b u t , r a th e r , th e  use o f  t r u th -c la im s . S ta tem en ts o f  lo g i c  d e sc r ib e  th e  
in t e r r e la t io n s h ip s  o f  s ta tem en ts  in s o fa r  as th ey  are  t r u e .  S ta tem en ts  
are tr e a te d  in  l o g i c  as p o s tu la te s :  t h e ir  im p lic a t io n s ,  when th ey  are
assumed to  be tr u e ,  a re  s tu d ie d .
L ogic may be in te r p r e te d  as i s o la t i n g  th e  tr u th -c la im s  in  tr u th -  
games and a n a ly z in g  them ap art from th e  o th er e lem en ts  o f  tru th -g a m es. 
S in ce  tr u th -c la im s  are th e  d e f in in g  e lem en ts  o f  tru th -g a m es, l o g i c a l  
r u le s  e x p ress  th e  r u le s  o f  th e  con cep t o f  t r u th . R u les o f  lo g i c  are  f o r ­
m a lized  sta tem en ts  o f  th e  meaning o f th e  con cep t o f t r u th , r e s u l t in g  from  
a n a ly s is  o f  t r u th -c la im s .
The a c t i v i t y  o f  lo g i c  i s  in  t h i s  sen se  an a n a ly s is  o f  th e  con cep t 
o f  tr u th ,  and i t s  laws are d e s c r ip t iv e  o f  th e  meaning o f  t h i s  co n cep t.
So, lo g i c  i s  th e  a c t i v i t y  o f  d is c o v e r in g  th e  meaning o f  t r u th .  I t  i s  th e
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d isc o v e r y  o f  th e  im p lic a t io n s  o f  th e  use o f  th e  con cep t o f  t r u th . I f  one 
■wishes t o  say -what th e  con cep t o f  tr u th  i s ,  we can say  th a t  i t  i s  th e  
c h a r a c t e r i s t ic  p r o c e s se s  o f  tru th -g a m es. I f  one w ish es  t o  " d e fin e  th e  
meaning" o f  t r u th ,  we can p o in t  to  th e  d is c o v e r ie s  o f  lo g i c  as such  a 
d e f i n i t i o n ,  a lth o u g h  an im p e r fe c t , in com p lete  one.
The u se s  o f  tr u th -c la im s  d i s c lo s e  th e  meaning o f  tr u th ,  b u t th ey  
have m eaning, im p lic a t io n s ,  beyond t h e ir  p r e se n t a c tu a l u s e .  I t  may be 
assumed th a t  th e  con cep t o f  tr u th  has a s p e c ts  th a t  have n o t y e t  been  d i s ­
cov ered . I t  i s  th e  job o f  lo g i c  t o  e x p lo r e  th e se  a s p e c ts  o f  th e  con cep t  
o f tr u th .
Language-games and Truth-gam es 
"Rules o f  meaning" d e sc r ib e  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  language by d e s c r ib in g  
th e  in t e r r e la t io n s  o f  m e a n in g -e n t i t ie s , s e n te n c e s .  "Rules o f  ( th e  con ­
cep t o f )  t r u th ,"  on th e o th er hand, may come to  be con fu sed  w ith  th e se  
becau se what th e y  d e sc r ib e  are a ls o  in t e r r e la t io n s  o f  ( c e t t a i n )  m eaning- 
e n t i t i e s .  A lth ou gh  th e  e n t i t i e s  r e le v a n t  to  tr u th  are a l s o  m eaning-en-  
t i t i e s ,  th e  r u le s  o f  tr u th  are n ot r u le s  o f  m eaning. I t  i s  th e  r u le s  
th a t  d i f f e r  and n o t th e  e n t i t i e s  w hich th ey  govern .
How t h i s  i s  p o s s ib le  w i l l  be e v id e n t  i f  i t  i s  remembered how 
ev en ts  are  in te r p r e ta b le  a s  a c t io n s :  in  r e s p e c t  to  a c t i v i t i e s  in  w hich
th ey  fu n c t io n .  What th e  e n t i t i t e s  o f  meaning a r e , v i z . ,  s e n te n c e s - -a r e  
such in  r e s p e c t  t o  th e  a p p ro p r ia te  a c t i v i t i e s ,  language-gam es. In  r e ­
sp e c t  t o  o th er  m a tters  th e s e  same e n t i t i e s  a r e , e . g . ,  u t te r a n c e s , sound 
d is tu r b a n c e s  in  th e  atm osphere, gram m atical form s, e t c .  In  th e  ca se  o f  
t r u t h - e n t i t i e s , " tr u th -c la im s ,"  th e  r u le s  o f  th e  con cep t o f  tr u th  d e ­
s c r ib e  r e la t io n s h ip s  betw een m e a n in g -e n t it ie s  in  th e  c a p a c ity  o f  tr u th
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e n t i t i e s .  As m eanings, th e se  sen ten ces  are  in stru m en ts o f a ty p e  o f  
b a s ic  a c t i v i t y ,  tru th -gam es. As such , th ey  are  in te r p r e ta b le  as tr u th -  
cla im s in  r e la t io n  to  th e se  a c t i v i t i e s .
S in ce  th e  r u le s  o f  tr u th  are  d i f f e r e n t  from th e  r u le s  o f  meaning 
and govern se n te n c e s  in s o fa r  as th ey  are p a r ts  o f  tru th -g a m es, i t  would 
seem th a t  "p i s  true"  must d i f f e r  from "p" in  m eaning. A ccord ing to  th e  
in te r p r e ta t io n  o f  t h i s  s tu d y , however, "p" in  ”p i s  t r u e ” i s  an " a sse r ­
t io n ,"  and does n o t stand  fo r  a l l  s ta tem en t-fo rm s. "p i s  true"  s ig n a ls  
th a t  a truth-gam e i s  go in g  on and th a t  th e  a s s e r t io n  "p" forms a p art o f  
i t  as a tr u th -c la im . I f  "p" i s  used in  a way th a t  im p lie s  th a t  "p i s  
t r u e ,” th en  ”p ” i s  e q u iv a le n t  to  "p i s  tr u e ."  To u se  a sen ten ce  as tru e  
in v o lv e s  i t  in  th e same r e la t io n s h ip s  to  o ther se n te n c e s  in  th e  argument 
as i t  would have i f  i t  were s ta te d  e x p l i c i t l y  to  be t r u e ,  "p” co n sid ered  
o u ts id e  any c o n te x t ,  w ith o u t b e in g  sa id  to  be tru e or used  as t r u e ,  i s  
n ot an a s s e r t io n  a t  a l l ,  i . e . ,  th e  q u e s tio n  o f  tr u th  i s  ir r e le v a n t .
”p" here i s  e i th e r  some o th er s o r t  o f  s ta tem en t—e . g . ,  f i c t i v e ,  
i r o n ic ,  e t c . —or a mere sta tem en t-form . In  e i th e r  c a s e ,  th e  q u e s tio n  o f  
tr u th  would be ir r e le v a n t .  N e v e r th e le s s , to  say a sta tem en t i s  tr u e  i s  
t o  say th a t  i t  i s  a p a r t ic u la r  so r t  o f  s ta tem en t—an a s s e r t io n  or t r u th -  
c la im . Thus, "p i s  true"  says th a t  ”p” has a c e r ta in  s o r t  o f  jo b , one 
governed by t r u t h - r u le s ,  and form ing p a rt o f  an a c t i v i t y  w ith in  th e t o t a l  
m e a n in g -a c t iv ity . On th e  o th er hand, an a s s e r t io n  ”p ” m erely shows or 
im p lie s  t h i s .  So th e meaning o f "p i s  true"  does d i f f e r  from an a s s e r ­
t io n  "p" in  t h i s  s e n se .
The p r e d ic a te  " is  tru e"  does n o t ,  however, a t t r ib u t e  any m eaning- 
r u le s  or m e a n in g -r e la tio n s  t o  "p” in  a d d it io n  to  th o se  govern ing  "p” as
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an a s s e r t io n .  In  other w ords, t h i s  d if f e r e n c e  in  meaning i s  not a d i f ­
feren ce  about meaning; what "p i s  tru e"  p r e d ic a te s  o f  "p" i s  n ot a type  
o f m ean in g-ru les b u t, r a th e r , t r u t h - r u le s .  Thus, a lth ou gh  th e meaning 
o f "p i s  true"  d i f f e r s  from th a t  o f  "p," " is  true"  does n o t mean a type  
of meaning.
As was noted  a t  th e  o u tse t  o f  t h i s  ch a p ter , th ere  are n o n - l in ­
g u i s t i c  th in g s  o f  which "true" i s  p r e d ic a t e d - - b e l ie f s ,  p ic t u r e s ,  m easure­
m ents, e t c .  These c a se s  are in te r p r e ta b le  in  term s o f  th e  a n a ly s is  o f  
th e concept o f  tr u th  th a t  has been o u t l in e d . B e l i e f s  are  tr u th -c la im s  
th a t are  r e la te d  to  a c t i v i t i e s  in  which one en g a g es . T heir r e la t io n s h ip s  
may be to  ( n o n - l in g u is t ic )  a c t io n s  perform ed as w e ll  as to  sta tem en ts  
made, and th e se  a c t i v i t i e s  are  in te r p r e ta b le  as tru th -g a m es. B e l i e f s  
and other n o n - l in g u is t ic  e n t i t i e s  o f  w hich tr u th  i s  p red ic a te d  are  t r u th -  
cla im s in  the same sen se  in  w hich a s s e r t io n s  may b e - - in  t h e ir  l o g i c a l  r e ­
la t io n s h ip s  to  o ther e lem en ts in  an a c t i v i t y .  S in ce  truth-gam es are  
b a s ic  a c t i v i t i e s  which need n ot alw ays be conducted by means of lan gu age-  
games, t h e ir  d e f in in g  e lem en ts may be a c t io n s  o f  any type as lon g  as 
they are "used as tru e"  in  th e  sen se  d e f in e d .
T his view  o f tr u th  may now be summarized: "Truth i s  a concept
m a n ifested  in  th e  use o f  a c t io n s  in  what I  c a l l  " tru th -gam es."  These a c ­
t i v i t i e s  are d i s t i n c t  from language-gam es s in c e  th ey  are one type o f  
" basic a c t i v i t y ,"  which has been d e fin ed  as an a c t i v i t y  th a t  gen era tes  
and u ses  m eaning. M e a n in g -a c t iv it ie s  or language-gam es are products o f  
b a s ic  a c t i v i t i e s ,  one typ e o f  which i s  tru th -g a m es. The concept o f  a
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sta tem en t s a id  to  be tru e  i s  th a t  o f  an a s s e r t io n  used  as a " tru th -cla im "  
in  a tru th -gam e. "Using a sen ten ce  as true"  or "making a tru th -c la im "  i s  
d e fin e d  as u s in g  a sen ten ce  as an elem ent in  an a c t i v i t y  in  w hich i t  has 
w ith  a t  l e a s t  one o th er elem ent o f  the a c t i v i t y  a m u tually  dependent r e ­
l a t i o n ,  i . e . ,  i f  one i s  tr u e  th e  other i s  a ls o  t r u e ,  or i f  f a l s e ,  th e  
other f a l s e .  " A ctiv ity "  in  t h i s  d e f in i t i o n ,  i . e . ,  a "truth-gam e,"  i s  to  
be understood , however, t o  in c lu d e  l o g i c a l l y  in v a lid  s tr u c tu r e s  o f  s t a t e ­
ments which are n e v e r th e le s s  truth-gam es because m e a n in g -r e la tio n sh ip s  
betw een th e ir  e lem en ts d is c lo s e  th a t  c e r ta in  elem en ts are b e in g  used as 
m u tu ally  dependent. So, in  a g iv en  language-gam e th a t  e x p r e sse s  a tr u th -  
game th e m e a n in g -r e la t io n sh ip s  r e v e a l  which sta tem en ts  are "used as 
t r u e ,"  i . e . ,  w hich s ta tem en ts  are b e in g  used  as m utually  dependent. The 
con cep t o f  tr u th  (a s  m an ifested  p a r t ic u la r ly  by th e  use o f  sta tem en ts  
sa id  to  be tr u e )  i s  th e  concept o f  th e  in te r r e la t io n s h ip s  o f  tr u th -c la im s  
in  tru th -gam es. I t  i s  thus th e con cep t o f  a type o f  job  perform ed in  one 
typ e o f  b a s ic  a c t i v i t y .
Whether th e  sta tem en ts  we u se  as tr u e  and a s s e r t  to  be so  a re  or 
are n o t , th e  concept o f  tr u th  rem ains th e same. The sta tem en ts  we use as  
t r u e ,  th e  a c t i v i t i e s  we engage in ,  change c o n t in u a lly .  We u se  immensely 
complex methods to  v e r i f y  s ta tem en ts  about su b -n u clear  p a r t i c l e s ,  fo r  
exam ple, and employ com p lica ted  m achinery to  app ly  th e s e  m ethods; b u t,  
what i s  meant by th e  con cep t o f  tr u th  does n ot change, even  though the  
tru th -gam es in  w hich i t  i s  m a n ifested  do. What changes i s  "the tr u th " - -  
o r , p ro p er ly , what i s  accep ted  as th e  tr u th . The nature o f  what i t  i s  to  
be t r u e ,  what th e  con cep t means, does not change.
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Meaning, Truth and th e  Concept o f  a P r o p o s it io n  
In t h i s  study  have been examined th e  im p lic a t io n s  o f  two v iew s:  
th a t  meaning i s  u se , and th a t  p h ilo so p h ic  problem s are con cep tu a l prob­
lem s. A view o f meaning has been developed  to  in te r p r e t  the f i r s t  o f  
th e se  t e n e t s ,  and a view  o f p h ilo so p h ic  method and th e  nature o f  concep­
t u a l  problem s to  in te r p r e t  th e  secon d . The in te r p r e ta t io n  o f  th e  f i r s t  
in v o lv e s  v iew in g  th e meaning o f  a sen ten ce  as th e  fundam ental m eaning- 
u n it ,  d i s t i n c t  and d i f f e r e n t  from w ords. This con cep t i s  an in te r p r e ta ­
t io n ,  th e r e fo r e ,  o f  one sen se  in  w hich the p h ilo so p h ic  term " p rop osition "  
has been em ployed. The in te r p r e ta t io n  o f  th e  second  t e n e t  in v o lv e s  a 
view o f con cep ts and t h e ir  r e la t io n  to  language th a t  le a d s  to  a form ula­
t io n  o f  th e  problem o f tr u th  as th a t  o f  th e  u se  o f  sen ten ces  s a id  to  be 
tr u e . T his i s  an in te r p r e ta t io n  o f  th e  second sen se  in  which th e  term  
" proposition "  has been employed.
Both sen se s  o f  " prop osition "  are u s e fu l  and , perhaps, n ecessa ry  
con cep ts fo r  p h ilo so p h ic  purposes in  d e a lin g  w ith  th e  problems o f  t h i s  
stu d y . These two se n se s  have been equated in  some treatm en ts o f  "propo­
s i t i o n s ,"  however, and t h i s  i s  not d e s ir a b le .  The two sen ses  have been  
equated because o f  c e r ta in  a sp e c ts  o f  th e  problem o f  t r u th , w hich may now 
be examined in  th e l i g h t  o f  th e  view o f tr u th  th a t  now has been o u t lin e d .
As was d isc u sse d  in  Chapter I ,  th e se  two s e n se s  may come to  be 
id e n t i f i e d  w ith  each  other b ecause o f  th e f a c t  th a t  what i s  tr u e  must 
have meaning. From t h i s  the c o n c lu s io n  m ight be drawn th a t  i t  i s  se n ­
te n c e s  th a t  have meaning and th a t  are t r u e - o r - f a l s e . In terms o f  the  
view  developed  in  t h i s  stu d y , how ever, i t  may be s a id  th a t  such an in f e r ­
ence would in v o lv e  a f a i lu r e  to  d e f in e  th e o b je c ts  o f  tr u th  and meaning
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in  term s o f th e ir  r e la t io n s  to  ap p ro p ria te  a c t i v i t i e s ,  and hence a f a i l ­
ure to  d is t in g u is h  betw een sen ten ces  as m e a n in g -e n t it ie s  and sen ten ces  as_ 
t r u t h - e n t i t i e s . I t  i s  a sen ten ce  in  one c a p a c ity  th a t  has m eaning, and 
in  another c a p a c ity  o f  w hich tr u th  i s  p r e d ic a te d .
I t  has a ls o  been a fe a tu r e  o f  some p r e p o s it io n a l  t h e o r ie s  to  
t r e a t  th e  n o tio n  o f  a p r o p o s it io n  as in v o lv in g  a " m ean in g -freeze ,"  as  
d is c u s se d  in  Chapter I ,  s in c e  "true" has been  thought to  be an a b so lu te  
norm in  th a t  i f  a sta tem en t i s  tru e  i t  must be a b s o lu te ly  tr u e ,  or tr u e  
r e g a r d le s s  o f c o n te x t . From our p o in t  o f  v iew , t h i s  view  in v o lv e s  m isap­
p reh en sion s about both  th e  nature o f  tr u th  and o f  m eaning. S en ten ces  
co n ceived  as m ea n in g s -in -th e m se lv e s , w ith o u t r e fe r e n c e  to  a c o n te x t  in  
which th ey  mean, are m erely  p o t e n t ia l  meanings or gram m atical form s, in  
th e  view o f th e  p r e se n t s tu d y , and any a c tu a l  meaning i s  by nature con­
te x t-d e p e n d e n t. The idea o f  tr u th  as an a b so lu te  norm, from w hich th e  
idea  o f  a m ea n in g -freeze  may be g en era te d , i s  a ls o  m istak en . I t  i s  i n t i ­
m ately  connected  w ith  th e  view  o f  tr u th  as a r e la t io n  between meaning and 
" fact"  or " s ta te  o f  a f f a ir s "  in  th e  w orld . I f  tr u th  were t h i s  s o r t  o f  
r e l a t io n ,  th en  p r e c is io n  o f  meaning would be e s s e n t i a l .  I f  i t  i s  n o t ,  as  
has been argued in  t h i s  s tu d y , th en  th e  n o tio n  o f  i t  as an a b so lu te  norm 
i s  n ot to  th e p o in t ,  and th e  n o tio n  o f  a "m eaning-freeze"  becomes u n n eces­
sary  in  th e p h ilo so p h ic  in v e s t ig a t io n  o f  tr u th .
The n o tio n  o f  tr u th  as a norm o f  norms ( i . e . ,  a norm a t  the top  
o f a h iera rch y  o f norms; an u lt im a te  norm) has been in stru m en ts 1 in  d i s ­
suad ing some p h ilo so p h ers  from i t s  exam ination  as s u c h - - e .g . ,  A u s tin ,  
Strawson and P o n tiu s  P i l a t e .  I f  "true" and "truth" are in te r p r e te d  as  
r e fe r r in g  to  some one, u n i f ie d ,  u lt im a te  norm in  term s o f  w hich e v e r y ­
th in g  must be judged , i t  would seem to  be dubious both  th a t  such a norm
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cou ld  e x i s t  and th a t  an yth in g  could  ever he shown to  meet i t .  Wo u l t i ­
mate norm i s  im p lied  by th e  ord inary  meaning o f " tru e ,"  however, and 
th e r e  are many truth-gam es in  which norms are n ot in v o lv e d . There are  
many tru th -gam es th a t  do in v o lv e , however, s e t t in g  up , t e s t in g  and ap ­
p ly in g  norms. When a sen ten ce  a s s e r t in g  "p i s  tru e"  occurs in  a lan gu age-  
game i t  s ig n a ls  th a t  a truth-gam e i s  b e in g  ca rr ied  on. I f  t h i s  i s  a 
truth-gam e in  which th e  use o f  norms o f  some k ind i s  in v o lv e d , "true" in  
"p i s  true"  says th a t  p i s  in  agreem ent w ith  th e se  norms. (Whether or 
not p a c tu a l ly  does m eet th o se  norms i s  a m atter o f  f a c t  th a t  i s  n ot a 
m atter o f  the meaning o f  p . B u t, " tru e” means here th a t  th e s e  norms are  
m et. "p i s  tr u e ,"  l i k e  "p," means what i t  does r e g a r d le s s  o f  th e  tr u th  
o f p .)
Truth i s  an u lt im a te  norm on ly  in  th a t  i t  comprehends a l l  norms.
I t  i s  n ot a sep a ra te  norm above a l l  o th e r s , but i s  a p p lic a b le  to  any 
norm ative tru th -gam e, i . e . ,  one in  w hich standards o f  some s o r t  are  in ­
v o lved  .
I t  i s  som etim es s a id ,  a l s o ,  th a t  an a s s e r t io n  i s  "true on ly  in  
t h i s  c o n te x t ."  H ere, a g a in , t h i s  usage som etim es i s  taken  as im plying  
th a t  th e r e  i s  an a b so lu te  standard  o f  "truth" in  a s t r i c t e s t  s e n se . In  
order fo r  an a s s e r t io n  to  be "true in  one con text"  but not in  a l l ,  how­
e v e r , i t  need not be tru e  " a b so lu te ly ."  I t  need on ly  be th e  case  th a t  
th e r e  be some c o n te x ts  in  w hich th e sta tem en t i s  f a l s e .  T h is might be 
th e  case  b ecau se: ( l )  th e sta tem en t-form  in  t h i s  co n te x t has a meaning
d i f f e r e n t  from i t s  meaning in  other c o n te x ts ;  or (2 ) the sta tem en t in  
t h i s  c o n te x t  has a r o le  in  a truth-gam e d i f f e r e n t  from i t s  r o le s  in  o ther  
truth-gam e s .
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T his dual r e la t io n s h ip  o f tru th  to  con text i s  a sen se in  which 
th ere  i s  " r e la t iv i t y  o f truth" and the meaning o f  tr u th , i . e . ,  how the  
concept i s  u sed , im p lie s  n e ith e r  th a t  th ere  i s  nor i s  not a h ierarchy o f 
d egrees o f tru th .
The "proposition"  as th e "meaning o f a sentence"  has been d is -  
guished  from the "sign" o f th e  sen ten ce . Indeed, i t  i s  s u ita b le  to  d i s ­
t in g u is h  between " u ttera n ces ,"  spoken or w r it te n , and th e ir  meaning or 
u se . In th e  view o f t h is  stu d y , though, th e  "signs" o f se n te n c e s , " u tte r ­
an ces ,"  are mere ev en ts  th a t  are not a c t io n s  in  a c t i v i t i e s .
P r o p o s it io n a l th e o r ie s  in  which the meaning or p r o p o s it io n  c o rr e ­
la t e s  words and the world are h ig h ly  m is lea d in g , i f  meaning i s  u se . The 
stru ctu re  o f " p ro p o sitio n a l s ign s"  i s  a co n ven tion a l m atter , but i t  i s  a 
su rfa ce  m a n ife s ta tio n  o f the, in terc o n n ec tio n s  o f a c t io n s  in  language a c ­
t i v i t i e s .  T he.con ven tion a l nature o f meaning reaches deeper than the 
a r b itr a r y  a sp ec ts  o f grammatical r u le s .
Of cou rse, th ere  i s  a sen se  in  which both meaning and tru th  are 
r e la t io n s  o f  words to  th e w o r ld - - s e n te n t ia l  meanings are about som ething, 
and, th e r e fo r e , so are true se n te n c e s . The id e n t i f i c a t io n  o f meaning and 
tru th  in  th e  n o tion  o f a "proposition"  might be in te r p r e te d  as a r is in g  
from t h is  g en era l c ircum stance. Language i t s e l f ,  however, i s  an a c t iv i t y  
in  the w orld , and not m erely about i t .  The type o f  a c t iv i t y  th a t con­
s t i t u t e s  tr u th , and in  which tru e sta tem en ts are used as th e elem ents o f  
th e  a c t i v i t y ,  i s  a ls o  an a c t iv i t y  in  the w orld. Meaning i s  r e la te d  to  
"the world" through a c t i v i t i e s  (" b a sic  a c t i v i t i e s " ) ,  in c lu d in g  argument- 
a c t i v i t i e s  or truth-gam es.
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Thus, i t  m ight he sa id  th a t meaning i s  r e la te d  in  one r e sp e c t  to  
the world through tr u th , in  th a t words have r e la t io n s  to  e x t r a - l in g u is t ic  
m atters because language i s  an instrum ent o f b a s ic  a c t i v i t i e s ,  one type  
of which i s  truth-gam es. I t  i s  n o t, th en , meaning th a t  i s  the medium 
through which tru th  i s  r e la te d  to  "the w orld ,"  or what meanings are about.
I t  i s  m islead in g  in  g en era l, however, to  speak about the " r e la ­
t io n  o f words to  the w orld ,"  which in v o lv e s  b y -p assin g  a fundam ental fa c t  
about m ea n in g --its  gen era tio n  in  b a s ic  a c t i v i t i e s ,  which are them selves  
roo ted  in  the w orld. T h is , I  have su g g ested , i s  a c e n tr a l a sp ect o f  mean­
in g , and i t s  e x p lic a t io n  i s  needed in  the a n a ly s is  o f tr u th , as w e l l .
The r e la t io n s  o f "words to  the w orld” are immensely com plicated  as w e ll  
as in d ir e c t  and d ev io u s . These r e la t io n s  may be c la r i f ie d  and d e lin e a te d  
through understanding the nature o f  meaning and r e la te d  a c t i v i t i e s ,  in ­
c lu d in g  t r u t h - a c t i v i t i e s . B ut, as i s  i l lu s t r a t e d  by the th e o r ie s  d i s ­
cussed in  Chapter I ,  i t  i s  m islead in g  to  reverse  the d ir e c t io n  and approach  
meaning and tr u th  through th e se  r e la t io n s ,  in s te a d .
The n o tio n  o f a p r o p o s it io n  has a ls o  been connected w ith  a type  
o f treatm ent o f the problem o f f a l s i t y .  I t  has been argued th a t  what i s  
f a l s e  cannot be m ean in g less , a lthough what i s  tru e  must be m ea n in g fu l, and 
t h a t ,  th e r e fo r e , what i s  m eaningful must be what i s  p o s s ib ly  true or p o s­
s ib ly  f a l s e - - a  p r o p o s it io n . In the view o f t h is  study t h is  whole argu­
ment i s  based upon an i n i t i a l  c o n fu s io n --th a t  in vo lved  in  tr e a t in g  what 
i s  m eaningful as an in t r i n s i c a l ly  t r u e - o r - f a ls e  o b je c t .
" F a lse ,"  o f  cou rse, i s  p red ica ted  o f a meaning in  the same sen se  
th a t  "true" i s - - v i z . ,  as an elem ent o f  a truth-gam e. To say  th a t some­
th in g  i s  " fa lse"  im p lie s  th a t  i t  i s  m eaningfu l, th a t  i t  i s  a sen tence or
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m eaning, s in c e  " fa ls e "  may be p r e d ic a te d  on ly  o f  th e  same s o r t  o f th in g  
th a t  "true" i s .  There i s  a sen se  in  w hich a f a l s e  s ta tem en t may be s a id  
to -b e  " p o ss ib ly  t r u e " - - v i z . ,  i t s  form i s  th e  same a s  th a t  o f  a tru e  
s ta tem en t. To say an a s s e r t io n  i s  f a l s e ,  how ever, i s  to  say  th a t  i t  can ­
n o t be used in  w hatever truth-gam e i s  in v o lv e d , b ecau se  o f  (n o t  i t s  
m eaning b u t)  i t s  t r u th -v a lu e .  Wiy i t  i s  f a l s e  and th e  manner in  w hich  
t h i s  may be e s t a b l is h e d  are m a tters  o f  v e r i f i c a t i o n ;  " fa lse "  i s  n o t sy n ­
onymous w ith  " d isp roved ,"  any more than  "true" i s  w ith  "proved," The 
con cep t o f " fa ls e "  i s  o f  a sen ten ce  which i s  in  c o n f l i c t  w ith  th e r u le s  
o f some truth-gam e and th e r e fo r e  sh ou ld  n o t be used in  some truth-gam e  
( q u it e  p o s s ib ly  n ot th e same o n e ).
To say  a form o f words i s  p o s s ib ly  tr u e  or f a l s e  i s  n o t very  u s e ­
f u l ;  on ly  a se n te n c e  as a meaning may be tr u e  or f a l s e  but t h i s  i s  sim p ly  
b ecau se  m eanings are  th e  means by w hich tru th -gam es are conducted . What 
i s  " p o s s ib ly  tru e  or f a ls e "  i s  c o -e x te n s iv e  w ith , but n ot e q u iv a le n t  t o ,  
" a s s e r t io n s ,"  a ty p e  o f  m eaning.
In Chapter I ,  i t  was argued th a t  tr u th  must be independent o f  
m eaning, in  th a t  i t  cannot c o n s is t  in  m ea n in g -con ven tion s; and, th a t  
meaning must be independent o f  t r u th ,  in  th a t  i t  i s  som etim es cap ab le  o f  
tr u th  but need n ot be e i th e r  a c t u a l ly  or even  p o t e n t ia l ly  t r u e .  In  th e  
view  d evelop ed  in  t h i s  s tu d y , "true" i s  p r e d ic a te d  o f  m eanings th a t  a re  
used  as tr u th -c la im s  and i t s  r u le s  are th e r e fo r e  d i f f e r e n t  from m eaning- 
c o n v e n tio n s . The r u le s  o f  t r u th  and th e  r u le s  o f  meaning have to  do w ith  
th e  same e v e n ts  or phenomena, but in  d i f f e r e n t  c a p a c i t i e s ,  a s  a c t io n s  
d e f in e d  in  r e l a t io n  t o  d i f f e r e n t  a c t i v i t i e s .
Thus, th e  con cep t o f  a p r o p o s it io n ,  w hich has f i l l e d  an ambiguous
117
p h ilo s o p h ic  r o l e ,  a s u n it  o f  meaning and a s  th a t  o f  w hich "true" i s  p red ­
ic a t e d ,  i s  a m is le a d in g  con cep t s in c e  th e s e  two s e n se s  r e f e r  to  q u ite  
d i s t i n c t  m a tte r s . A lthough  each  sen se  has a r o le  in  th e  e x p la n a tio n  o f  
th e  con cep t o f  t r u th ,  com bining them ob scu res th e  n atu re o f  t r u th ,  as  
w e l l  a s o f  m eaning.
Truth and F u n ctio n  
I f  we lo o k  now a t  th e  d eb ate  betw een  A u st in  and Straw son d i s ­
cu ssed  in  Chapter I ,  t h e ir  v iew s may be in te r p r e te d  in  term s o f  th e  view  
d ev e lo p ed  in  t h i s  stu d y .
A u s t in 's  m o d ified  correspondence th eo ry  o f f e r s  a d e s c r ip t io n  o f  
tr u th  a s  a typ e o f  correspondence betw een " statem ents"  and " fa c t s ."  T h is  
co rresp on d en ce , he co n ten d s, i s  e f f e c t e d  by means o f  a c o r r e la t io n  b e ­
tw een two ty p es  o f  meaning r e l a t io n s ,  d e s c r ip t iv e  and d em on stra tiv e  con ­
v e n t io n s .  T his trea tm en t o f  tr u th  d i f f e r s  from a p r o p o s it io n a l  c o r r e s ­
pondence th eory  l i k e  th a t  o f  the T ra c ta tu s  in  v ie w in g  th e  r e le v a n t  mean­
in g  r e la t io n s  as co n v en tio n s  th a t  have no co n n ec tio n  w ith  any s o r t  o f  
n e c e ssa r y  r u l e s - - i n  p a r t ic u la r ,  l o g i c a l  r u le s .  A u s t in 's  view  i s  n e v e r ­
t h e le s s  o f  a correspondence typ e th a t  in t e r p r e t s  th e s e  co n v en tio n s  as  
c o r r e la t in g  words and th e  w orld . Any correspondence typ e o f  view  i n ­
v o lv e s  some view  o f  th e  meaning s id e  o f  th e  correspon d en ce in  w hich i t  
may be c o r r e la te d  in  some way w ith  what i t  i s  ab ou t. Such v iew s o f  mean­
in g  c o n f l i c t  w ith  th e  view  o f meaning as u se  p resen ted  in  t h i s  stu d y .
The sta tem en t s id e  o f  A u s t in 's  correspondence i s  s im ila r  t o  th e  
p r o p o s i t io n a l - s ig n  s id e  o f  th e  T ra cta tu s  co rresp on d en ce , e x ce p t th a t  i t  
c o n s is t s  in  th e  words a s  an " h is to r ic  u tte r a n c e ,"  an u tte r a n c e  as a tem ­
p o r a l o ccu rr en ce , ra th e r  than as s ig n s .  An " utterance"  in  t h i s  sen se
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A u stin  c o n s id e r s  t o  tie th e  "use" o f  a s e n te n c e , and to  be what i s  tru e  
or f a l s e .  A " sta tem en t,"  accord in g  to  A u s t in , i s  a "use" o f  a s e n te n c e ,  
i . e . ,  i t  i s  made by means o f  a se n te n c e , and th e  making o f  i t  i s  an " h is ­
t o r i c ” (tem p o ra l) e v e n t .
In  t h i s  trea tm en t, th e  sta tem en t i s  s im ila r  t o  th e  p r o p o s it io n ,  
com bining what i s  (p o s s ib ly )  tru e  and what has a (ty p e  o f )  m eaning, b u t  
th e  words as a sen ten ce  are  c o r r e la te d  w ith  ty p es  o f  s i t u a t io n s  by d e ­
s c r ip t i v e  c o n v e n tio n s , w h ile  the words as a sta tem en t are  c o r r e la te d  w ith  
a c tu a l s i t u a t io n s  by d em on strative  c o n v e n tio n s . These c o r r e la t io n s  a r e ,  
a s Straw son p u ts  i t ,  th e  c o n d it io n s  o f  " f a c t - s t a t in g  d is c o u r s e ."  In th e  
view  o f  th e  p r e se n t  s tu d y , an u tte r a n c e  in  t h i s  sen se  cannot c o n s t i t u t e  
a u se . S tra w so n 's  c r i t ic i s m  o f t h i s  i s  s im ila r :  "'My s ta tem en t' may be
e i th e r  what I  say  or my sa y in g  i t .  My sa y in g  som ething i s  c e r t a in ly  an 
e p is o d e . What I  say  i s  n o t . I t  i s  th e  l a t t e r ,  n o t th e  form er, we d e c la r e  
to  be t r u e .
On th e  o th er  s id e  o f  the correspon d en ce, th a t  o f  "the world" as  
opposed t o  "words," A u s t in  p u ts a " fa c t ,"  w hich i s  synonymous fo r  him 
w ith  " s ta te  o f  a f f a ir s "  or " c ircu m stan ces."  T his i s  ra th e r  e c c e n tr ic  
u sa g e , s in c e  in  ord in ary  usage a " fact"  i s  som ething th a t  i s  t r u e ,  w h ile  
a " s ta te  o f  a f f a ir s "  i s  an e x is t e n t  s i t u a t i o n . To use th e se  term s synon­
ym ously i s  t o  con fu se  two q u ite  d i f f e r e n t  ty p e s  o f  th in g s --w h a t  in  p h i lo ­
so p h ic  term s are som etim es d is t in g u is h e d  as "truth" and " r e a l i t y ."  A 
" s ta te  o f  a f f a i r s ,"  a p a r t o f  " r e a l i t y ,"  j u s t  i s ,  so  to  sp eak , b u t a 
" fact"  i s  a tr u e  s ta tem en t.
1
Straw son , op. c i t . , pp. 1 2 9 -3 0 .
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Straw son, in  c r i t ic i s m  o f t h i s  a sp e c t  o f A u s t in 's  v iew , con tends  
th a t  "a s i t u a t io n  or s t a t e  o f  a f f a i r s  i s ,  ro u g h ly , a s e t  o f  f a c t s  n o t a 
s e t  o f  th in g s ,"  n e ith e r  f a c t s  nor s t a t e s  o f  a f f a i r s  b e in g  in  th e w orld . 
Strawson a rg u es , anyway, th a t  what a sta tem en t i s  "about" (w hich i s  some­
th in g  in  th e  w orld ) cannot be what makes i t  t r u e .  S tra w so n 's  view o f  the  
meaning o f " fa c ts"  and " s ta te s  o f  a f f a ir s "  does n ot a g ree  w ith  th a t  ad ­
vocated  in  th e  l a s t  paragraph, b u t, r e g a r d le s s  o f  th e  c o r r e c tn e ss  o f  
t h i s ,  S traw son 's  a s s o c ia te d  c r i t ic i s m  th a t  what a sta tem en t i s  about can­
not be what makes i t  tru e  in v o lv e s  a cu riou s in te r p r e ta t io n  o f  th e  words 
and w orld  d ichotom y. Straw son se e s  th e  w orld as composed o f  o b je c ts  and 
e v e n ts  e x c lu s iv e ly ,  w h ile  f a c t s ,  s i t u a t io n s ,  e t c . ,  are  e v id e n t ly  m atters  
o f meaning.
What meanings are about are  th e se  o b je c ts  and e v e n ts  in  th e  
w orld , w h ile  tr u th , f a c t s ,  o r , a p p a ren tly , an yth in g  about o b je c ts  and 
e v e n ts , are m atters o f  m eaning. T his view i s  an e c c e n tr ic  one and o v e r ­
s im p l i f i e s  th e  r e la t io n s  betw een language and what i t  i s  ab ou t. To re-- 
duce what language i s  about to  " o b je c ts  and e v e n ts ,"  e x c lu s iv e  o f  any r e ­
la t io n s h ip s  among them , i s  to o  la n g u a g e -cen ter ed , as w e l l  as b e in g  in a d ­
equate as a d e s c r ip t io n  o f  what e x i s t s  in  th e  w orld . On t h i s  s o r t  o f  
view o f  th e  r e la t io n s h ip s  betw een language and what i t  i s  ab ou t, an a n a l­
y s i s  o f  tr u th  i s  l im ite d  to  i n t r a - l in g u i s t i c  r e la t io n s h ip s  and, th e r e fo r e ,  
i s  l i k e l y  to  f in d  tr u th  in  some so r t  o f  m e a n in g -r u le s .
To re tu rn  to  A u stin  now, h is  trea tm en t o f  " fa c ts"  as synonymous 
w ith  " s ta te s  o f  a f f a ir s "  i s  m is le a d in g  and, more im p ortan t, i t  su g g e sts  
an am bigu ity  a t  th e  b a s is  o f  h is  a n a ly s is  o f th e  problem  o f  tr u th . That 
i s ,  by id e n t i f y in g  "what makes a sta tem en t true"  ( " f a c t s ” ) w ith  "what i t
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i s  about" (" s t a t e s  o f  a f f a i r s " ) ,  he i s  le d  to  a correspondence ty p e  o f  
th e o r y . He says " fa c t  th a t"  i s  a "compendious way o f  sp eak in g  about a 
s i t u a t io n  in v o lv in g  both  words and w orld ."  The phrase i s  " designed  fo r  
use in  s i t u a t io n s  where th e  d i s t i n c t i o n  betw een a tr u e  sta tem en t and th e  
s t a t e  o f a f f a i r s  about w hich i t  i s  a tr u th  i s  n eg le c ted "  (p . 1 1 8 ) . B u t, 
perhaps i f  f a c t s  and s t a t e s  o f  a f f a i r s —tr u e  sta tem en ts  and s i t u a t io n s  in  
th e  w orld —were d is t in g u is h e d  from each  o th er  a t  th e  o u t s e t ,  th en  tr u th  
need n ot be sought in  a r e l a t io n  betw een  th e s e  two ty p e s  o f  t h in g s ,  tru e  
s ta tem en ts  and s i t u a t io n s  in  th e  w orld .
A u st in  d e f in e s  th e  n a tu re  o f  th e  problem  o f  tr u th  a t  th e  b e g in ­
n in g  o f  h is  e s sa y  as the "use o f  ' i s  t r u e ." '  What he understands by 
"use" i s  p a r t ly  e x p l i c i t  in  h is  d e f in i t i o n  o f  th e u se  o f  a s e n te n c e  as  
i t s  u t te r a n c e , and p a r t ly  im p l i c i t  in  h is  a n a ly s i s .  H is in t e r p r e ta t io n  
o f  th e  u se  o f  a se n te n c e  a s  i t s  tem poral u tte r a n c e  i s  b e s id e  th e  p o in t ,  
as has a lr ea d y  been  d is c u s s e d , b u t what i s  more im portant here i s  th a t  
"use" i s  in  t h i s  way d i f f e r e n t ia t e d  from "m eaning." I t  i s  th e  use o f  a 
sen ten ce  (a s  a " sta tem en t" ) ra th er  than i t s  m eaning, th a t  i s  tr u e  or 
f a l s e .  To d i f f e r e n t i a t e  th e  meaning o f s e n te n c e s  from t h e ir  "use" ( in  
any r e le v a n t  sen se  o f th e  word, one o f  w hich i s  n o t as " u tter a n c e ,"  fo r  
th e  rea so n s d is c u s se d  in  Chapter I I I )  in  t h i s  way i s  m ista k en , in  th e  
view  o f t h i s  stu d y .
I m p l ic i t  in  A is t in 's  a n a ly s is  i s  a l s o ,  I b e l i e v e ,  a view  o f  th e  
use o f  words th a t  i s  to o  c lo s e  t o  th a t  o f  t r a d i t i o n a l  r u le s  o f  grammar — 
what was r e fe r r e d  t o  as " su rfa ce  grammar" in  Chapter I I I .  In any c a s e ,  
A u s t in 's  trea tm en t o f  tr u th  as a problem  o f  th e  u s e ' o f  s e n te n c e s  i s  in  
l i n e  w ith  th e  v iew s o f  th e  p r e s e n t  s tu d y , even though h is  rea so n s  fo r
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thus t r e a t in g  i t  are b e s id e  th e  p o in t .  His view  o f  th e  use o f  words and 
th e  r e la t io n  o f  t h i s  t o  the u se  o f  s e n te n c e s , how ever, i s  in  c o n tr a s t  
w ith  th e  in t e r p r e ta t io n  o f meaning as use o f  th e  p r e se n t stu d y .
S traw son 's trea tm en t o f  th e  problem o f  t r u th , on th e  other hand, 
appears q u ite  d i f f e r e n t  from A u s t in ' s ,  approached from th e  v iew p o in t o f  
t h i s  stu d y . To b eg in  w ith , h i s  fo rm u la tio n  o f  th e  problem , "the use o f  
' i s  t r u e ," '  i s  on ly  s u p e r f ic i a l ly  th e same as A u s t in 's .  What Strawson  
understands by th e use o f  "true" seems to  be l im ite d  to  ra th er  su per­
f i c i a l  a s p e c ts  o f  i t s  u s e , as was d isc u sse d  in  Chapter I .  T h is under­
sta n d in g  o f "use" in c lu d e s  th e  view th a t  th e  use o f  " is  true"  does n ot  
in c lu d e  ta lk in g  about a n y th in g . T his i s  a c e n tr a l p o in t  in  S traw son 's  
a n a ly s i s ,  and i s  c l o s e l y  connected  w ith  h is  h ig h ly  c ircu m scrib ed  t r e a t ­
ment o f  u se .
S traw son 's  v iew s on "about" have an im portant a p p lic a t io n  in  h is  
a n a ly s is  o f  th e  nature o f  f a c t - s t a t in g  d is c o u r s e . He contends th a t  when 
we u se " tru e ,"  " fa c t ,"  e t c . ,  we are " ta lk in g  w ith in , and not ab ou t, a 
c e r ta in  frame o f d is c o u r s e ,"  so  th e  "problem about th e u se  o f  't r u e ' i s  
to  se e  how t h i s  word f i t s  in to  th a t  frame o f d isco u rse"  (p . 1*4-2). Now, 
th e  f a c t  th a t  in  u s in g  such words we are  ta lk in g  w ith in  a c e r ta in  frame 
o f  d is c o u r s e  does not ex c lu d e  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  th a t  we are ta lk in g  about 
so m e th in g --e ith e r  som ething w ith in  th a t  frame o f d isc o u r se  or som ething  
o u ts id e  i t .  From the v iew p o in t o f  t h i s  stu d y , how "true" " f i t s  in to"  th e  
frame o f  d isc o u r se  would not exclu d e i t s  r e la t io n s h ip s  to  th in g s  "outside"  
i t - - v i z . ,  th in g s  " in  th e  w orld ,"  w hatever th ey  may b e . These are "about"- 
r e l a t io n s ,  which are n o t exclu ded  from language-gam es, and how words are  
used i s  in te r p r e te d  to o  narrow ly when i t  i s  tak en  to  ex c lu d e  them.
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The perform atory  or r e - a s s e r t iv e  th eo ry  o f t r u th  th a t  Straw son  
a d voca tes  h in g es  on th e  con cep t o f  a " l in g u is t i c  perform ance."  In th e  
view  o f  th e  p r e se n t  s tu d y , t h i s  con cep t i s  id e n t i f i e d  w ith  th a t  o f  a s e n ­
te n c e . A perform atory  word A u s tin  understands to  be a verb ( in  f i r s t  
p erso n , p r e se n t  in d ic a t iv e )  w hich a lth o u g h  seem ing to  d e sc r ib e  an " a c t iv ­
ity "  o f  th e  sp ea k er , a c t u a l ly  i s  th a t  " a c t iv i t y ."  (" A c tiv ity "  here i s  
s im ila r  to  " action "  a s  used in  t h i s  s tu d y .)  In  th e p r e se n t s tu d y , a p e r ­
formance o f  t h i s  k ind  cou ld  n o t be a word, b u t , r a th e r , a se n te n c e  made 
by means o f  i t .  Only a sen ten ce  can c o n s t i t u t e  an a c t io n ,  in  t h i s  s e n se .
In  th e  view o f  t h i s  s tu d y , any s e n te n c e , in  th e  proper c o n te x t ,  
as an e lem en t in  an ap p rop ria te  language a c t i v i t y ,  may be in te r p r e te d  as  
p r im a r ily  a perform ance o f  t h i s  k in d . T his typ e  o f  sen ten ce  i s  a p r im i­
t i v e  one, in  th e se n se  th a t  i t  f a i l s  t o  have th e complex in te r -c o n n e c t io n s  
w ith  oth er a c t io n s  in  th e  a c t i v i t y  th a t  se n te n c e s  "about" som ething h ave .
An e s s e n t i a l  p a rt o f  th e  con cep t o f  p erform atory u t te r a n c e s  (b o th  
fo r  Straw son and fo r  A u stin ; s e e  A u s t in 's  "P erform ative U ttera n ces" ^ ) i s  
th e  view  t h a t  th ey  can be n e ith e r  tru e  nor f a l s e ,  s in c e  th ey  are p e r fo r ­
mances and n o t about perform ances or an yth in g  e l s e .  One does n ot s a y , o f  
c o u r se , t h a t  a perform ance or a c t io n  i s  " tru e ."  T his seems to  be i n t e r ­
p re ted  by A u s tin  and Straw son a s  fo l lo w in g  from o r , a t  l e a s t ,  con n ected  
w ith  th e f a c t  th a t  a perform ance i s  n o t about a n y th in g . Truth, how ever, 
has n o th in g  to  do d i r e c t ly  w ith  b e in g  about a n y th in g , in  th e  p r e se n t  v ie w , 
b u t th e  n o t io n  th a t  i t  does i s  fundam ental to  many th e o r ie s  b e s id e s  th e s e  
o f A u s tin  and Straw son .
J . L. A u s t in , "P erform ative U tte r a n c e s ,"  P h ilo s o p h ic a l Papers  
(O xford: C larendon P r e s s ,  1961) ,  pp. 22 0 -2 3 9 .
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To view a sen ten ce as b e in g  a performance or an a c t io n  o f one 
kind or another does n ot imply th a t th e r e fo r e  i t  cannot be t r u e - o r - f a l s e .  
We p red ic a te  "true" and " fa lse"  o f  m eaning, but we do not say , e i t h e r ,  
"This meaning i s  tr u e ."  We do not say  th a t  a c t io n s  are tr u e , b u t we p red ­
ic a te  "true" o f e n t i t i e s  s ig n i f ie d  by c e r ta in  s tr u c tu r e s  o f  w ords, but 
an a lyzab le  as sym bolic a c t io n s  or meaning. I t  i s  how we use w ords, not 
what we say about them, th a t  d is c lo s e s  th e ir  meaning in  f u l l .
The e s s e n t ia l l y  s e n t e n t ia l  nature o f  perform atory u tte r a n c e s  i s  
perhaps rev e a led  in  S traw son 's su g g e stio n  th a t  "Ditto."' i s  s u b s ta n t ia l ly  
synonymous w ith  " tru e ."  " D itto !"  i s  a sen ten ce  analogous w ith  th e  se n ­
ten ce  "True!" or "That's tr u e ."  A " l in g u is t ic  perform ance,"  in  th e  p r e ­
sen t v iew , i s  a sen ten ce and, i f  t h i s  i s  th e  c a se , perhaps to  an a lyze  
"true" as a l i n g u i s t i c  performance n e c e s s a r i ly  le a d s  to  a n a lo g iz in g  i t  
w ith  a sen ten ce o f  some ty p e . H u s, S traw son 's r e j e c t io n  o f  many o f  the  
p e r t in e n t  a sp e c ts  o f th e  use o f " tru e,"  p a r t ic u la r ly  i t s  r e fe ren ce  to  
c e r ta in  s e n te n c e s , r e s u l t s  in  h is  treatm ent o f  th e  concept as a c tu a lly  
b ein g  a se n te n c e , in  th e terms o f th e p resen t stu d y .
The a n a ly se s  o f  A u stin  and Straw son, as w e l l  as th a t  o f the  
T r a c ta tu s , in v o lv e  o v e r s im p lif ie d  in te r p r e ta t io n s  o f  th e nature and mech­
anisms o f l i n g u i s t i c  meaning. The co n c lu s io n s  o f th e  p resen t study o f fe r  
ways o f understanding how such o v e r s im p lif ie d  view s may be generated  out 
o f f a c t s  about th e use o f "true" (and i t s  r e la t io n  to  meaning) through  
o v e r s im p lif ic a t io n  o f  th e  im p lic a tio n s  o f  th e se  f a c t s .
The view o f th e  concept o f  tr u th  developed  in  t h i s  study has been  
d erived  from view s o f ( l )  the nature o f  l i n g u i s t i c  meaning and ( 2 ) the
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nature o f con cep tu a l problem s. Meaning has been view ed as th e fu n c t io n ­
in g  o f language-gam es, t o o ls  o f b a s ic  human a c t i v i t i e s .  Concepts have 
been viewed as elem ents or a sp ec ts  o f  b a s ic  a c t i v i t i e s  and th e r e fo r e  e x ­
h ib ite d  in  language-gam es. W ithin th e  co n tex t o f th e s e  v ie w s, tr u th  has 
been analyzed  as a concept th a t  fu n c tio n s  in  a typ e o f  b a s ic  a c t i v i t y  in  
which th e d e f in in g  elem en ts are lo g i c a l ly  r e la t e d .
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